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THE DEVELOPING LAW ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HANDICAPPED: AN 
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR 
ISSUES 
Jana H. Guyt 
This Article examines state and federal law dealing with the 
obligation of employers to provide employment opportunities 
to handicapped individuals. The author surveys all pertinent 
statutes and implementing regulations and explores possible 
constitutional arguments available in handicap discrimina-
tion cases, analyzing the rights and remedies available to 
handicapped employees, the obligations of and defenses 
available to employers, and the issues expected to dominate 
litigation. The author concludes that the regulations 
promulgated by administrative agencies, pursuant to legisla-
tive mandate, impose onerous standards for compliance and 
may exceed the bounds of statutory authority in some 
respects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
America's handicapped l citizens assert that for 200 years they 
have been relegated unnecessarily to a position of virtual depend-
ence upon a society blind to their ability to contribute and deaf to 
their demands for a chance to prove their competence.2 During the 
last decade, however, the handicapped have taken a lesson from 
other disadvantaged segments of the population and have coalesced 
into a highly visible and vocal minority group intent on obtaining 
for its members a fair opportunity to achieve independence through 
employment.3 Approximately eleven million Americans between the 
ages of sixteen and sixty-four, or one of every eleven, are members of 
this newly-identified minority.4 Half of these handicapped Ameri-
cans are unemployed5 and their integration into an already 
underemployed work force poses a significant problem. This new 
minority group is highly sensitized to its rights - in part because of 
the massive publicity given to its cause - and its advocacy has 
wrought fundamental changes in public, legislative, and judicial 
attitudes towards the right of the handicapped to an equal 
opportunity for employment. The result has been the enactment of 
new, and the revitalization of old, laws to establish rights and 
remedies for handicapped employees and job applicants, and 
correlative liabilities for employers. 
At the federal level, Congress has prohibited discrimination 
against the handicapped in programs receiving federal financial 
1. The term "handicapped" is used herein both as an adjective, as in "handicapped 
citizens," and as a noun, as in "the handicapped." Discrimination on the basis of 
a handicap sometimes will be referred to herein as "handicap discrimination" 
and "handicapped status discrimination." 
2. See, e.g., F. KOESTLER, THE UNSEEN MINORITY: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BLINDNESS 
IN AMERICA (1976); KrIegel, Uncle Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the 
Cripple as Negro, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 412, 414(1969); Note, Equal Employment and 
the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 457, 457-58 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Employment and the DisableclJ; Note, Abroad in the Land: 
Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 
1501, 1501-02 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Abroad in the LanclJ. 
3. Despite the indignities that may have been visited upon the physically and 
mentally disabled, federal and state governments periodically have expended 
vast resources to provide better and more humane institutionalization, rehabili-
tation, and training programs for many handicapped citizens. For a lengthy 
discussion of the efforts that have' been made to improve the lot of the 
handicapped, see Lenihan, Disabled Americans: A History, 27 PERFORMANCE 1 
(November-December,01976 and January, 1977) (available from the President's 
Commission on Employment of the Handicapped, Washington, D.C., 20210). 
Many of the °nihabilitation programs were engendered by the perceived need to 
ready the handicapped for employment opportunities. See Achtenburg, Law and 
the Physically Disabled: An Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 S.W.L.J. 
847, 878 (1976). 
4. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, ONE IN ELEVEN -
HANDICAPPED ADULTS IN AMERICA: A SURVEY BASED ON 1970 U. S. CENSUS 
DATA 2 (1977). 
5. Id. at 8-9. 
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assistance.6 In addition, Congress has mandated that government 
contractors take affirmative action to assure equal employment 
opportunities for the handicapped.7 Moreover, some courts recently 
have looked to federal civil rights statutes and constitutional 
guarantees as a basis for invalidating employment practices 
discriminatory to the handicapped.8 Finally, federal tax laws now 
contain incentives for employers who hire and accommodate the 
needs of the handicapped.9 State legislators also have responded to 
the advocacy of this newly-identified minority. While legal recogni-
tion of the employment rights of disabled persons is still limited in 
some states to mere public policy statements, such as those set forth 
in "White Cane Laws,"l0 a majority of the states have included the 
handicapped among those minority groups accorded protection 
under fair employment practice statutes.ll 
Although still very much in its infancy, the body of law on equal 
employment opportunity for the handicapped has matured suffi-
ciently to allow an overview of the legal developments and an 
analysis of the emerging major issues. While this article primarily 
focuses on the legal and practical effect of the law on Maryland 
employers and employees, the discussion and analysis is pertinent to 
employment in other states, since a significant portion of the law 
derives from federal statutes and constitutional considerations. 
Moreover, many of the state statutes regarding employment of the 
handicapped are similar, and the courts and administrative agencies 
are arriving at common answers to the major issues - the problems 
associated with identifying the handicapped, assessing their job 
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) and discussion at notes 43-70 and 
accompanying text infra. 
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975) and discussion at notes 18-35 and 
accompanying text infra. 
8. See notes 83-131 and accompanying text infra. 
9. Although the new tax laws are not a principal focus of this article, the 
practitioner should note that § 2122 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, LR.C. § 190, 
permits a taxpayer to deduct up to $25,000 of any amount paid or incurred by 
him in any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1976, and before January 
1, 1980, for the removal of certain architectural and transportation barriers in 
order to make facilities or public transportation vehicles owned or leased by the 
taxpayer for use in connection with its trade or business more accessible to, or 
usable by, handicapped or elderly individuals. The Internal Revenue Service has 
promulgated temporary income tax regulations to implement § 2122. See Treas. 
Reg. §§ 7.190-1 to .190-3. 
In addition, § 51 of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, LR.C. 
§ 51, provides for a tax credit to businesses that hire as new employt!es 
individuals who have a physical or mental disability that constitutes or results 
in a substantial handicap to employment, and who have been referred to the 
employer upon completion of, or while receiving, federally funded rehabilitative 
services. 
10. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1951-1955 (West Supp. 1977). See discussion at 
notes 143-146 and accompanying text infra. 
11. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a)(I) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See discussion at 
notes 137-142 and accompanying text infra. 
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qualifications, and ascertaining the validity, nature, and extent of 
the duty to "accommodate" the handicapped. 
Before the legislative and judicial developments in this area are 
analyzed in detail, some unique aspects of the problems involved in 
providing equal employment opportunities for the handicapped 
should be recognized. The handicapped comprise a novel class of 
potential employment discrimination victims. Many handicaps are 
not immediately obvious, so that it may be difficult for an employer 
to ascertain whether an individual is a member of the protected 
class. Moreover, some problems that are being recognized as 
handicaps, such as drug addiction,12 are, at least to some degree, 
volitional in nature. 13 The minority status of handicapped class 
members therefore does not always depend upon an immutable and 
inherent characteristic that is in no way attributable to the fault or 
lack of self-control of the victim, as has been the case with other 
protected minority classes.14 At the same time, the characteristic 
that renders an individual a member of the protected class - his 
health - bears a much more intrinsic relation to ability to perform 
work than does one's race, sex, religion, national origin, or age.15 
The factors that distinguish this newly-identified minority from 
other disadvantaged groups affect significantly the impact that 
equal employment opportunity laws for the handicapped may have 
on employer liabilities, and provide a background for a more 
meaningful discussion of the law. 
12. See discussion at notes 209-211 and accompanying text infra. 
13. For a more detailed discussion of the volitional nature of some "handicaps," see 
Ogden, Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417. 
14. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. 
V 1975), for example, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin. While religion is a matter of choice, and 
thus not an immutable and inherent characteristic, one's choice of religion is 
protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution, which is not 
the Case with the choice to engage in drug and alcohol abuse to the extent that it 
becomes an addiction. Although transsexuality and homosexuality also may be 
a matter of choice, the weight of authority holds that discrimination against 
transsexuals, e.g., Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. 
Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975); EEOC Dec. No. 75-030 
(1974), and homosexuals, e.g .. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 
(N.D. Ga. 1975), is not sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 
15. Employment discrimination on the basis of age is prohibited by the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
Obviously, one's age or sex may affect one's strength and, to this extent, these 
characteristics may be job-related. It is not, however, the diminished strength 
that renders one a member of a minority class based on sex or age, but this is 
precisely the type of physical condition that may render one a member of the 
"handicapped" minority. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT 
RIGHTS OF THE HANDICAPPED 
A. FEDERAL LAws 
Advocates of equal employment for the handicapped have failed 
thus far to obtain protection for this minority under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 although efforts to secure an amendment 
to this effect continue.17 The handicapped nevertheless achieved a 
major legislative goal upon enactment of several federal statutes 
that affect two specific groups of employers - federal contractors 
and federally financed programs and institutions. 
1. Laws Regulating Government Contractors 
a. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Rehabilitation Act)18 contains the first congressional19 affirmative 
action requirement imposed upon government contractors. Section 
503 of the Act20 requires that any contract exceeding $2,500 for the 
16. Several attempts have been made to amend Title VII to prohibit employment 
discrimination against the handicapped, e.g., H.R. 13,199, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1974); H.R. 10,963, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971). 
17. Several bills to prohibit discrimination in employment practices with respect to 
physically handicapped individuals were proposed this past year: S. 1346, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Senator Bayh (D, Ind.»; H.R. 264, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Conte (R, Mass.»; H.R. 
1107, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative O'Brien (R, Ill.»; 
H.R. 1200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Roe (D, 
N.J.»; H.R. 488, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative Koch 
(D, N.Y.»; H.R. 3504, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Representative 
Edwards (D, Cal.) and Representative Drinan (D, Mass.». 
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (Supp. V 1975). 
19. Prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, affirmative action requirements 
had been imposed only by Executive Order. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 
86 (Supp. 1961), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 631 app. at 362 (1964), superseded by Exec. 
Order No. 11,246 as amended, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965). 
20. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975). The section states: 
(a) Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal 
department or agency for the procurement of personal property and 
nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall 
contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out 
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take 
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified 
handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(6) of this title. The 
provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of 
$2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for 
the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (includ-
ing construction) for the United States. The President shall implement 
the provisions of this section by promulgating regulations within ninety 
days after September 26, 1973. 
(b) If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has 
failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the 
United States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals, such 
individual may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. The 
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procurement of personal property and non-personal services (includ-
ing construction) entered into by any federal department or agency 
must contain a provision (an "affirmative action clause") requiring 
the contractor to take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment "qualified handicapped individuals" to carry out the 
contract. A similar provision must be included in any subcontract in 
excess of $2,500 entered into by the contractor in furtherance of its 
federal contract.21 Thus, the federal contractor and subcontractor 
become obligated under the government contract to engage in 
affirmative action to benefit the handicapped in employment. 
Section 503 also provides that a handicapped individual who 
believes a federal contractor or subcontractor has violated the 
affirmative action clause of its contract may file a complaint with 
the Department of Labor, which is authorized to investigate such 
complaints and "take such action thereon as the facts and 
circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract 
and the laws and regulations applicable thereto."22 
The Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs (OFCCP) has promulgated regulations to imple-
ment Section 503 (the OFCCP regulations).23 These regulations 
prohibit discrimination against the handicapped in all employment 
decisions made by federal contractors. Included within the non-
discrimination obligation is a duty to "accommodate" the needs of 
Department shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take 
such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent 
with the terms of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable 
thereto. 
(c) The requirements of this section may be waived, in whole or in 
part, by the President with respect to a particular contract or 
subcontract, in accordance with guidelines set forth in regulations which 
he shall prescribe, when he determines that special circumstances in the 
national interest so require and states in writing his reasons for such 
determination. 
21. Id. § 793(a). It is questionable, however, whether a subcontract for supplies 
essential to every aspect of the prime contractor's business, such as paper clips, 
is "entered into . . . in carrying out" a federal contract. Both prime and 
subcontractors will be referred to hereinafter as "contractors." 
22. Id. § 793(b). . 
23. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.1 to .54 (1977). Executive Order No. 11,758,39 Fed. Reg. 2075 
(1974), delegates to the Secretary of Labor the Presidential authority set forth in 
§ 503(b) of the Rehabilitation Act to promulgate implementing regulations. 
OFCCP also administers the affirmative action programs mandated under 
Executive Order No. 11,246, which requires federal contractors and subcontrac-
tors with contracts for $10,000 or more to engage in affirmative action to 
eliminate discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. See id. pts. 60-1 to 60. Under a recent Presidential 
reorganization of the federal civil rights agencies, the OFCCP will continue to 
enforce § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 402 of the Veteran's Readjustment 
Act, discussed at notes 36-40 and accompanying text infra, as well as Executive 
Order 11,246 for at least two more years. During the interim, consideration will 
be given to the transfer of its enforcement responsibility to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
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qualified handicapped employees and job applicants.24 The regula-
tions reiterate the statutory requirement for the incorporation of an 
affirmative action clause regarding the handicapped into all federal 
contracts that exceed $2,500,25 with certain minor exceptions.26 In 
addition, the regulations impose an obligation upon all contractors 
or subcontractors who hold federal contracts of $50,000 and employ 
24. One federal court has held, however (in the process of finding no private cause of 
action under § 503), that the section does not forbid discrimination against the 
handicapped but merely "encourages" their employment. Moon v. Roadway 
Exp., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
The "accommodation" duty imposed by the regulations is discussed in detail 
at notes 304-345 and accompanying text infra. 
25. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.3 to .4 (1977). The affirmative action clause requires the 
contractor to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment 
qualified handicapped individuals and prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
physical or mental handicap in regard to any position for which the 
handicapped individual is qualified. In addition, the clause binds the contractor 
to post notices stating its obligation and the rights of handicapped employees 
and job applicants under the law, and to notify unions or other employee 
representatives of its legal obligation under the Rehabilitation Act. [d. 
§ 60-741.4. 
The affirmative action clause may be incorporated by reference into the 
government contract. [d. § 60-741.22. The mere omission of the affirmative 
action clause from a contract does not relieve the contractor or subcontractor of 
the obligation imposed by the clause, however, since by operation of law, the 
affirmative action clause is considered to be a part of every contract and 
subcontract required by the Rehabilitation Act and the OFCCP regulations to 
include such a clause, whether or not it is physically incorporated into the 
contract and whether or not there is a written contract between the agency and 
contractor. [d. § 60-741.23. 
The federal contractor should be aware that the financial amount involved 
in contracts covered by the Rehabilitation Act, $2,500, is much less than the 
amount involved in contracts covered under other legislative and executive 
affirmative action mandates. For example, both Executive Order No. 11,246 and 
the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. V 1975), 
apply only to federal contracts exceeding $10,000. 
The OFCCP regulations specifically require that the affirmative action 
clause be included in contracts and subcontracts for indefinite quantities, unless 
the contracting agency has reason to believe that the amount to be ordered in 
any year under the contract will be less than $2,500. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.3(a)(2) 
(1977). Finally, the regulations specify that no agency, contractor, or subcontrac· 
tor may procure supplies or services in less than usual quantities to avoid the 
applicability of the affirmative action clause. [d. § 60-741.3(a)(1). 
26. Pursuant to subsection c of § 503, the President has the authority to waive the 
requirements of the Section when the national interest warrants. The OFCCP 
regulations provide that the requirements of the affirmative action clause are 
waived with regard to work performed outside the United States 'by the 
contractor's employees who were not recruited within the United States. The 
Director of the OFCCP also may waive the application to any contract or 
subcontract of any part or all of the affirmative action clause, if he deems thltt 
the waiver is in the national interest. Moreover, an agency head, with the 
concurrence of the Director, may grant waivers to groups or categories of 
subcontracts or contracts of the same type where it is in the national interest, 
where it is found impracticable to act upon each request for a waiver 
individually, and where the waiver will substantially contribute to convenience 
in administration of § 503 of the Act. Such waivers can be withdrawn at the 
Director's discretion. In addition, the head of a subcontracting agency may 
decline to apply any requirement in the regulations to a contract or subcontract 
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50 or more persons to prepare and maintain at each establishment27 
a written program of affirmative action (an affirmative action plan) 
to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped 
individuals.28 These affirmative action and non-discrimination 
when its award without compliance with the regulatory requirements is 
necessary to the national security. 41 C.F.R. § 6D-741.3(b) (1977). 
It should be noted that § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act requires federal 
contractors to engage in affirmative action only "in employing persons to carry 
out the [federal] contract." The OFCCP regulations contain a conclusive 
presumption that all of the contractor's employees at the plant or facility where 
work is being done on the federal contract are in fact engaged in work to carry 
out the contract. Nevertheless, the fact that an individual complainant was not 
employed to work on the federal contract, or is involved in a very tangential 
manner, is a possible defense that should not be ignored by the employer. In this 
regard, the regulations permit the Director of OFCCP to waive the requirements 
of the affirmative action clause with respect to any of a prime contractor's or 
subcontractor's facilities that he finds to be in all respects separate and distinct 
from activity of the contractor related to the performance of the federal contract, 
if such a waiver would not interfere with or impede the effectuation of the Act. 
The waiver, however, must be specifically requested by the contractor or 
subcontractor. Id. § 6D-741.3(a)(5). With respect to state or local governments 
that enter into contracts with the federal government, on the other hand, the 
regulations state that the affirmative action clause does not apply to those local 
or state governmental agencies, instrumentalities, or subdivisions that do not 
participate in work on or under the federal contract or subcontract. No request 
for a waiver of their coverage therefore need be made. Id. § 6D-741.3(a)(4). 
The private sector federal contractor may be able to exclude subsidiaries not 
involved with the federal contract or subcontract from the affirmative action 
obligations, if the tests for joint employer status under the National Labor 
Relations Act are not met. See Ernst·Theodore Arndt, 52 COMPo GEN. 145 (1972); 
Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225, 
251 (1971). 
27. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(a) (1977). But see note 26 supra. 
28. The elements of the affirmative action plan also constitute the agency's criteria 
for determining whether a contractor with less than $50,000 in government 
contracts has complied with its obligations under the law. Thus, the only 
difference the regulations establish between large and small contractors is that 
the large contractor must set forth its affil1TIative action policies, practices and 
procedures in a written plan. Compare 41 C.F.R. §6D-741.5(a) (1977) with id. 
§60-741.6. 
The discussion herein of the affirmative action program obligations imposed 
upon government contractors by Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act is limited 
to a general overview and to an analysis of the distinctions between affirmative 
action and nondiscrimination. This article, therefore, will not set forth a detailed 
discussion of the elements of affirmative action plans. The various items that 
must be included within affirmative action plans are set forth at 41 C.F.R. 
§ 60-741.6 (1977). In brief, the plan must contain a statement of the contractor's 
affirmative action policy, must set forth plans for the internal and external 
dissemination of the policy, must assign responsibilities for the implementation 
of the policy to corporate officials, must show that the contractor has issued an 
invitation to handicapped employees and job applicants to identify themselves in 
order to take advantage of the affirmative action program, must provide for a 
review of personnel processes to determine whether present procedures provide 
for the systematic consideration of known handicapped individuals for vacancies 
and promotions, must provide for a review of all physical and mental 
qualifications for the purpose of ensuring that they do ~not factor out 
handicapped individuals for reasons that are not job related or consistent with 
business necessity and the safe performance of the job, must specify accommoda-
tions for the handicapped that are being made or planned, and must set forth 
other affirmative action programs to benefit the handicapped that the employer 
is developing or executing. The affirmative action plan required under this 
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obligations are imposed upon state and local governments and their 
agencies, as well as private companies, that contract with or do 
subcontract work for the federal government.29 
The OFCCP regulations also establish complaint procedures and 
provide for investigation and conciliation of such complaints.30 If the 
OFCCP investigation of a complaint reveals contractor noncom-
pliance that cannot be resolved during conciliation,31 and the 
opportunity for a hearing is provided, the Director of OFCCP is 
section is very similar to that required under Executive Order 11,246 and the 
OFCCP regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, with the exception that the 
federal contractor is not required to establish goals and timetables with respect 
to employment of the handicapped. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 with id. pt. 
60-2, especially § 2.12. 
Contrary to its approach under Executive Order No. 11,246, OFCCP has been 
concentrating its enforcement efforts with respect to § 503 on investigation of 
discrimination complaints rather than on compliance reviews of affirmative 
action programs. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 
ADMINiSTRATION, OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS TASK 
FORCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE REVITALIZATION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 100 (1977) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP TASK 
FORCE REPORT). The Task Force, however, has recommended that the Agency 
establish a system for the targeting and conduct of compliance reviews in 
addition to the complaint system, and that the compliance review program be 
merged with the one currently in operation to enforce Executive Order No. 
11,246. Id. at xvii·iii. The Secretary of Labor recently stated that the Department 
will begin compliance reviews on randomly selected contractors and subcontrac-
tors, to be conducted by OFCCP's regional offices. See [1977] 6 DAILY LAB. REP. 
(BNA) A-5 to A-6. 
A more detailed analysis of the components of an affirmative action plan 
can be found in Note, Lowering Barriers to Employment of the Handicapped: 
Affirmative Action Obligations Imposed on Federal Contractors, 81 DICK. L. 
REV. 174 (1976); Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped 
Individuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (1976). An excellent review of many of the 
issues pertinent to Rehabilitation Act discrimination cases is set forth in Wright, 
Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65, 
65-106 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Equal Treatment). For a discussion of the 
wisdom of utilizing government contracts as a means for achieving societal 
goals through affirmative action, see Morgan, Achieving National Goals 
Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative 
Process, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 301. 
29. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977) defines a "government contract" as: 
Any agreement or modification thereof between any contracting agency 
and any person for the furnishing of supplies or services or for the use of 
real or personal property including lease arrangements. The term 
"services," as used in this section includes, but is not limited to the 
following services: utility, construction, transportation, research, insu-
rance and fund depository, irrespective of whether the government is the 
purchaser or the seller. The term "government contract" does not include 
(1) agreements in which the parties stand in a relationship of employer 
and employee, and (2) federally-assisted contracts. 
Section 60-741.2 defines a "person" as: 
[A]ny natural person, corporation, partnership or joint venture, unincor-
porated association, state or local government, and any agency, 
instrumentality, or subdivision of such a government. (emphasis added). 
30. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1977). 
31. Before a contractor will be deemed in compliance after an investigation reveals a 
violation, it must make a specific written commitment to take corrective action. 
See, id. § 60-741.26(g)(2). But see OFCCP Policy Clarification Memorandum 
78-12/60-2, reprinted in 1978 DAILY LAB. REP. No. 50 (BNA) (written 
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authorized by the regulations to debar contractors found in 
violation of the affirmative action clause from receiving further 
federal contracts, to withhold their contract progress payments, and 
to suspend, cancel, or terminate their current contracts.32 The 
Director also is empowered to seek judicial action to enforce the 
affirmative action clause, including injunctive relief, without first 
providing a hearing on the alleged noncompliance.33 In attempting 
conciliation agreement not normally required under Executive Order 11,246 
regulations in certain circumstances, such as when no show cause order issued 
against contractor and there are only minor deficiencies in the affirmative action 
program). 
32. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.28 to .30 (1977). The regulations state that hearings on 
violations of the Rehabilitation Act must be conducted in accordance with 
OFCCP's rules of practice applicable to hearings on violations of Executive 
Order 11,246 which are set forth in 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-30. Id. § 60-741.29(b) (revised 
in 42 Fed. Reg. 19146 (1977)). 
Employers who rely heavily on government contracts as a source of business 
should recognize the risk they take by refusing to conciliate a complaint found 
meritorious during an OFCCP investigation. If, after a hearing, the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, concludes that a 
violation of the affirmative action clause occurred, he is authorized by the 
regulations not only to enjoin the violation and require the contractor to provide 
remedial relief, but also to impose any of the sanctions discussed in the text 
supra - i.e., debarment from future contracts, suspension, termination, or 
cancellation of current contracts, and withholding of progress payments on 
current contracts. 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.30(a) (1977). The Assistant Secretary's choice 
of which sanctions to impose is virtually unlimited, with the exception that the 
regulations require that the OFCCP's "complaint" against the contractor, which 
is issued prior to the hearing, must include a statement of the sanctions that the 
government expects to impose. Id. § 60-30.5(b). OFCCP can, in practice, enforce 
the debarment, suspension, termination, cancellation or withholding of contract 
progress payments without a court order. Finally, failure to comply with the 
Assistant Secretary's order "shall result in the immediate cancellation, 
termination, and suspension of the respondent's contract and/or debarment of 
the respondent from future contracts." Id. § 60-30.30(a). Under this provision, 
OFCCP also is enabled to compel compliance with the injunctive and remedial 
aspects of its orders, which typically would require judicial enforcement, by the 
threat of withdrawal of government contracts if the orders are not complied with. 
The final administrative order of the Director of OFCCP is subject to judicial 
review under the standards set forth in the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. §§551-576, 701-703 (1970). See Pan American World Airways v. 
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Timken Co. v. Vaughan, 413 F. Supp. 
1183 (N.D. Ohio 1976). A stay of administrative action pending judicial review 
would be available in some cases. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAw TREATISE § 23.19 (1958). A preliminary injunction against debarment or 
other sanctions imposed without compliance with the hearing procedure set forth 
in the regulations would also be available. See Pan American World Airways v. 
Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For a general discussion of the due 
process rights of government contractors, see Steadman, Banned in Boston -
and Birmingham and Boise and .... ": Due Process in the Debarment and 
Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793 (1976). 
33. Compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28(b) (1977) with id. § 60-741.29(a). 
194 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
to remedy discriminatory acts through conciliation, OFCCP has 
regularly pursued both reinstatement and back pay relief for 
handicapped complainants, even though the regulations do not 
expressly empower the agency to seek such relief.34 In part because 
of these administrative enforcement mechanisms, the existence of a 
34. The regulations do not specifically provide for back pay awards in conciliation 
agreements. See id. §§ 60-741.26(g), .28(a). Nevertheless, OFCCP has supervised 
conciliations wherein the complainant was awarded back pay and reinstate· 
ment. See News Release of Employment Standards Administration, Department 
of Labor (Jan. 10, 1977) (more than $115,000 has been paid to handicapped 
workers in settlements of charges brought under § 503, with settlements ranging 
from $231 to $12,000); OFCCP VETERANS AND HANDICAPPED WORKERS PROGRAM 
OPERATIONS DIVISION, SUMMARY OF BACK PAY CASES (available from United 
States Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Veterans and Handicapped Workers 
Program Operations Division, Room No. N-3402, New Department Labor 
Building, Washington, D. C. 20210) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP BACK PAY 
CASES SUMMARY). See also OFCCP VETERANS AND HANDICAPPED WORKERS 
PROGRAM OPERATIONS DIVISION, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL 
40-43 (available from same source) (hereinafter cited as OFCCP STANDARD 
OPERATING MANUAL). 
OFCCP relies upon U. S. v. Duquesne Light Co., 423 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Pa. 
1976), as authority for its assertion of the power to require back pay and 
reinstatement. In that case, OFCCP sought injunctive relief, including back pay, 
against Duquesne Light Co. for violations of Executive Order 11,246. The court 
pointed out that § 209(a)(2) of the Executive Order empowered the Secretary of 
Labor to recommend to the Department of Justice that "appropriate proceed-
ings" be brought to enforce the contractual provisions set forth in the order, and 
held that this reference to "appropriate proceedings" conferred discretion to 
invoke the equitable powers of the court. 
While § 503(b) of the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically authorize 
judicial proceedings against violators of the Rehabilitation Act, or make any 
mention of the type of relief available to discrimination victims, it does empower 
the Department of Labor to "promptly investigate [complaints of violations of 
the affirmative action clause] and ... take such action thereon as the facts and 
circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of such contract and the laws 
and regulations applicable thereto." This provision does not appear to permit 
back pay relief for complainants, particularly in light of the fact that when 
Congress has intended that such back pay relief be made available to 
discrimination complainants, it specifically has so provided. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) (remedial provision of Title VII). McNutt v. Hills, 426 
F. Supp. 990, 1002 (D.D.C. 1977), compared Title VII with § 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. V 1975), which requires federal 
agencies to adopt plans of affirmative action to employ the handicapped, and 
reached the conclusion that § 501 did not constitute a waiver of sovereign 
immunity since, like § 503, it did not mention a back pay remedy. Compare 
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 
934 (1970) with Pettit v. United States, 488 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (Ct. Cl. 1973), 
which differ on the issue of whether a federal employee may obtain back pay for 
violations of executive Order 11 ,246. -
In any event, it can be argued that victims of discrimination violative of an 
employer's contract with the federal government are limited to the type of relief 
generally available in suits by a third party beneficiary to a contract - i.e., 
specific enforcement rather than damages. The Duquesne court rejected this 
argument, however, holding that the action was actually one to enforce a 
statutorily authorized administrative program, and "the remedies available to 
enforce such a measure should not be limited to those discernible by references to 
ordinary principles of contract law." 423 F. Supp. at 510, n.5. 
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private cause of action against an employer under Section 503 is 
doubtfu1.35 
b. Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974 
Section 402 of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 197436 (hereinafter referred to as the Veterans' 
Readjustment Act) imposes an obligation upon persons that have 
federal contracts of $10,000 or more to take affirmative action to 
employ and advance in employment qualified disabled veterans and 
veterans of the Vietnam era. In addition, the Veterans' Readjust-
ment Act requires government contractors and subcontractors to list 
job opportunities and to file reports with state employment service 
agencies. 37 
35. The statutory prOVISIOn for administrative enforcement of the law is an 
indication that Congress did not intend for § 503 to be enforced through private 
suits. Cf. Nat'l RR Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of RR Passengers, 414 U.S. 
453 (1974) (Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 does not imply a private cause of 
action); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g 406 
F. Supp. 1257 (D.C. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 559 F.2d 1077 (7th Cit: 1976) 
(Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 does not imply a private cause of 
action). Congress' repeated rejection of attempts to amend Title VII, which does 
provide a private remedy, to include the handicapped, see note 16 supra, is a 
further indication that it intended to provide no private remedy for handicap 
discrimination under § 503. 
At the very least, it would appear that a private cause of action to enforce 
§ 503 would be available only when the suit challenges "wholesale .. . 
discrimination against a large number of [individuals] by a particular .. . 
institution." Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d at 1074. The cases that have 
considered the issue of whether § 503 provides a private cause of action put the 
weight of authority on the negative side. Wood v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. 
Supp. 1002 (D. Del. 1977); Moon v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. 
Ga. 1977); Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977) and 
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977), held that § 503 did 
not establish a private cause of action, while Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. 
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977), concluded that § 503 established a 
private cause of action, but that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior 
to suit. It should be noted that the Drennon court relied in part upon decisions 
holding that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act establishes a private cause of action. 
Section 504 is distinguishable in that it does not specifically establish a means 
for administrative enforcement of the nondiscrimination obligation imposed 
upon programs receiving federal financial assistance. See Wood v. Diamond 
State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. at 1008 (legislative history of § 504 not helpful in 
interpreting whether § 503 establishes private cause of action). In any event, the 
implication of a private cause of action under § 504 is also qu·estionabie. See note 
70 and accompanying text infra. For an exhaustive analysis of this issue, see 
Equal Treatment, note 28 supra, at 89-97. . 
Section 503's provision for an administrative complaint procedure is more 
similar to Executive Order 11,246 than to § 504. Several federal courts have held 
that no private cause of action exists under Executive Order 11,246 or its 
predecessors. See Farkas v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., F.E.P. Cas. 1762 
(N.D. Cal. 1975); cf. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964) 
(no private right of action exists under Executive Order 11,246 when administra-
tive remedies have not been exhausted). Contra, Lewis v. Western Air Lines, 379 
F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
36. 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (Supp. V 1975). 
:37. Id. 
196 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
The OFCCP has promulgated regulations (the OFCCP Veterans' 
regulations), which correspond closely with those issued pursuant to 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, discussed above. 38 Besides 
imposing general affirmative action obligations upon federal 
contractors and subcontractors, the OFCCP Veterans' regulations 
require contractors and subcontractors with federal contracts of 
$50,000 and with 50 or more employees to prepare and maintain at 
each establishment a written program of affirmative action to 
employ and advance in employment disabled veterans and veterans 
of the Vietnam era.39 The OFCCP Veterans' regulations will be 
separately discussed in this text only insofar as the obligations they 
impose upon federal contractors with respect to disabled veterans 
differ from the contractor's obligations to other handicapped 
individuals, as set forth in the OFCCP regulations issued under 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.40 
2. Laws Regulating Programs Receiving 
Federal Financial Assistance 
a. Section l11(b) of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Under Section 111(b) of the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilita-
tion Act,41 the affirmative action obligations imposed by Section 503 
38. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250.1 to .54 (1977). 
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.5(a) (1977). Both the OFCCP § 503 regulations and the OFCCP 
Veterans' regulations provide that the affirmative action plan required may be 
integrated into other affirmative action plans of the contractor. Compare id. with 
id. § 60-741.5(a). 
The government contractor who is covered by the Veterans' Readjustment 
Act is also covered by § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act in most cases, so that a 
combined affirmative action plan for the purposes of these two laws may be 
advisable. There is a strong argument, however, against combining these two 
plans with that required under Executive Order 11,246, since both the former 
plans must be made available for employee inspection, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-250.5(c), 
741.5(d), while the latter need not be. See id. pts. 60-1 through 60-2. If the 
Rehabilitation Act and Veterans' Readjustment Act affirmative action plans 
were combined with the Executive Order 11,246 plan, the detailed goals and 
timetables that must be set forth in Executive Order 11,246 affirmative action 
plans would then become available to employees. 
40. The major substantive difference between the two sets of regulations is in the 
definition of the individuals covered. The OFCCP Veterans' regulations define a 
"disabled veteran" as: 
[A] person entitled to disability compensation under laws adminis· 
tered by the Veterans Administration for disability rated at 30 per 
centum or more, or a person whose discharge or release from active duty 
was for a disability incurred or aggrevated [sic] in the line of duty. 
41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2 (1977). 
The Department of Labor has suggested that a disabled veteran could be 
protected under the Veterans' Readjustment Act, but not.under the Rehabilita-
tion Act, and vice versa. 41 Fed. Reg. 26386 (1976). But see note 172 infra 
(suggesting that the OFCCP's definition of a handicap under the Rehabilitation 
Act is so broad as to subsume the Veterans' Act definition). 
41. 29 U.S.C. § 721(a) (Supp. V 1975). The amendment stated: 
Section 101(a)(6) of [the Rehabilitation] Act [which sets forth some of the 
components of the state plan required under Title I] is amended by 
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of the Act upon federal contractors are also incumbent upon state 
agencies and facilities for the handicapped that are funded under 
Title I of the Rehabilitation Act. The legislative history of the 1974 
amendments indicates Congress intended that this affirmative 
action duty also be imposed upon privately owned rehabilitation 
facilities and programs for the handicapped to which the states 
funnel Rehabilitation Act funds available under Title 1.42 
b. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
In contradistinction to Section 111(b)'s limited applicability to 
federally funded rehabilitation programs for the handicapped and 
its mandate for affirmative action, Section 50443 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act affects all public and private sector programs that receive 
federal financial assistance for any purpose, but merely imposes a 
non-discrimination duty. Section 504 provides: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States, as defined in Section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely 
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.44 
adding at the end thereof before the semi-colon "(including a require-
ment that the StaJe Agency and the facilities in receipt of assistance 
under this Title shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified handicapped individuals covered under, and on 
the same terms and conditions set forth in, section 793 of this title)." 
(emphasis added). 
42. The Senate report on the amendment stated: 
The new provision requires that each State agency and every other 
facility in receipt of assistance under title I of the Act must take 
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified 
handicapped individuals who are covered under Section 503 (thereby 
applying the new defmition of "handicapped individual" which would be 
added by Section 111(a) in H.R. 14225 and this identical original bill) 
and on the same terms and conditions as set forth in Section 503 
(relating to the affirmative action requirement under Federal contracts 
and subcontracts) . 
. . . [T]hose State agencies which administer a program for handicapped 
individuals, along with facilities and other public and nonprofit private 
agencies which provide services through funds under the Act, are 
expected to adopt strong affirmative action programs which are at least 
equivalent to those now being developed for Federal agencies. Moreover, 
these State agencies and facilities should be held to the same exemplary 
standard for affirmative action required of the Federal agencies with 
particular responsibilities for programs affecting handicapped individu-
als, in order to serve as a model for compliance with the affirmative 
action that is required of all Federal contractors and all Federal 
subcontractors under Section 503 of the Act. 
S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6391-92 (emphasis added). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975). 
44. [d. There is no explanation in the legislative history for Congress' use of the 
phrase "qualified handicapped individuals" in § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act 
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The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has promul-
gated regulations implementing Section 504 of the Act with regard to 
federal financial assistance administered by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare,45 (the HEW regulations). Pursuant to 
Executive Order 11,914, the Secretary has also promulgated 
regulations (the Executive Order 11,914 regulations)46 to coordinate 
the consistent enforcement of Section 504 by all federal agencies that 
while using the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in § 504 of 
the Act. The regulations promulgated to implement § 504 by the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare, see note 45 infra, use the term "qualified 
handicapped person." With respect to this usage, the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare has explained: 
The Department believes that the omission of the word "otherwise" is 
necessary in order to comport with the intent of the statute because, read 
literally, "otherwise" qualified handicapped persons include persons who 
are qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their 
handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the 
qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be said to be 
"otherwise qualified" for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was 
not intended by Congress. In all other respects, the terms "qualified" 
and "otherwise qualified" are intended to be interchangeable. 
42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22686 (1977) (Appendix to final HEW regulations on 
"Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities 
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance," Subpart A -
general provisions, ~ 5) (emphasis added). 
45. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676-22685 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (hereinafter 
cited by C.F.R. title and section number). Section 5 of Executive Order 11,914,3 
C.F.R. 117-18 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of HEW to adopt rules and 
regulations and issue orders necessary to implement § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act. 
46. 42 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 85) (hereinafter 
cited by C.F.R. title and section number). Section 1 of Executive Order 11,914, 3 
C.F.R. 117 (1977), authorizes the Secretary of HEW to coordinate the implementa-
tion of § 504 by all federal departments and agencies empowered to extend 
federal financial assistance to any program or activity. Specifically, the 
Secretary is authorized to establish standards for determining who are 
handicapped individuals and to adopt guidelines for determining what are 
discriminatory practices, which standards and guidelines are set forth in the 
proposed Executive Order 11,914 regulations. 
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extend financial assistance,47 each of which is expected to issue its 
own regulations effectuating Section 504.48 
All of the Section 504 regulations issued to date purport to 
govern employment practices,49 but their authority to do so is fat 
from clear. Although Section 111(b) of the 1974 amendments, 
discussed above, clearly applies to the employment practices of 
programs receiving federal funds under Title I of the Rehabilitation 
Act, Section 504 makes no reference to employment practices of the 
other federally funded programs to which it applies. 
47. Both the HEW and the proposed Executive Order 11,914 regulations define a 
"recipient" of federal financial assistance governed by the regulations as 
[a]ny state or its political subdivision[s], any instrumentality of a state 
or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, 
organization, or other entity, or any person to which federal financial 
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient, including 
any successor, assignee, or transfere of a recipient, but excluding the 
ultimate beneficiary of the assistance. 
Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(0 with id. § 85.3(d). In Simon v. St. Louis County Police 
Dept., 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977), the court held that a plaintiff 
charging a violation of § 504 must allege that the particular job category in 
which he was allegedly discriminated against was part of a program or activity 
receiving federal funds, unless he asserts that he was discriminated against with 
respect to all employment in a federally funded program. The case therefore 
implies that the § 504 obligation applies only to the specific program of a state or 
local government that is federally funded, and that, for example, the fact that a 
university's science program is federally funded would not subject its athletic 
program to the § 504 obligation, unless that program also was federally funded. 
"Federal financial assistance" is defined by both the HEW and Executive 
Order 11,914 regulations as 
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a 
contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which 
the Department [agency] provides or otherwise makes available 
assistance in the form of: 
(1) Funds; 
(2) Services of Federal personnel; or 
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property, 
including: 
(i) transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market 
value or for reduced consideration; and 
(ii) proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if 
the federal share of its fair market value is not returned to the 
Federal Government. 
Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) with id. § 85.3(e). 
48. The Small Business Administration (SBA) has issued proposed regulations for 
the implementation of §504. 43 Fed. Reg. 9488-9493 (1978) (proposed for 
codification in 13 C.F.R. pt. 113) (hereinafter cited by C.F.R. title and section 
number). In addition, the Treasury Department has promulgated interim 
regulations pursuant to § 122 of the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972, as 
amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242(a)(I) (West Supp. 1977), which makes the provisions 
of § 504 applicable to state or local governments receiving revenue·sharing funds. 
Section 51.50 of the Treasury regulations states that a purpose of the regulations 
is to prohibit discrimination with respect to an otherwise qualified handicapped 
individual, as provided in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 42 Fed. Reg. 
18362-18372 (1977) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. pt. 51) (hereinafter cited by C.F.R. 
title and section number); 31 C.F.R. §~ 51.52 to .53 (1976). 
49. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11 to .14, 85.52 to .55; 31 C.F.R. §§ 51.52 to .53 (1976). 13 C.F.R. 
§§ 113.3 to .3-3. 
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The wording of Section 504 is similar to that of Section 901 of 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended/>O which 
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving 
federal financial assistance. In Romeo Community Schools u. 
H.E. W.,51 a federal district court in Michigan held that HEW 
regulations52 promulgated to implement Title IX were invalid to the 
extent that they purported to govern the employment practices of 
educational programs receiving federal financial assistance. The 
court reasoned that: 
Though cast in broad terms, § 1681 [Section 901 of Title IX] 
nevertheless addresses itself only to sex discrimination 
against the participants in and the beneficiaries of federally 
assisted education programs. Section 1681 must therefore be 
read to protect from sex discrimination only those persons 
for whom the federally assisted education programs are 
established, and this can only mean the school children in 
those programs. As a reference to faculty employees, the 
language of § 1681 is indirect, if not obscure .... Teachers, 
in short, are hard pressed to fit themselves within the plain 
meaning of § 1681's prohibitory language, general as it may 
appear on its face. When Congress means to statutorily 
regulate employment discrimination, it uniformly does so in 
more explicit terms than this. 53 
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975). 
51. 438 F. Supp. 1021, (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
52. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51 to .71 (1976). 
53. 438 F. Supp. at 1031-1032. See also Seattle Univ. v. H.E.W., 16 FEP Cas. 719 at 
720 (1978). But see McCarthy v. Burkholder, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 7926 (D. Kan. 
1977). 
Both Title IX and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act track the language of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which 
prohibits federally assisted programs from discriminating on the basis of race, 
color or national origin. The Romeo court rejected an argument that the absence 
of an explicit provision in Title IX, similar to § 604 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(d)(2), which specifically excludes employment discrimination from 
coverage of Title VI, showed a congressional intent to make Title IX broader 
than Title VI in this respect. The court noted that Title IX was· enacted as part of 
a legislative program which also included an amendment to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, enlarging the scope of that provision to include sex 
discrimination in employment, and an amendment to the Equal Pay Act 
authorizing the Secretary of Labor to regulate sex discrimination in educational 
employee compensation. Thus, the court held, the addition to Title IX of a 
provision similar to § 604 in Title VI would have created some inherent 
contradiction between Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act. Romeo 
Community Schools v. H.E.W., 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
Like Title IX, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not specifically exclude 
employment practices from coverage. Although a construction of § 504 that 
would render it applicable to employment practices would not conflict with Title 
VII, which does not cover handicapped status discrimination, the defeat of 
amendments that would have expanded Title VII to provide such coverage 
buttresses the conclusion that Congress did not mean to cover employment 
discrimination on the basis of a handicap, except where it specifically so 
provides. See note 16 supra. 
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The Romeo court's rationale in invalidating employment 
regulations derived from a statute unrelated to employment is 
pertinent to the legality of the Section 504 regulations insofar as 
they attempt to govern employment practices of federally assisted 
programs. Congress used explicit terms in certain sections of the 
Rehabilitation Act, such as Section 503 and Section 111(b) of the 
1974 amendments discussed above, that were directed towards 
employment practices, and there are additional specific references to 
employment practices in the Act. For example, Section 501, entitled 
"Employment of Handicapped Individuals," specifically requires 
federal agencies and departments to prepare affirmative action 
programs for the employment of the handicapped; requires the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to "encourage" the 
appropriate state agencies to adopt and implement policies and 
procedures to facilitate the hiring, placement, and advancement in 
employment of individuals who have received rehabilitation servi-
ces; and requires that special consideration be given to qualified 
handicapped individuals in filling vacancies on the President's 
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped.54 The specificity of 
these provisions strengthens the argument that Congress, which did 
not include employment language in Section 504, did not intend to 
regulate the employment practices of programs receiving federal 
financial assistance. 55 
Notwithstanding the arguments against the application of 
Section 504 to the employment practices of programs receiving 
federal financial aid (other than those funded directly under Title I 
of the Rehabilitation Act), the HEW, Executive Order 11,914, and 
Treasury regulations all cover employment. For example, the HEW 
regulations specifically prohibit discrimination against qualified 
handicapped individuals in all employment practices, including the 
development and application of employment criteria and pre-
employment inquiries.56 In addition, the recipient of federal financial 
assistance is required to provide HEW with an "assurance" that its 
program will be conducted in full compliance with the regulations.57 
54. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp.V 1975). 
55. See also discussion at note 79 and accompanying text infra. 
56. 45 C.F.R. §§84.11 to .14. 
57. ld. § 84.5. The "assurance" must be set forth on a form provided by the Secretary 
of HEW. Breach of the "assurance" can give rise to a judicial action for 
enforcement. See id. § 80.8(a). It therefore is conceivable that federally funded 
programs could be bound by their assurance to comply with regulations that, in 
and of themselves, would be unenforceable. Accordingly, some recipients of 
federal financial assistance have questioned whether they should limit their 
"assurance" to a promise to comply with all valid regulations. HEW has stated, 
however, that the assurance does not preclude a recipient from raising the 
invalidity of a regulation as a defense in an enforcement action. See Letter from 
Peter Libassi, General Counsel, HEW, to Jay Hedgepth, General Counsel, 
American Hospital Association (July 8, 1977). 
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Moreover, the recipient must conduct a "self-evaluation," enlisting 
the aid of "interested persons," such as handicapped persons or 
organizations representing handicapped persons, to ascertain 
whether any modifications are necessary to bring the federally 
financed program into compliance with the regulations, and whether 
"remedial steps" should be taken to eliminate the effects of past 
discrimination.58 Any recipient with fifteen or more employees is 
required to establish grievance procedures for handling complaints 
under the Act, and to appoint an employee to coordinate its efforts to 
comply with the regulations.59 The recipient with fifteen or more 
employees also is required to notify job applicants, employees, and 
unions or professional organizations with which it has collective 
bargaining agreements that the recipient does not discriminate on 
the basis of handicap.60 
In some respects, the HEW regulations more closely control 
employment practices than do the OFCCP regulations addressed to 
58. 45 C.F.R. § 84.6. The "self·evaluation" must be completed within one year after 
the effective date of the regulations - by June 3, 1978. Recipients with fifteen or 
more employees must maintain a list of the persons consulted, areas examined, 
problems identified, modifications made, and remedial steps taken on file for 
three years. The file must be made available for public inspection and provided 
to the Director on request. 
Needless to say, the self·evaluation should be approached very carefully. 
There is a possibility of conflict with the concept of exclusive representation of 
employees by collective bargaining representatives, if management confers with 
the representatives of handicapped employees without first notifying their 
union, or if management makes personnel policy changes that conflict with the 
collective bargaining agreement. C{. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); The Emporium 
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) 
(employees who sought to bargain separately with employer as to the elimination 
of racially discriminatory practices are not free from the exclusivity principle of 
the National Labor Relations Act); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 
678 (1944) (employer violates National Labor Relations Act by disregarding the 
bargaining representative to negotiate with individual employees over working 
conditions). 
Moreover, few employers would want to reveal to third parties detailed 
information about business practices and problems when those third parties may 
not be subject to a duty of confidentiality. Further, there is always the possibility 
that the suggestions of such participants- during the evaluation might later be 
admitted into evidence in litigation. Finally, depending upon the extent to which 
HEW relies upon third party input, the agency may be accused of improperly 
delegating to unidentified third parties, not subject to any standards, its own 
duty to regulate compliance with the law. For a general discussion of the 
subdelegation problem, see 1A K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 
§§ 9.05- .06 (1958). -
59. 45 C.F.R. § 84.7. When employees are represented by a union, the employer 
should permit union involvement in the grievance procedure if requested, and 
obtain union approval before resolving a grievance by making any changes in 
personnel policies that would conflict with the collective bargaining agreement. 
See discussion at note 58 supra. 
60. 45 C.F.R. § 84.8. The notification requirement was to be complied with by sixty 
days after the effective date of the regulations, or by August 2, 1977. 
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affirmative action in employment under Section 503,61 even though 
the affirmative action duty of Section 503 connotes, conceptually at 
least, a more onerous burden than the duty of nondiscrimination 
imposed by Section 504. The term "nondiscrimination" merely 
demands neutrality, while "affirmative action" requires a disposi-
tion in favor of the protected minority.62 Moreover, the HEW 
regulations and the Executive Order 11,914 regulations, like the 
OFCCP regulations, require recipients to make "reasonable accom-
modations" to the known physical or mental limitations of qualified 
handicapped job applicants, unless the accommodations would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the federally financed 
program. 63 Whether Section 504 authorizes the implementing 
regulations to impose an "accommodation" burden in employment 
also is unclear, since accommodation is conceptually an affirmative 
method of alleviating discrimination that generally is imposed only 
by a specific legislative or executive mandate for either accommoda-
tion or broad affirmative action.64 No such mandate appears in 
Section 504. 
The HEW regulations incorporate by reference the procedural 
regulations issued pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,65 which set forth a complaint procedure for discrimination 
victims66 and authorize informal conciliation of complaints.6? The 
procedural regulations also permit HEW to suspend or terminate 
federal financial assistance after a hearing, to refer complaints to 
the Department of Justice for judicial enforcement of the rights of 
the United States under "any law of the United States, or any 
assurance or other contractual undertaking," and to engage in other 
applicable proceedings under state or local law.68 The Executive 
Order 11,914 regulations instruct other federal agencies to adopt the 
Title VI procedures.69 The weight of judicial authority presently 
61. For a comparison of the rules on pre-employment inquiries and physicals under 
the HEW and OFCCP regulations, see notes 283-295 and accompanying text 
infra. 
62. See, e.g., Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Handicapped Individuals, 49 
S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 800 n.77 (1976). 
63. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12(a), 84.55; 41 C.F.R. § 6D--741.6(d) (1977). 
64. See discussion at notes 305-308 and accompanying text infra. 
65. 45 C.F.R. § 84.61. The Title VI complaint and hearing procedures are set forth at 
id. §§ 80.6-80.10, 81.1 to .131. 
66. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6. 
67. Id. § 80.7(d). 
68. Id. § 80.8. 
69. Id. § 85.5. 
204 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
supports the existence of a private cause of action under Section 504, 
at least when the plaintiff exhausts existing administrative reme-
dies. 70 
70. A private right of action under § 504 has been recognized in several cases. See 
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No. 77-1237 (4th Cir., filed March 28, 
1978), rev'g 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 
296 (2d Cir. 1977) (motion for preliminary injunction denied on other grounds to 
individual plaintiffs attacking school policy forbidding visually handicapped 
students to participate in public school contact sports); United Handicapped 
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (defendant's motion for summary 
judgment denied in class action attacking inequality of access by mobility 
handicapped persons to urban transportation system); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. 
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied in 
class action attacking inequality of access by mobility handicapped persons to 
public transportation system); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 
(D.S.C. 1977) (preliminary injunction granted in private action challenging 
denial of interpreters to deaf students enrolled in private college that received 
federal funds); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 
1977) (defendant's motion to dismiss denied in private action alleging that the 
city-owned hospital's employment policy of denying jobs to persons who had 
epileptic seizures less than two years before application violated §§ 503 and 504, 
but action stayed pending administrative proceedings); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. 
Supp. 1190 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in 
private action seeking declaratory judgment that, inter alia, denial of access by 
prisoner to federally funded prison vocational rehabilitation program violated 
§ 504 granted in relevant part); Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 
1975) (permanent injunction granted in class action seeking to restrain 
transportation board from owning public mass transit system that did not assure 
availability of mass transportation to handicapped persons). Ct. Crawford v. 
University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.S.C. 1977) (preliminary 
injunction granted, noting probable jurisdiction under § 504); Duran v. City of 
Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (preliminary injunction denied on other 
grounds in private action challenging denial of public employment due to history 
of epilepsy); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (violation of 
§ 504 found in private action requesting injunction against exclusion of child 
with spina bifida from public school classroom); Snowden v. Birmingham-
Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), atf'd, 551 F.2d 
862 (5th Cir. 1977) (no violation of § 504 found in class action challenging denial 
to mobility handicapped persons of access to public transportation facilities); 
Simon v. St. Louis County Police Dept, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Mo. 1977) 
(individual action challenging employment discrimination in violation of § 504 
dismissed with leave to amend, due to failure to allege that plaintiff was denied 
all employment or that the particular job category in which he was the victim of 
discrimination was a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance). 
The case most often cited for the proposition that a private cause of action 
exists under § 504 is Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 
1977), which applied the four standards set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 
(1975) for determining whether a federal statute provides a private cause of 
action. The Third Circuit concluded that § 504 was enacted for the special benefit \ 
of the handicapped, that the legislative history of the 1974 Amendments to the 
Rehabilitation Act indicate the Congressional intent to permit private enforce-
ment of § 504 of the Act, at least after any administrative remedies are exhausted 
(see S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91), that it is consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy, and that a private 
suit to enforce § 504 is not the kind of suit traditionally relegated to state law in 
an area basically the concern of the states. 548 F.2d at 1284-87. Lloyd left open 
the question, however, of whether administrative remedies under the HEW 
regulations, which were not in existence when the case was decided, must be 
exhausted prior to a private suit, id. at 1286 n.29. But see Drennon V. 
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Lloyd also left 
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c. Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975 
205 
Section 6(a) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975,71 which provides for federal assistance to fund public 
education for handicapped children, requires that each recipient of 
such assistance take "positive efforts" to employ and advance in 
employment qualified handicapped individuals in programs funded 
by the Act. The HEW regulations discussed above cite this Act, in 
addition to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as one of the 
promulgating authorities.72 Thus, to the extent that the attempt of 
the HEW regulations to govern the employment practices of 
federally assisted programs pertains to educational programs for the 
handicapped, Section 6(a) of the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975 provides legislative support. Moreover, the 
mandate to take "positive efforts" to employ the handicapped may 
justify the imposition of such programs of more than a duty to avoid 
discrimination.73 
unanswered the question of whether the private cause of action is available only 
to a large class of plaintiffs and not to individual complainants. 548 F.2d at 1287. 
On the latter question, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, (7th 
Cir. 1976); Crawford v. University of North Carolina, 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.S.C. 
1977). Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(approving court's holding that failure of school system to provide English 
language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry violates § 601 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, in view of the large number of children affected by the lack of 
such a program of instruction). It would appear that private actions alleging a 
single instance of employment discrimination therefore might be distinguishable 
from Lloyd. Duran u. City of Tampa, Drennon u. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., and 
Simon u. St. Louis County Police Dep't, all of which involved single plaintiffs 
challenging allegedly discriminatory employment practices, do not speak to this 
issue, however. Employment discrimination cases are also distinguishable from 
Lloyd in that the great majority of plaintiffs would have a remedy under state 
law. See note 137 infra. 
It should be noted that § 124 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1244 (West. Supp. 1977) explicitly established 
a private cause of action for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by 
recipients of revenue sha'ring funds. See note 35 supra, for cases discussing a 
private cause of action under § 503. For a detailed analysis of the private cause of 
action issue under both sections of the Rehabilitation Act. See Equal Treatment, 
supra note 28, at 89-97. 
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (Supp. V 1975). 
72. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22678 (1977). In addition to the Education For All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 
amended, the HEW regulations also cite as among the promulgating authorities 
§ 321 of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, 
Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4581 (Supp. V 1975), and 
§ 407 of the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, as amended, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 1174 (Supp. V 1975). The latter two provisions deal with the responsibility of 
federal agencies to provide equal access to treatment facilities to drug addicts 
and alcoholics. 
73. The HEW regulations so assume. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1l(a)(2). But cf. United 
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversing 
lower court decision that nondiscrimination duties under § 504 and "special 
efforts" duties under Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, 49 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1613 (Supp. V 1975), were met, in light of regulations issued 
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d. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act 
The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act74 provides for federal assistance to states and universities, and 
for special grants to public and non-profit private entities to fund 
programs and services for developmentally disabled individuals.75 
Section 106 conditions federal assistance provided pursuant to the 
Act upon the requirement that 
each recipient of such assistance take affirmative action to 
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped 
individuals on the same terms and conditions required with 
respect to the employment of such individuals by the 
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which govern 
employment (1) by State rehabilitation agencies and 
rehabilitation facilities, and (2) under Federal contracts and 
subcontracts. 76 
Although there is scanty legislative history to aid in the 
interpretation of Section 106,77 it apparently is intended to add 
programs receiving federal aid under the Developmentally Disabled 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act to the list of employers required to 
engage in affirmative action to employ the handicapped. As has 
been discussed above, and as indicated in Section 106, the list 
already included federal contractors (Section 503 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973), and state agencies and facilities receiving funds 
under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 111(b) of the 
pursuant to both statutes imposing "affIrmative duties"). Contra, Snowden v. 
Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (N.D. Ala. 
1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (case decided before promulgation of 
regulations but affirmed afterwards). 
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (Supp. V 1975). 
75. The Act defines a "developmental disability" as 
[A] disability of a person which-
(A) (i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or 
autism; 
(ii) is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be 
closely related to mental retardation because such condition res~lts in 
similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive 
behavior to that of mentally retarded' persons or requires treatment and 
services similar to those required for such persons; or 
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described 
in clause (i) or (ii) of this subparagraph; 
(B) originates before such person attains age 18; 
(C) has continued or can be expected to continue indefInitely; and 
(D) constitutes a substantial handicap to such person's ability to 
function normally in society. 
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. V 1975). 
76. Id. § 6005. 
77. See H.R. REP. No. 94-58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 919; CONF. COMM. REP. No. 940473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 960. 
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1974 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).78 Moreover, the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, also discussed above, 
which was enacted shortly after the Developmentally Disabled 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, adds federally assisted education 
programs for the handicapped to the list of programs having 
employment obligations with respect to the handicapped, although it 
requires only "positive efforts," rather than affirmative action. 
A comparison of these enactments with Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act is helpful in analyzing the coverage of Section 
504. Since both the Education for All Handicapped Children Act and 
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
were enacted subsequent to the Rehabilitation Act, and since, unlike 
Section 504 of the' Rehabilitation Act, both specifically govern em-
ployment practices, these laws buttress the argument that Con-
gress did not intend that Section 504 apply to employment practices 
of programs receiving federal financial assistance.79 In fact, these 
enactments and Sections 111(b), 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, taken together, indicate a congressional scheme to regulate 
employment practices as they affect the handicapped only with 
respect to federal contractors and certain federally funded programs 
specifically designed to benefit the handicapped. HEW has gener-
ated confusion in this area by issuing one set of regulations to 
govern the treatment of the handicapped by all the federally funded 
programs for which it is responsible, regardless of whether the 
appropriations statute under which the program is funded imposes 
any obligation to employ the handicapped and regardless of the 
nature of any such obligation imposed.80 To the extent that the 
78. The reference to "affirmative action ... on the same terms and conditions 
required by the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which govern 
employment by ... state rehabilitation agencies and rehabilitation facilities" 
relates to § 111(B) of the Rehabilitation Act, which, as discussed previously, 
imposes an affirmative action obligation upon state rehabilitation agencies and 
facilities funded under Title I of the Act. Similarly, the reference to federal 
contracts and subcontracts apparently relates to § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Thus, it can be inferred that Congress intended to make these affirmative action 
obligations incumbent upon federal programs funded under the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 
79. See also notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. 
The argument can be made, however, that Congress simply intended to 
impose a more onerous obligation on employers administering those programs -
an affirmative action or positive efforts obligation, as opposed to a mere 
prohibition on discrimination in employment - which arguably had already 
been imposed by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This appears to be HEW's 
understanding. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a) with id. § 84.11(b). The surface logic 
of this argument is nevertheless undermined by the specificity of the provisions 
in the Rehabilitation Act, other than § 504, that explicitly apply to employment 
practices, discussed previously. 
80. As stated at p. 205 supra, the HEW regulations cite both the Education For All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which applies to employment practices of 
education programs for the handicapped, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
which does not apply to employment practices, among its promulgating 
208 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
regulations purport to govern the employment practices of employers 
not specifically covered by the statutes cited as promulgating 
authorities, they therefore are subject to challenge. 
As currently interpreted by the implementing regulations, all 
of the recently enacted statutes discussed above have significant im-
port for both private and public sector ~mployment practices. At least 
275,000 businesses and institutions, employing more than one third 
of the country's work force, are federal contractors affected by 
Section 503 of the Act and the implementing regulations.81 In 
addition, numerous private industries, private and state or munici-
pal hospitals, and educational institutions receive federal financial 
aid in the form of grants, loans, contracts, or other arrangements 
with the government under which assistance is made available in 
the form of funds, services of federal personnel, or governmentally-
owned real and personal property. As HEW has interpreted Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, all of these federally financed 
programs are prohibited from discriminating against, and are 
required to accommodate, qualified handicapped employees and job 
applicants. Some employers or institutions may be subject to the 
provisions of both Sections 503 and 504. A notable example is a 
hospital that receives federal financial assistance in the form of 
research grants or construction funds, and that also has a 
contractual arrangement with the government to provide services 
or to perform research.82 Because a vast number of public and 
private entities do business with the federal government, and are 
affected by the Rehabilitation Act, this legislation greatly increases 
employment opportunities available to the handicapped and imposes 
heavy burdens on many employers. 
3. Application of Constitutional Provisions and 
the Civil Right Acts to Handicap Discrimination 
In addition to the new statutory remedies discussed above, the 
handicapped are beginning to use some of the older civil rights 
authorities. The regulations do not indicate that the sections pertaining to 
employment practices are applicable only to educational programs for the 
handicapped. They do, however, indicate that these programs are subject to a 
"positive efforts," rather than a "nondiscrimination," obligation with respect to 
employment of the handicapped. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a) with id. § 84.11(b). 
But ct. note 73 supra. 
81. The Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1976, at 1, col. l. 
82. Whether health care facilities that receive reimbursement for services to 
Medicare or Medicaid recipients are government contractors is an open question 
at the moment. In fact, the types of arrangements that will be deemed 
government contracts is not at all clear. See Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 
428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (staying action pending exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, and questioning whether research arrangement 
between hospital and federal government was contractual in nature). One court 
has also rejected a contention that a rehabilitation center receiving Medicaid and 
Medicare reimbursements was a recipient covered by § 504. Trageser v. Libbie 
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., No. 77-0191-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 1977) (app. 
pending). 
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statutes and constitutional provisions as means of securing 
recompense for employment discrimination. An analysis of the 
applicability of these laws to the handicapped thus is appropriate. 
a. Constitutional Provisions 
Handicap discrimination by public employers and private 
employers involved in state action83 may violate the due process 
clauses of the fourteenth84 and fifth amendments. 85 Plaintiffs 
who have asserted that their due process rights were offended by 
employment practices discriminatory against the handicapped have 
found support in the "irrebuttable presumption" analysis developed 
by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.86 
In Gurmankin v. Costanzo,87 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit invalidated as constituting an "irrebuttable 
presumption" a school board rule that prohibited blind teachers, who 
were otherwise eligible, from taking an exam to qualify them to 
teach sighted students.88 As defined by Gurmankin, an "irrebuttable 
83. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving persons 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. When the state is 
enmeshed in the affairs of a private employer, however, the private employer's 
actions may be held to constitute state action sufficient to subject it to 
constitutional standards. E.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408 (2d Cir. 
1975) (employment actions of private university may constitute state action if 
there is sufficient state financial support and regulation of hiring and the claims 
to private status do not "by themselves outweigh the peculiar offensiveness of 
the alleged misconduct"); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n., 496 
F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974) (hospital's receipt of Hill·Burton Act funds involved state 
in its affairs sufficiently to warrant imposition of fourteenth amendment 
procedural due process standards on hospital's dismissal of physician). But see 
Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
943 (1976) (no state action when state support or control did not contribute to the 
alleged discrimination) .. 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
85. Id. amend. V. 
86. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur, the Court ruled that a mandatory maternity 
leave policy under which· a pregnant teacher was required to take maternity 
leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of her child, 
even though many teachers would be physically able to continue working beyond 
the arbitrary cutoff date, established an irrebuttable presumption of physical 
incompetency. Such an irrebuttable presumption, the Court held, was a violation 
of due process of law, /!.lthough it represented a "good faith effort to achieve a 
laudable goal," because it unduly penalized a female teacher in the exercise of a 
basic liberty - the right to bear a child. [d. at 648. "Irrebuttable presumptions" 
infringing upon a protected right have not been allowed to stand where the fact 
presumed was not "necessarily or universally true in fact," Vlandis v. Kline, 412 
U.S. 441, 452 (1973), where the presumption was permanent, Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645 (1972), and where the state had other reasonable alternative means 
of making the determination presumed to be true. In this connection, it is not 
sufficient for the state to show merely that the presumption results in greater 
administrative convenience, speed, and efficiency, id. at 656-57. 
87. 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'g 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
88. A condition precedent to due process analysis, of course, is the existence of a 
protected right. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Ms. Gurmankin 
had a reasonable expectation of being admitted to the qualifying exam, since she 
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presumption" arises when public sector employment policies 
eliminate handicapped individuals from consideration for certain 
jobs without providing an opportunity for the individuals to 
demonstrate that, despite their handicap, they can perform the jobs. 
The attack is not on the rationality of underlying competency 
requirements for the job or upon the classifications they set forth, 
but on the denial of an opportunity to prove that the requirements 
can be met.89 Thus, the judicial inquiry involves procedural rather 
than substantive due process or equal protection analysis. 90 
Several other federal courts have refused to dismiss suits by 
handicapped individuals against public sector employers predicated 
on the "irrebuttable presumption" theory.91 On the other hand, in 
Coleman v. Darden,92 a federal district court in Colorado refused to 
apply the theory to a requirement that legal research assistants have 
the ability to read typewritten characters with the help of corrective 
lenses. In effect, the court applied a substantive due process test, 
stating that it was not "arbitrary or capricious" for an agency to set 
had previously been issued a professional certificate by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education. Under the rules of the defendant school district, this 
certificate was the only requirement for entrance to the examination. Thus, the 
court held that the right to take the examination was a right arising under state 
law, and its deprivation in an arbitrary manner violated due process. 556 F.2d at 
188. In most cases of hiring discrimination, however, the establishment of the 
protected right might be more difficult since there is no fundamental right to 
public employment, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976). But cr. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) 
(preliminary injunction denied on other grounds to plaintiff alleging denial of 
due process in failure to hire due to City Civil Service Board medical standard 
precluding employment of applicants with a history of epilepsy; court found a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the fourteenth amendment 
claim). The establishment of a "reasonable expectation" of continued employ· 
ment sufficient to warrant due process analysis has proved difficult for some 
plaintiffs. Compare Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) with Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
The court awarded Ms. Gurmankin "rightful place seniority," ordering her 
employment with seniority rights and all other rights that would have accrued 
had she been permitted to take the examination. The lower court had found that 
Ms. Gurmankin would have been offered suitable employment by September, 
1970, if she had been permitted to take the examination when requested. 556 F.2d 
at 188. 
89. The Gurmankin court distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) 
(rejecting an "irrebuttable presumption" attack on the duration of relationship 
requirements of the Social Security Act), on the ground, inter alia, that it 
involved an attack on the rationality of the law rather than on the denial of an 
opportunity to rebut a legislative presumption. 556 F.2d at 188 n.5; see 422 U.S. 
at 772. 
90. This approach has been roundly criticized, see, e.g., Note, Irrebuttable 
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1974). 
91. Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. 
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (W.O. Pa. 1977); cr. Hoffman v. Ohio 
Youth Comm'n., 13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dictum indicating that, if 
case had not been moot, a violation of due process would have been found on the 
grounds that the refusal to hire a blind plaintiff as a youth counselor because of 
his blindness constituted an unconstitutional "irrebuttable presumption"). 
92. 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977). 
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job-related physical requirements, and that the sight requirement 
was in fact job-related.93 
The vitality of the "irrebuttable presumption" theory in 
handicap discrimination cases may well depend upon whether the 
court views the plaintiff's attack as directed towards an employer's 
failure to provide a hearing, thus requiring procedural due process 
analysis, as did the Gurmankin court; as an attack on the rationality 
of the underlying employment criteria, requiring substantive due 
process analysis, as was apparently the case in Coleman; or as an 
attack on a legislative classification, thus requiring equal protection 
analysis. Under substantive due process or equal protection 
analysis, the plaintiff is less likely to prevail. 94 The trial court 
opinion in Gurmankin indicates, however, that when the court is of 
the view that procedural due process has been offended, it may 
engage in a searching comparison of job duties and the correspond-
ing competency requirements in its attempt to define the extent to 
which the defendant must provide handicapped job applicants with 
an opportunity to prove their ability.95 
93. Id. at 6789. 
94. See note 97 infra. 
95. The Gurmankin trial court took extensive testimony on the methods blind 
teachers can use to overcome problems that might be encountered as a result of 
their handicaps. The court concluded: 
The School District can reasonably and legitimately consider an 
applicant's blindness in evaluating his or her qualifications for a 
teaching position. [T]he testimony indicated that blind persons could be 
successful teachers, but that special arrangements were necessary in 
some areas. For example, blind teachers usually were not assigned to 
lunchroom or playground supervision, and special arrangements 
sometimes had to be made for administering tests or keeping records. 
The special problems encountered by blind teachers and the kinds of 
adjustments in normal school procedures that may be necessary are 
relevant to a school district's evaluation of a blind applicant for a 
teaching position. 
In Ms. Gurmankin's case, however, the interviewers frequently did not 
give her an opportunity to explain how she might overcome her 
handicap, nor did the interviewers have sufficient background informa-
tion to properly evaluate the prospects of a blind applicant for a teaching 
position. 
411 F. Supp. at 988. 
In Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Com'n, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975), the 
trial court .engaged in a similar analysis inquiring into minute aspects of the job 
of a youth counselor, the areas in which a blind person might have difficulty, 
and the accommodations that could be made by the employer to eliminate the 
difficulties. The court concluded: 
[T]his Court is of the view that the Ohio Youth Commission could have 
accommodated Dr. Hoffman and explored the ways in which he could 
have implemented such alternatives as utilized by Mr. Hallford and the 
San Diego Department of Social Welfare without infringing upon the 
rights of the State and its agencies to set National requirements for the 
position of Youth Counselor ... and that the irrebuttable presumption 
indulged in by the Commission in 1969 that a blind person could not 
perform the duties of a Youth Counselor was unreasonable. 
Id. at 35-36. The Hoffman court declined to determine whether the denial of 
employment to Dr. Hoffman reached the constitutional magnitude of a violation 
of the due process clause because the claims for relief were moot. 
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Another potential area of constitutional applicability with 
respect to the handicapped is the equal protection clause.96 Several 
substantive difficulties are associated with suits alleging a violation 
of equal protection. Judicial inquiry into most such claims is limited 
to an analysis of whether there is any "rational basis" for the 
classification attacked, unless a fundamental right or a suspect 
classification is involved, in which case the courts will apply "strict 
scrutiny" to the classification and require the state to justify it with 
a compelling state interest.97 To date, public sector employment in 
itself has not been recognized as a "fundamental" right sufficient to 
invoke the "strict scrutiny" test unless an inherently "suspect" 
classification was involved,98 and the handicapped have not been 
These opinions indicate that courts inquiring into employment practices 
alleged to constitute irrebuttable presumptions resulting in handicap discrimina-
tion will proceed to a large degree along the same lines of inquiry mandated by 
the Rehabilitation Act and state fair employment statutes, discussed infra at 
notes 229-263 and accompanying text. That is, the courts will review physical 
standards for employment to ascertain whether they are in fact job-related, and 
also will seek to determine whether reasonable accommodations could have been 
made for the handicapped individual. To some extent, perhaps, this inquiry is 
necessary to ascertain whether the irrebuttable presumption is in fact 
universally true. Actually, however, the courts in irrebuttable presumption cases 
are requiring that the standards for employment meet a test higher than the 
rational basis test, see note 97 infra, a requirement that would not be imposed 
had the attack been made upon the rationality of the employment standards 
themselves under the equal protection clause. 
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § l. 
97. Under this traditional approach to equal protection, most statutory classifica-
tions that do not involve a suspect class are upheld, since judicial scrutiny under 
the rational basis test is extremely limited. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484 (1974) (state disability insurance program that excluded from coverage 
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy upheld as a non-gender based 
classification, rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the self-
supporting nature of the insurance program) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying compelling state interest test, on 
grounds that sex is a "suspect" classification, to a statute that prohibited 
servicewomen from claiming their husbands as dependents unless they showed 
that the husband was in fact dependent on the wife for more than one-half of his 
support). 
Recently, the Court has begun to apply what appears to be an intermediate 
test to classifications that, while not inherently "suspect," are deemed to require 
close scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying close scrutiny, 
the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males under 
the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) 
(rejecting the "compelling state interest" test but applying close scrutiny to strike 
down an Idaho statute giving preference to men over women as administrators 
of a decedant's estate). For a discussion of this phenomenon in the development 
of equal protection analysis, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine of a Changing Court: a Model of a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
98. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) 
(upholding a Massachusetts statute requiring mandatory retirement of uni-
formed state police officers at age 50 against a challenge that a classification 
based on age alone lacked a rational basis in furtherance of any substantial 
state interest). The Court in Murgia stated that "equal protection analysis 
requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to 
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recognized as a "suspect" classification.99 In fact, Justice Brennan's 
plurality opinion in Frontiero u. Richardson,100 holding that sex is a 
suspect classification, specifically excluded physical disability from 
the category. Justice Brennan stated: 
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as 
intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the 
recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society.101 
At least for the present, then, it appears that cases brought by 
handicapped individuals alleging fourteenth or fifth amendment 
violations are more apt to be successful if predicated upon 
irrebuttable presumption theories. 
b. The Civil Rights Acts 
Several federal civil rights statutes also may have relevance in 
cases involving allegations of handicap discrimination. Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,102 although not applicable to 
handicapped status discrimination as SUCh,103 may be helpful to 
plaintiffs who allege employment discrimination on the basis of 
handicaps that are particularly prevalent among persons of a 
particular race, ethnic ancestry, or sex. For example, discrimination 
because of physical problems associated with sickle cell anemia, 
which is an inherited disease occurring most frequently in blacks, 
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class," Id. at 312 (footnotes omitted), 
rejecting the contention that the right to public sector employment is a 
fundamental right. 
99. The plaintiffs argument in Gurmankin u. Costanzo that the blind constitute a 
"suspect classification" was rejected by the lower court in dictum: 
Even admitting that the blind are a small, politically weak minority that 
has been subjected to varying forms of prejudice and discrimination, the 
limitations placed on a person's ability by a handicap such as blindness 
cannot be ignored. Unlike distinctions based on race or religion, 
classifications based on blindness often can be justified by the different 
abilities of the blind and the sighted. 
411 F. Supp. at 992 n.8. 
To date, race, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954), national ancestry, 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and alienage, In re Griffiths, 
413 U.S. 717 (1973), are the only classifications other than sex, see note 97 supra, 
. to be regarded as inherently "suspect" and subjected to "strict scrutiny." For 
arguments on whether the handicapped should be considered a suspect 
classification, Compare Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The 
Qualifications' of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975) with Employment and the 
Disabled, note 2 supra, at 457-58. 
100. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
101. Id. at 682. 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (Supp. V 1975). 
103. Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6788 (D. Colo. 1977); McNutt v. Hills, 
426 F. Supp. 990, 1002 n.27 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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might have such a disproportionate impact upon blacks as to give 
rise to a cause of action for racial discrimination under Title VII.l04 
Recourse to Title VII may be limited, however, by judicial 
decisions holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination only on the 
basis of those characteristics that are inherently related to one's 
status as a member of one of the classifications covered by the 
law. l05 Thus, the mere fact that, for example, a statistically 
significant percentage of drug addicts are blacks,106 or that heart 
disease is more prevalent in males than females, would not warrant 
a holding that employment criteria which deny jobs to individuals 
with these impairments are prima facie violative of Title VII, absent 
proof that the impairments are inherently race or sex related. 
The same rationale should limit the use of Section 1981 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866107 as a remedy for handicapped status 
discrimination. Although Section 1981 has been held to afford a 
cause of action for employment discrimination in the private as well 
as the public sectors,108 the statute was enacted pursuant to the 
thirteenth amendment and its application generally has been limited 
to discrimination on the basis ofrace. l09 It has specifically been held 
104. Cf. Smith v. Olin Chemical Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (summary 
judgment for defendant on grounds that business necessity could be presumed 
for a job requirement of a "good back" in a manual labor position, even though 
plaintiff claimed that the job criteria impacted adversely upon blacks who 
suffered from sickle cell anemia); Woods v. Safeway Stores, 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. 
Va. 1976) (discharge of black plaintiff for failure to meet grooming code because 
of a beard grown on advice of a dermatologist as treatment for a skin condition 
that affects blacks almost exclusively, upheld on ground that there was a 
legitimate business purpose for the rule). 
105. See, e.g., Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 
1976); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Both 
cases refused to strike down a sex differentiated grooming regulation, holding 
that the regulation did not constitute discrimination based on either immutable 
sex characteristics or constitutionally protected activities. For a more detailed 
discussion of the cases on this point, see D. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw, 337-60 (1976). See also Ogden, 
Justice and the Problem of the Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417, 419. 
106. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against Rehabilitated Drug Addicts, 49 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 67, 70 (1974). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). 
108. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975): 
[1]t is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals - and we now 
join them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination 
in private employment on the basis of race. An individual who 
establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable 
and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstan-
ces, punitive damages. (citations omitted). 
109. The statute also has been held applicable to discrimination on the basis.of 
alienage, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), and 
national origin, Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975), 
vacated and remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977) 
(Mexican-Americans); Puerto Rican Council v. Metromedia, Inc., 10 F.E.P. Cas. 
1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Contra, Gradillas v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865, 
867 (D. Ariz. 1975). Korylas v. United States Dep't of Agric., 373 F. Supp. 1072, 
1075-76 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 514 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Section 1981 is 
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inapplicable to "pure" handicapped status discrimination,l1O and 
therefore should have relevance only where a handicap is inherently 
related to race.11I 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871112 presents another 
alternative for the redress of discrimination based upon handi-
capped status - an alternative that already has been recognized in 
a few federal courts,113 Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the 
fourteenth amendment,114 and establishes a private cause of action 
against 
every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States, or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities 
secured by the Constitution or the laws.1l5 
Section 1983 thus provides to the handicapped a statutory remedy 
for violations of any constitutional or federal statutory right .. 
Inasmuch as Section 1983 by its terms applies only to 
discriminatory action engaged in by persons acting under color of 
state law, relief is generally unavailable against private sector 
employers not so involved with the state that state action can be 
found to be present,11s Although state and local agencies and 
municipalities recently have been deemed "persons" subject to suit 
under Section 1983,117 the plaintiff is limited to recovery for official 
not applicable to discrimination based on sex. See, e.g., Agnew v. City of 
Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.s. 959 (1957); Terry v. 
Bridgeport Brass Co., 11 F.E.P. Cas. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 806 (7th 
Cir. 1975). 
110. Simon v. St. Louis City Police Dep't, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363, 1364 (E.D. Mo. 1977). 
111. In some circuits, if the handicap relates to the complainant's national origin, a 
§ 1981 action would also be possible. See note 109 supra. 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
113. See United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); King-Smith 
v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. 
Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W. Va. 1976). 
114. The title of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 states that it is "An Act to Enforce the 
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and for other Purposes," Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22 § 1, 17 Stat. 13. 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
116. See Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.s. 943 (1976); Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971). See also note 83 supra. 
117. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978). Monell overruled a 
substantial body of precedent which had effectively precluded injunctive and 
monetary relief under § 1983 against state and local agencies and municipalities. 
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Singleton v. Vance City Bd. of 
Educ., 501 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 
1973) (city is not a person suable under § 1983). 
Relying on pre-Monell precedent, however, the courts have permitted 
plaintiffs to sue local agencies or municipalities directly under the fourteenth 
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policies or customs that deprive him of civil rights. The local or state 
government, thus, cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for the 
"constitutional torts" of its employees under the doctrine of 
respondent superior.118 
Sections 1985(3)119 and 1986120 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
also may have utility in employment discrimination cases based on 
handicapped status. Section 1985(3) was enacted pursuant to the 
fourteenth amendment and provides a cause of action against 
persons who 
cons~ire or go in disguise on the highways or on the 
premIses of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the 
equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing 
or hindering the constituted authorities of any state or 
territory from giving or securing to all persons within such 
state or territory the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 1986 authorizes suits against persons who have knowledge 
that a violation of Section 1985 is about to be committed, but who 
neglect or refuse to exercise their power to prevent or aid in 
preventing the violation. 
To date, there have been no definitive rulings on whether 
Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action for conspiratorial 
handicap discrimination, although claims under the section have 
been raised in a few public sector cases. l21 Regardless of its 
amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1977), holding that the "person" requirement 
of § 1983 is not a jurisdictional bar to a suit against a municipality. See, e.g., Cox 
v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. 
No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Gray v. 
Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975); 
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Some 
courts have limited the relief available in such cases to equitable relief, holding 
that a claim for damages against a political subdivision is not cognizable under 
the fourteenth amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Raffety v. Prince George's Cty., 
423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976); Scott v. Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. N-76-1513 (D. 
Md. Sept. 2, 1977); Clipper v. Takoma Park, Civ. No. B-73-295 (D. Md. March 25, 
1975). See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional 
Violations, 89 HARv. L. REV. 922 (1976). 
118. Most courts, however, have permited a recovery of money damages against 
government officials sued in their individual capacities, although equitable relief 
has been denied on the grounds that it is inappropriate relief against one sued in 
his individual capacity. See, e.g., Burt v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 
1975); O'Brien v. Galloway, 362 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1973). 
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). 
120. Id. § 1986. 
121. See Simon v. St. Louis City Police Dep't, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 1363 (E.D. Miss. 1977) 
(holding that plaintiff failed to raise factual allegation sufficient to establish a 
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applicability, there would appear to be few situations In which 
Section 1985(3) would provide a better basis for a handicap 
discrimination suit against a public sector employer than that 
existing under Section 1983, which involves fewer elements of 
proof.122 The same limitations on relief and on suable defendants 
that exist with respect to an action under Section 1983 are applicable 
in suits against public sector defendants brought under Section 
1985(3).123 
In the private sector, however, Section 1985(3) could provide 
some plaintiffs with what might be the only means of obtaining 
federal judicial relief. Even if a private cause of action for 
employment discrimination exists under the Rehabilitation Act,124 
only those employers who are government contractors or recipients 
of federal aid would be subject to suit. As mentioned above, Section 
1981 would provide a cause of action against private employers only 
where the basis for discrimination is a race-related handicap,125 
Similarly, Title VII suits would be feasible only where the handicap 
discrimination has a disparate impact upon the classes protected by 
that statute.126 Thus, Section 1985(3) could be valuable to handi-
capped individuals alleging conspiratorial employment discrimina-
tion in the private sector who have no cause of action under the 
above-mentioned statutes. 
conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights under § 1985(3»; United Handicap Fed'n 
v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversing grant of defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, but with no discussion of the § 1985(3) claim); King-Smith v. 
Aaron, 455 F.2d 378,381-86 (3d Cir. 1972) (reversing lower court's dismissal of 
action on the basis of abstention doctrine but expressing no opinion on the 
merits of plaintiff's claims brought under the 14th Amendment and §§ 1983 and 
1985). 
Quaere, however, whether § 1985(3) applies to actions against public sector 
defendants alleging a conspiratorial violation of due process through, for 
example, an "irrebuttable presumption," see notes 87-96 and accompanying text 
supra, as opposed to actions challenging a denial of equal protection. See, e.g., 
Coltharp v. Cutler, 419 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Utah 1976). For a discussion of this 
issue, see C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, CIVIL PRACTICE §§96, 99 
(1971). 
122. The plaintiff in a § 1983 action need show only that he has been deprived of a 
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, that the defendant caused the deprivation, and, that in so doing, the • 
defendant acted. under color of state law. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 
436 (2d Cir. 1969); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
397 U.S. 991 (1970). Some district courts have begun to apply the Supreme 
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), requiring proof of 
purposeful discrimination in equal protection cases, to § 1983 suits alleging a 
violation of equal protection. See League v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 
(C.D. Calif. 1976). But see Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970). 
123. See notes 117:'18 supra. 
124. See notes 35 & 70 supra. 
125. See notes 107-111 and accompanying text supra. 
126. See notes 104-105 and accompanying text supra. 
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State action is not a prerequisite to Section 1985(3) suits,127 but 
in order to obtain relief against private sector defendants the 
plaintiff must prove a conspiracy based upon "some racial or 
perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus"128 
intended to deprive him of equal protection of the laws or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the law. In addition, the plaintiff 
must prove an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that either 
injured him in person or property or deprived him of having and 
exercising a right or privilege of citizens of the United States.129 To 
date, the only private conspiracy that the Supreme Court has 
recognized as actionable under Section 1983(5) is one intended to 
deprive Negro citizens of the right to travel or of thirteenth 
amendment rights.130 If this limitation is adhered to, the plaintiff 
would have no cause of action against private sector defendants 
under Section 1985(3) unless the conspiratorial handicap discrimina-
tion also impinged upon one of these rights, so that only race-related 
handicap discrimination in employment would be actionable. 
Nevertheless, some lower federal court opinions raise the possibility 
that "invidiously discriminatory" private conspiracies directed 
towards classes based on characteristics other than race may be 
actionable under Section 1985(3).131 
4. Summary of Federal Laws 
The above overview has illustrated that private sector employees 
and job applicants alleging handicapped status discrimination have 
127. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971). 
128. Id. at 102. 
129. Id. at 103. 
130. Id. at 105. 
131. See Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, opmwn withdrawn and 
vacated as moot, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing dismissal of § 1985(3) suit 
against private defendants who allegedly conspired to deprive environmentalist 
of his job); Marlowe V. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 1973) (action 
alleging conspiratorial deprivation of equal employment opportunities because of 
religious beliefs and national origin remanded inter alia on § 1985(3) claim); 
Action V. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming denial of motion to 
dismiss § 1985(3) action by white plaintiffs to enjoin organizations of blacks from 
conspiring to interrupt church services and interfering with first amendment. 
rights); Richardson V. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (reversing order 
dismissing § 1985(3) claim of white persons who advocated racial equality in 
employment opportunities); cf. Weise V. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408-09 
n.16 (2d Cir. 1975) (remanding, inter alia, on issue of whether conspiratorial sex 
discrimination is a "class-based inviduously discriminatory" violation of equal 
protection actionable under § 1985(3». Contra, Cohen V. Illinois Inst. of Tedi., 
524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (conspiratorial sex 
discrimination held not actionable under § 1985(3), absent state action); Bellamy 
V. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974) (private conspiracy to deprive 
Ku Klux Klan members of first amendment rights held not actionable under 
§ 1985(3»; Dombroski V. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (private conspiracy 
to deprive criminal lawyers of rental office space held not actionable under 
§ 1985(3». 
The argument can also be made that private conspiracies to deprive 
individuals of rights established by federal statutes, as well as constitutional 
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several possible sources of relief under federal law. 132 The Rehabilita-
tion Act provides for relief through the Department of Labor for the 
failure to meet affirmative action obligations if the employer is a 
government contractor or subcontractor. If the employer is a 
federally funded educational program for the handicapped or 
receives federal fmancial assistance under Title I of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, relief from discriminatory employment practices is 
available under the HEW regulations. Although their applicability 
to the employment practices of other federally funded programs is 
subject to challenge, the HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regula-
tions purport to provide this alternative with respect to all public 
and private sector programs receiving federal financial assistance, 
and the Treasury regulations reiterate this alternative with respect 
to programs receiving revenue sharing funds. In addition, although 
it is unlikely that a private cause of action would be implied under 
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act,133 there is substantial judicial 
authority that a private suit may be brought under Section 504 of the 
rights, may be challenged under § 1985(3). But see Doski v. Goldseker, 539 F.2d 
1326 (4th Cir. 1976) (no action under § 1985(3) for conspiratorial sex discrimina· 
tion where Title VII was available as a remedy and plaintiff had failed to perfect 
her rights thereunder); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Ga. 
1976) (no claim exists under § 1985(3) for conspiratorial age discrimination since 
the Age Discrimination In Employment Act provides the exclusive federal 
remedy). 
132. Another possible mechanism for alleviating certain types of handicap discrimi-
nation in employment is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970). Section 1994 was 
enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, and prohibits "the holding of 
any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage" in any 
territory or state. The section also invalidates 
all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory 
or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or 
by virtue of which any attempt shall' hereafter be made to establish, 
maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary 
service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or 
obligation, or otherwise. 
It has been suggested that § 1994 and other sections of the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1866 and 1871 could provide a means of achieving redress for handicapped 
individuals who are forced to perform work at the institutions where they are 
receiving treatment, sometimes for subminimum wages or no wages at all. See 
Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARv. 
L. REV. 567 (1974). While the practice of requiring patients to perform labor for 
no compensation or for unequal compensation may violate the ban against 
discrimination in compensation on the basis of a handicap set forth in the 
OFCCP and HEW regulations, any private cause of action that may exist under 
the Act would lie only against government contractors and federally-funded 
institutions. Although patient workers in private institutions are protected by the 
minimum wage provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Ach see Souder 
v. Brennan, 267 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973) and 29 C.F.R. pt. 529 (1976), these 
provisions are not applicable to most public sector employees. See Nat'l League 
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
Section 1994 thus could provide patient workers with a cause of action to fill 
the gaps, but the elements of the case may be difficult to establisp. See Friedman, 
supra. 
133. See note 35 supra. 
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Act, at least where the plaintiff has exhausted administrative 
remedies.134 
Moreover, discrimination on the basis of a handicap that is 
inherently race or sex-related may be challenged under Title VII, 
and race-related handicap discrimination claims might be raised 
under Section 1981 as well. A Section 1985(3) conspiracy action could 
be brought for discrimination on the basis of a race-related 
handicap, but whether the action is available when the suit is 
predicated on a private conspiracy directed towards a handicapped 
class as such is open to question for the present. Legal and equitable 
relief from private sector defendants is available in suits brought 
under anyone of these latter four statutes. 
All of the above alternatives are also available to public sector 
employees. In addition, the public sector victim of handicap 
discrimination may be entitled to relief under Section 1983 from 
officials acting under color of state law, as well as state and local 
agencies and municipalities, and, under the due process clauses of 
the fourteenth and fifth amendments, from both persons and entities 
involved in state action. The public sector employee's relief from 
governmental entities, however, may be limited to instances in 
which an official policy or custom is directly involved. Although 
state and local government officials may be sued in their 
individual capacities, equitable relief has been available only when 
the public official is sued in his official capacity.135 In addition, the 
defense of "qualified immunity" may preclude monetary awards 
against state or local governments or individuals acting in an 
official capacity unless they have acted in bad faith. 136 
While these federal statutes and constitutional provisions 
establish several possible sources of relief for handicap discrimina-
tion in employment, the above discussion also has revealed that 
each of the remedies is subject to certain limitations. Moreover, there 
are many unsettled questions of law as to the applicability of some 
remedies to the handicapped class, the scope of those remedies that 
may exist, the nature of the relief available, and the defendants who 
may be called upon to provide such relief. Ample grounds exist, then, 
for defending employers against administrative action or judicial 
complaints predicated on an alleged deprivation of federally 
protected employment rights of the handicapped. 
134. See note 70 supra. 
135. See note 118 supra. 
136. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), reh. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975) 
(compensatory awards against individual government officials are appropriate 
only if they "acted with such disregard of clearly established constitutional 
rights that [the] action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good 
faith"). C{. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978). 
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B. STATE AND LoCAL LAws 
At the present time, thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination against the 
handicapped in employment.137 There are differences among these 
137. ALASKA STAT. § 18:80:220(a)(I), (4) (Supp. 1976) (physical handicap); CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 1420 (West Supp. 1977) (physical handicap or mental condition); Anti· 
Discrimination Act of 1957, as amended by H.B. No. 1454,1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 
(to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306) (physical handicap); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1977) (physical disability); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. 
§ 6-1504 (West Supp. 1977·1978) (physical handicap); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(3) 
(West 1973 & Supp. 1977); Fair Employment Practice Law, amended by chs. 30 & 
109, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2) (physical 
handicap); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22, -23, ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1977); IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(l), -13 (Bums Supp. 1977) (certified handicaps only); 
IOWA CODE § 601A.6 (1975) (physical or mental disability); Act Against 
Discrimination as last amended S.B. 369, 1977 Kan. Sess. Laws (to be codified at 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009) (physical handicap only); 1976 Equal Opportunities 
Act, H.B. 407, ch. 280, Ky. Acts 1976 (to be codified as Ky. REV. STAT. 
§ 207.130(2), (3)(a), 150(1) (prohibits discrimination by public sector employers on 
the basis of physical handicaps only); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4572,4573(4) (West 
Supp. 1976-1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19 (Supp. 1977); MASS. ANN. LAws 
ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law Co-op 1976) (establishes a misdemeanor offense, 
punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $200, for the dismissal 
from employment of or refusal to hire, solely because of handicap, any qualified 
rehabilitated handicapped person); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 37.1202 (West 
Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(1) (West Supp. 1977); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 43-6-15 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
blindness or other physical handicaps in public sector employment); MONT. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 64-304 to -306(1), (2), (6)(c), (9) (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 48-1104 (1974) (physical or visual handicap); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (1975); 
Law Against Discrimination, H.B. 857, 1975 N.H. Laws (to be codified at N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1976) 
(physical handicap only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7 (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296 
(McKinney Supp. 1976-77); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Supp. 1975) (prohibits 
discrimination in hiring policies of state's personnel system on the basis of 
physical defect or impairment); id. § 168-6 (sets forth a right of handicapped 
persons to public sector employment on the same terms and conditions as the 
able-bodied); id. § 143-416.2 (establishes state public policy against employment 
discrimination on the basis of inter alia handicap); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§4112.02 (Page Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §659.425 (1975); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78); R.I. GEN. LAw § 28-5-7 (Supp. 1976) 
(physical handicap); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §3-6A-15 (1974) (prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of physical disability in state employment); Pub. ch. 
457, § 1, 1976 Tenn. Pub. Laws (makes discrimination in hiring practices on the 
basis of physical, mental or visual handicap a misdemeanor); TEX. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 441ge, § 3(f) (Vernon 1976) (makes discrimination against the 
handicapped a misdemeanor offense and establishes a cause of action for 
damages against employers who violate the law); see also Mentally Retarded 
Persons Act of 1977, § 9, S.B. 700, 1977 TEX. GEN. LAWS (forbidding the denial of 
equal opportunities in employment because of mental retardation); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Supp. 1976) (prohibits discrimination in employment on the 
basis of physical handicap and establishes civil action for damages or other 
equitable relief); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1976) (prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of physical handicap in employment by all employers not covered by the 
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and establishes private cause of action to 
enjoin such discrimination); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1976) 
(prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sensory, mental, or 
physical handicap); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1977) (prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of blindness); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(a), (f) (West 
1974 & Supp. 1977-78). 
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laws as to the type of administrative enforcement and relief 
authorized, and as to whether they provide for a private cause of 
action. 13B Many city and county governments also have adopted 
ordinances prohibiting employment discrimination against the 
handicapped.139 
For the most part, the state and local employment practice laws 
do not mandate affirmative action in the absence of a finding of past 
discrimination.l40 As will be discussed in more detail below,l4l 
however, judicial decisions and regulations promulgated by the 
agencies authorized to enforce these laws often render this a 
distinction without a difference, so that many of the same 
accommodation and affirmative action duties set forth in the 
OFCCP and HEW regulations have been made incumbent upon 
employers covered only by state fair employment practice statutes.142 
138. Most state laws establish a human relations commISSIon to investigate 
complaints of noncompliance, issue determinations of whether a violation 
occurred, conduct hearings, and issue orders enforceable by the judiciary. The 
remedies that the commissions may order vary, however. For example, the 
Maryland statute did not authorize the Maryland Commission on Human 
Relations to award back pay to victims of unfair employment practices until July 
1, 1977. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14(e) (Supp. 1977), as amended by H.B. 
No. 458, Act of March 22, 1977, ch. 937, 1977 Md. Laws. 
A private cause of action to enforce handicap discrimination statutes exists 
in the minority of states, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.10.020(c), 18.80.145 (Supp. 
1976); 1976 Equal Opportunities Act, H.B. 407, Ch. 280, 1976 Ky. Acts (to be 
codified as Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.230); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4621-4623 (West 
Supp. 1976-77); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.14 (West. Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 64-329 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613-420 (1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAw 
§ 297 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 962(c) (Purdon 
Supp. 1977-78); TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 441ge, § 6(b) (Vernon 1976); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, §498(b) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE §40.1-28.7 (1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ l11.36(3)(c) (West 1974 & Supp. 1977-78). 
139. See, e.g., BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 4 (1966), amended by Ordinance # 908 (1975). 
140. But see CAL. LAB. CODE § 1431(a), (b) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 
§ 854 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (state contractors); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 784 . 
(West Supp. 1976-1977) (state contractors); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West 1974 & 
Supp. 1977-78) (state contractors). 
141. See notes 303-314 and accompanying text infra. 
142. Some state laws, however, prohibit the imposition on employers of the duty to 
make certain types of accommodations. See Fair Employment Practice Law, as 
amended by ch. 30, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws' (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 378-9(7» (unreasonable structural changes or expensive alterations are not 
required); 1976 Equal Opportunities Act, H.B. 407 ch. 280, Ky. Acts 1976 (to be 
codified as Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.150) (employer not required to modify facilities 
or grounds or exercise a higher degree of caution for the handicapped); IND. 
CODE § 22-9-1-13(c) (Supp. 1977) (employer not required to modify physical 
accommodations or administrative procedures for the handicapped). 
On the other hand, some states require accommodations for the handicaI1ped 
as an element of the nondiscrimination duty. See Colorado Anti-Discrimination 
Act of 1957, amended by H.B. No. 1454, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as 
COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-306(1)(a» (not unlawful for employer to discriminate 
against the handicapped if no reasonable accommodation can be made); D.C. 
CODE ENCYCL. § 34-3.1 (West Supp. 1977-78) (defines handicap as a disability 
for which reasonable accommodation can be made); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. 
§§ 37.1202(f), (g), .1207 (Supp. 1977-78) (accord). 
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In addition, many states also have "White Cane Laws" designed 
primarily to define the rights and responsibilities of blind persons, 
particularly in relation to the use of white canes and guide dogs.!43 
In some states, White Cane Laws have been broadened to include 
other types of handicaps as well.144 Most White Cane Laws merely 
set forth a public policy statement or make discrimination on the 
basis of handicapped status a misdemeanor.145 White Cane Laws 
generally impact only upon employment rights in the public sector, 
if they apply to employment at all.146 
Maryland's range of laws impacting upon employment rights of 
the handicapped is fairly typical. The Maryland fair employment 
practice laws are set forth in Article 49B of the Maryland Annotated 
CodeY7 Section 19(a) of Article 49B makes it an unlawful 
employment practice for employers covered by the law to refuse to 
hire or to discriminate in terms or conditions of employment against 
any individual "because of such individual's ... physical or mental 
handicap lUlrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably 
preclude the performance of the employment," or to classify such 
individuals in ways that would tend to deprive them of employment 
opportunities or adversely affect their status. as employees. 
Complaints of handicap discrimination may be filed with the 
Maryland Commission on Human Relations (the Commission), 
which is empowered to investigate, render findings on, and 
conciliate such complaints.14s If conciliation cannot be achieved, the 
Commission is authorized to hold public hearings, issue enforcement 
orders, and award relief, including injunctive relief, equitable relief, 
and back pay.149 The Commission is empowered to seek enforcement 
of its orders in the appropriate equity court of the county where the 
alleged discrimination took place. l50 Article 49B does not provide for 
a private cause of action by discrimination victims. 
Section 19(a) of Article 49B applies to all private sector 
employers with fifteen or more employees,151 and the Maryland 
Court of Appeals recently held in Maryland Commission on Human 
Relations v. Mayor of Baltimore,152 that employees of the state's 
143. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §46-1951 (West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 30, §33 
(1976). 
144. See LA. REV. STAT. § 46-1951 (West 1977) (applies to blind, visually handicapped, 
and "otherwise physically disabled"). 
145. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 3364,3365 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 30, § 33(g) (1976). 
146. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 3365 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). 
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17-20 (Supp. 1977). 
148. Id. §§ 12-15. 
149. Id. § 14(e) as amended by H.B. No. 458, Act of March 22, 1977, ch. 937, 1977 Md. 
Laws. 
150. Id. § 15(a). 
151. Id. § 18(b). 
152. 280 Md. 35, 371 A.2d 645 (1977). 
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political subdivisions also are covered. In addition, Section l1(b) of 
Article 49B prohibits discriminatory employment practices by state 
agency employees. The authority of the Commission with respect to 
complaints of viola:tions of Section l1(b) is limited, however, to 
investigation, conciliation, mediation, and reporting to the governor. 
Maryland also has a White Cane Law, which provides in part: 
It is the policy of this State that the blind or visually 
handicapped shall be employed in the State service, the 
service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public 
schools, and in all other employment supported in whole or 
in part by public funds on the same terms and conditions as 
the persons not so handicapped, unless it is shown that the 
particular handicap prevents the performances of the work 
involved.153 
Although Maryland's White Cane Law contains no provisions for 
administrative enforcement, it makes interference with rights of a 
blind or visually handicapped person under the law a misdemeanor 
offense. 154 
III. ISSUES ARISING UNDER LAWS GOVERNING EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HANDICAPPED 
The above overview of the laws pertaining to employment 
discrimination against the handicapped has been limited to an 
outline of. their basic provisions and coverage. The judicial 
application of these laws to date has not been extensive. Neverthe-
less, regulations issued by the state and federal agencies and a few 
isolated lower court cases suggest the types of issues that will likely 
predominate in handicap discrimination litigation, and some trends 
as to their probable resolution. It is already clear that three problems 
will pose difficult issues for the courts. These three problems are: (1) 
identifying those employees and job applicants who are handi-
capped within the meaning ofthe law, (2) determining whether these 
individuals nevertheless are qualified for a job, and (3) determining 
whether or to what extent accommodations must be made for their 
handicaps. 
A. IDENTIFYING HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS 
1. Federal Standards 
The identification of individuals who are considered handi-
capped and thus entitled to benefit from affirmative action or to 
receive protection from discrimination is the. first and most crucial 
problem for the employer. The difficulty associated with this task is 
153. MD. ANN. CODE art. 30, § 33(b) (1976). 
154. Id. § 33(g). 
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evidenced by the fact that Congress failed in its first attempt to 
define adequately the diverse class of "handicapped individuals" 
entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act. In the 1973 Act, 
the term "handicapped individual" was defined as 
any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability 
which for such individual constitutes or results in a 
substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably 
be expected to benefit in terms of employability from 
vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to 
[Titles I and III] of this Act. I55 
In less than a year, Congress recognized that this definition was 
too narrow. First, the definition permitted government contractors to 
condition the affirmative action required under Section 503 of the 
Act upon a handicapped individual's having benefited or having a 
reasonable expectation of benefit from vocational rehabilitation 
programs. Second, the definition made the protection from discrimi-
nation in federally assisted programs accorded by Section 504 of the 
Act available only to those individuals whose disability was a 
handicap to employment. The section thus effectively failed to 
prohibit discrimination in federally assisted housing, medical, or 
other programs against handicapped individuals who were em-
ployed. I56 
Accordingly, in the 1974 Amendment to the Rehabilitation Act, 
Congress added a new definition of "handicapped individual," for 
the purposes of Section 503's affirmative action mandate for federal 
contractors and Section 504's non-discrimination mandate for 
programs receiving federal financial assistance. This new definition 
describes a "handicapped individual" as "any person who (A) has a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or 
more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such 
impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such impairment."157 This 
statutory definition is incorporated into the various regulations 
issued to implement the Act. 
The regulations provide further illumination as to certain 
aspects of the statutory definition. Although the OFCCP regulations 
do not explain what "physical or mental impairments" are included 
under the statutory definition, both the HEW and Executive Order 
11,914 regulations provide that: 
"Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiologi-
cal disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatom-
155. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. IV 1974). 
156. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388-89. 
157. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975). 
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ical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respira-
tory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; 
digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and 
endocrine or (B) any mental or psychological disorder such 
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or 
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 15s 
It should be noted that HEW has not defined the term 
"impairment" in reference to the degree of severity or duration of the 
impairing condition. Thus, a minimal and temporary physiological 
condition affecting any body system, or, in the case of mental 
disorders, minimal retardation or temporary emotional illness, 
theoretically is covered.159 The impairment must "substantially 
limit" an individual in a "major life activity," however, before the 
individual can be deemed "handicapped" under the statutory 
criteria. 
The HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations refrain from 
defining the phrase "substantially limits ... major life activities," 
but the OFCCP regulations state that "a handicapped individual is 
'substantially limited' if he or she is likely to experience difficulty 
in securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a 
handicap."l60 
Both OFCCP and HEW have attempted to delineate the types of 
"major life activities" the "substantial limitation" of which results 
in an impaired person's being deemed "handicapped." Appendix A 
to the OFCCP regulations interprets the phrase "life activities" to 
158. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(j)(2)(i), 85.31(b)(i). The Secretary of HEW has noted that 
although this definition does not list specific diseases or conditions deemed to be 
handicaps, it covers "such diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech 
and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple 
sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, 
and ... drug addiction and alcoholism." 42 Fed. Reg. 22685 (1977). 
159. The Secretary's analysis of the final regulations states, however: 
It should be emphasized that a physical or mental impairment does not 
constitute a handicap for purposes of section 504 unless its severity is 
such that it results in a substantial limitation of one or more major life 
activities. Several comments observed .the lack of any definition in the 
proposed regulations of the phrase "substantially limits." The Depart-
ment does not believe that a definition of this term is possible at this 
time. 
A related issue raised by several comments is whether the definition 
of handicapped individuals is unreasonably broad .... The Department 
continues to believe, however, that it has no flexibility within the 
statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe, 
permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded 
as handicaps. The Department intends, however, to give particular 
attention in its enforcement of section 504 to eliminating discrimination 
against persons with the severe handicaps that were the focus of concern 
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
42 Fed. Reg. 22685-86 (1977). 
160. 41 C.F.R. 60-741.2 (1977) (emphasis added). 
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include "communication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization, educa-
tion, vocational training, employment, transportation, adapting to 
housing, etc.,"16I but provides that for the purpose of Section 503, 
primary attention is given to those life activities affecting employa-
bility. Similarly, the HEW regulations define "major life activities" 
to include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working."162 
In addition to providing an amplification of the components of 
clause (A) of the statutory definition of "handicapped individual" 
(an "impairment" which "substantially limits" one or more "major 
life activities"), the agency regulations explicate what is meant by 
clause (B) of that delmition ("has a record of such an impairment"), 
·~md clause (C) ("is regarded as having such an impairment"). With 
respect to clause (B), the OFCCP's Appendix A guidelinesI63 and the 
HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations164 indicate that this 
aspect of the statutory definition of a "handicapped individual" 
extends the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act to individuals who 
previously were erroneously classified as handicapped - for 
example, as mentally ill or retarded - and those who may be 
recovered in whole or in part, from a previous physical or mental 
impairment - such as the mentally restored and those who have 
had and recovered from heart attacks or cancer. An implication of 
this aspect of the definition is that an employer may have 
obligations with respect to individuals who, because of their previous 
handicaps, have had poor work attendance or productivity records. 
In other words, such records may not totally justify an adverse 
employment decision if the record resulted from a past handicap that 
does not presently exist. 
With respect to clause (C) of the statutory definition - "is 
regarded as having such an [mental or physical] impairment" - the 
HEW regulations state: 
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a 
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as 
constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities 
only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such 
impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in 
paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated as having 
such an impairment.165 
161. Id. pt. 60-741, app. A (1977). 
162. 45 C.F.R. 84.3G)(2)(ii); see id. § 85.31(b)(2). 
163. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741, app. A (1977). 
164. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3G)(2)(iii); id. § 85.31(3). 
165. Id. § 84.3G)(2)(iv); see id. § 85.31(b)(4). 
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According to the Secretary of HEW's commentary on the regula-
tions, this part is intended to include those persons who are 
"ordinarily considered" to be handicapped but who do not techni-
cally fall within the first two parts of the statutory definition, "such 
as persons with a limp;" those who might not ordinarily be 
considered handicapped, "such as persons with disfiguring scars;" 
and those who actually have no physical or mental impairment but 
who "are treated by a recipient as if they were handicapped."166 
The OFCCP regulations do not define "is regarded as having 
such an impairment," but the Appendix A definitional guidelines of 
the OFCCP regulations state that this phrase 
refers to those individuals who are perceived as having a 
handicap, whether an impairment exists or not, but who, 
because of attitudes or for any other reason, are regarded as 
handiCapped by employers, or supervisors who have an 
effect on the individual securing, retaining or advancing in 
employment.167 
No one agency has issued regulations that explicate all aspects 
of the statutory definition of a "handicapped individual." It is 
possible, however, to read the regulations together, with one set 
filling in the gaps left by the others, so as to obtain a more complete 
picture of the agencies' collective interpretation of the elements of 
the definition. There is some support for this approach, even though, 
as indicated above, employers are covered by the provisions of 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (and the HEW and Executive 
Order 11,914 regulations) only if they are recipients of federal 
financial assistance, and by Section 503 (and the OFCCP regula-
tions) only if they are federal contractors. The 1974 Amendment's 
definition of a "handicapped individual" applies to both Sections 503 
and 504 of the Act, and the legislative history of the Amendment 
indicates that Sections 503 and 504 are to be administered in a 
consistent and uniform manner by the federal agencies involved.168 
Accordingly, those aspects of the statutory definition of a handi-
capped individual that are amplified in the OFCCP regulations, but 
166. 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977) (emphasis added). 
167. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741, app. A (1977). 
168. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6391. See also Exec. Order 11,914, § 5,3 C.F.R. 117,118 (1977), which 
provides in part: 
The Secretary shall ensure that such rules, regulations, and orders 
[adopted to carry out his responsibilities under the Order] are not 
inconsistent with, or duplicative of, other Federal Government policies 
relating to the handicapped, including these policies adopted in 
accordance with sections 501, 502, and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, as amended, or the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4151-4157 (Supp. V 1975)). 
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not in the HEW or Executive Order 11,914 regulations, and vice 
versa, must be considered by both federal contractors and recipients 
of federal financial assistance. 
Taken together, the definitional aspects of these regulations 
purport to create a vast class of persons who may be deemed 
"handicapped," and thus entitled to the protection of Sections 503 
and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. First, as pointed out above, 
HEW's interpretation of the types of impairments included within 
the statutory definition of a handicap does not refer to the severity of 
the impairment, so that handicap discrimination complaints 
presumably can be asserted by individuals who are impaired only 
minimally. Second, OFCCP has liberally construed the term 
"substantially limits" by defining it as "likely to experience 
difficulty ... in employment" - a phrase that conceivably could 
apply to anyone who is denied a job and a phrase that presumes that 
employment in and of itself, is the type of "major life activity" to 
which Congress was referring. Thus, an individual with a minimal 
impairment that has resulted in the loss of a single job opportunity 
theoretically may be entitled to the protection of Sections 503 and 
504 under the combined effect of these regulations, even if his 
lifestyle has not been affected otherwise by his impairment. 
Both OFCCP and HEW appear to have correctly interpreted 
clause (B), "has a record of such an impairment," and clause (C), "is 
regarded as having such an impairment." Congress clearly intended 
to accord protection (1) to individuals who in fact have no 
impairment, but who are perceived as or have a record of being 
impaired, and (2) to individuals who have, have a record of, or are 
perceived as having impairments that actually impose no substan-
tial limitation on their ability to engage in major life activities, but 
which are treated as imposing such a limitation. A problem with 
clause (C) of the definition, however, results from HEW's interpreta-
tion of "impairment" and OFCCP's construction of "substantially 
limits." Virtually anyone who has been denied a job because of a 
failure to meet a physical or mental, as opposed to educational, job 
requirement could argue that he has been "perceived" as "impaired" 
and "substantially limited" as a result thereof. The "perceived" 
impairment apparently need not be an obvious one, and could be so 
innocuous as the "emotional illness" of fear of height that precludes 
the job applicant from working on the top floor of a skyscraper. The 
employer accordingly could be required to establish that the fear of 
height could not be accommodated by, for example, putting the 
individual in a job on the first floor of the building. 
Such a result admittedly would be possible only under a broad 
reading of the defmitions and regulations. An OFCCP summary of 
the facts of the cases in which the agency has obtained back pay 
settlements for handicap discrimination complainants indicates 
however, that OFCCP intends to apply the "handicapped individ-
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ual" definition as broadly as its regulations permit. The "handicaps" 
involved in these cases included an intestinal infection, an injury to 
the right elbow, an extra vertebra in the back, a bleeding ulcer, 
hypertension, anemia, alcoholism, and what was vaguely described 
as mental instability and emotional illness.169 There was little 
significant comment on the severity, duration, or curability of any of 
these conditions, and there was nothing to indicate that any of the 
complainants previously had been at all limited in major life 
activities as a result of their condition, or that they were likely to 
experience limitations in the future. Moreover, there was no 
indication in many cases that the complainant had even experienced 
previously difficulty in obtaining employment. In fact, many of the 
complainants had obtained jobs with different employers by the time 
a back pay settlement was made. Clearly, many of these "handic-
aps" would not substantially limit the individual in terms of general 
employability, although the handicap may have caused the 
individual's rejection for a particular job. 
In essence therefore, OFCCP, at least, has made handicapped 
status a result of one's treatment by the defendant employer in a 
discrimination case, rather than a result of the relationship, or 
generally perceived relationship, of an impairment to one's ability to 
function normally. The legislative history of the 1974 Amendment 
signifies that Congress had precisely the opposite intent. First, it 
appears that Congress was attempting by the 1974 Amendment to . 
change the emphasis of the statutory definition applied to Section 
503 and 504 from a focus on isolated external factors, such as 
difficulty in obtaining employment or prospects of benefiting from 
rehabilitation programs, to a focus on the impact of the impairment 
itself upon normal body functions. Thus, the section -by section 
analysis of the 1974 Amendment, attached to the Conference 
Committee's report, indicates that the mere fact that one's employa-
bility is impeded by an impairment is not sufficient to render one 
handicapped - that employment, in and of itself, is not the type of 
"major life activity" to which Congress meant to refer. The report 
states: "In contrast [to the old definition], the definition proposed in 
the Committee substitute focuses on substantial limitations of one or 
more of an individual's major life activities, rather than focusing on 
handicaps to employment, vocational goals, and prospective benefit 
from vocational rehabilitation services."17o 
Moreover, the Senate bill that first suggested an amended 
definition for "handicapped individual" originally included the 
phrase "a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 
such person's functioning or one or more of such person's major life 
169. See OFCCP BACK PAY CASES SUMMARY, note 34 supra. 
170. S. REP. No. 39-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 6373, 6414 (emphasis added). 
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activities." The deletion of "such person's functioning" as "redund-
ant" illustrates that Congress intended to use the phrase "major life 
activities" in its basic sense to convey the notion that the 
impairments covered by the definition must have a significant 
impact upon operational ability.17l "Major life activities" therefore 
must be those required to maintain the level of autonomy normally 
expected of individuals of the same age. The term would include 
locomotion, communication, perception, and other similar "activi-
ties," but not playing, learning, or working. While the extent to which 
one's major life activities are limited or are perceived to be limited 
may be manifested in a decreased access to playmates, an education, 
or a job, these deprivations are the effect, rather than the cause, of 
one's status as a "handicapped individual" as Congress has defined 
the term. Under O'FCCP's contrary interpretation, the definition is a 
tautological curiosity that is no help whatsoever to employers, 
agencies, or the courts. 
The available legislative history further indicates that by 
adding clause (C) - "is regarded as having such an impairment"-
to the statutory definition, Congress was not trying to reach 
individuals who are denied a particular job by a single employer 
merely because they were erroneously believed to be physically or 
mentally incapable of performing the job. Instead, Congress 
intended to protect individuals who have or exhibit the obvious 
characteristics of impairments that generally are perceived, albeit 
erroneously, as resulting in a substantial limitation upon function-
ing. The Conference Committee's section-by-section analysis of the 
1974 Amendment states, as an example of clause (C),s application, 
that it pertains to "a person with some kind of visible physical 
impairment which in fact does not substantially limit that person's 
functioning." 1 72 
171. Id. [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6389. 
172. Id. [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6414 (emphasis added). 
An additional argument against a broad application of the statutory 
definition of a handicapped individual results when that definition is compared 
with the definition of a "disabled veteran" under the Veterans' Readjustment 
Act, i.e., one "entitled to disability compensation under laws administered by the 
Veterans' Administration for disability rated at 30 per centum or more, or whose 
discharge from active duty was for a disability incurred or aggravated in the line 
of duty." 38 U.S.C. § 2011(1) (Supp. V 1975). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2 (1977). 
It is difficult to conceive of a disabled veteran covered by this definition who 
would not also be deemed "handicapped" under OFCCP's broad interpretation of 
the Rehabilitation Act definition. But see note 40 supra. Yet, if Congress had 
intended that the definition of a handicapped individual set forth in the 
Rehabilitation Act be construed so broadly as to include disabled veterans, 
there would have been no need to cover "disabled veterans," as well as veterans 
of the Vietnam Era, under the affinnative action provisions of the Veterans' 
Readjustment Act of 1974. The Veterans' Act was enacted subsequent to the 
Rehabilitation Act and the 1974 Amendments to the Act, but before the first set 
of proposed regulations to implement § 503 were issued. With the exception of the 
requirement that the federal contractor list all employment vacancies with the 
local employment service office, disabled veterans derive no employment benefits 
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Notwithstanding these indications in the legislative history that 
Congress anticipated a narrower construction of the statutory 
definition of a "handicapped individual," OFCCP, at least, has 
tended to assert jurisdiction over complaints filed by any individual 
who alleged that he had been denied a single job opportunity 
because of an existing, previous, or perceived mental or physical 
condition of any type. 173 Employers, therefore, constantly must be 
alert to the possibility that an employee or job applicant may 
consider, himself "handicapped." Perhaps because of the latitude 
given by OFCCP to the term "handicapped," however, the agency 
regulations establish some procedural methods by which a govern-
ment contractor can alleviate the risk of unexpected complaints of a 
violation of Section 503. First, the OFCCP regulations require the 
contractor to issue an "invitation" to all employees and job 
applicants to identify themselves as "handicapped individuals" if 
they wish 10 take advantage of the contractor's affirmative action 
plan. If the contractor complies with this requirement, it is not 
obligated to search the medical records of job applicants or 
employees to ascertain those who are entitled to the benefit of 
affirmative action. On the other hand, employees may take 
advantage of the invitation at any time, and the issuance of the 
invitation does not relieve the contractor of its obligations to 
individuals of whose handicaps it has actual knowledge, nor does it 
relieve the contractor of liability for discrimination against the 
handicapped. 1 74 
Second, the OFCCP regulations permit the government contrac-
tor to require a job applicant or employee to submit medical 
documentation of an alleged "impairment," or, in the alternative, to 
undergo a medical examination at the contractor's expense. The 
medical documentation of a handicap required under this provision 
must be based upon the American Medical Association Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. 175 Employers might be well 
from the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974 that were not already available to 
them as "handicapped individuals" under OFCCP's interpretation of the 
applicability of the Rehabilitation Act. 
173. See OFCCP SUMMARY OF BACK PAY CASES, note 34 supra. 
174. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c) (1977). 
The invitation must state that any information given by the employee is 
voluntarily provided, that it will be kept confidential, that refusal to provide it 
will not subject the applicant or employee to any adverse treatment, and that it 
will be used only in accordance with the Act and the regulations. Id. 
§ 60-741.5(c)(l) Appendix B to the OFCCP Guidelines sets forth an acceptable 
form for such an invitation. 
175. Id. § 60-741.7(b)(d). 
The regulations provide that any determination of a handicap required by 
the employer must meet the requirements of § 60-741.5(c), which sets forth the 
safeguards applicable to "invitations" to identify oneself as handicapped. Thus, 
the medical information obtained must be kept confidential. The provisions of 
§ 60-741.5(c)(I) and § 60-741.7(c) conflict, however, in that the latter section 
infers that the contractors may require medical documentation, while the former 
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advised to absorb the expense of providing a medical examination 
conducted by their company physicians in accordance with the 
Guides to any employee or applicant who alleges that he is 
"handicapped." Interestingly enough, the Guides would appear to 
impose more stringent standards for the assessment of an impair-
ment than those expressed in the definitional aspects of the OFCCP 
and HEW regulations and guidelines. The Guides refer only to 
permanent impairments, which are defmed as "an anatomic or 
functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation 
has been achieved, which abnormality or loss a physician considers 
stable or nonprogressive at the time evaluation is made." The 
"evaluation of permanent impairment" conducted by the physician, 
according to the Guides, is "[a]n appraisal of the nature and extent 
of the patient's illness or injury as it affects his personal efficiency 
in one or more of the activities of daily living. These activities are 
self-care, communication, normal living posture, ambulation, eleva-
tion, traveling, and non-specialized hand activities."176 
The OFCCP regulations limit the applicability of the Guides to 
the determination of the existence, rather than the degree, of 
impairment, however.177 Under the Guides, an individual with a 
20/25 measure of central visual acuity in one eye has a total visual 
impairment of only one percent,178 but the OFCCP regulations 
indicate that, nevertheless, such an individual would be considered 
"handicapped" ifthe visual impairment resulted in the loss of a job. 
For the present, therefore, employers should be made cognizant of 
the potential for liability under Section 503 and 504 that inures in 
large measure from the liberal view of the agencies responsible for 
implementing these sections as to what constitutes a "handicap." 
indicates that information must be obtained on a voluntary basis with the 
assurance that refusal to provide it will not subject the applicant to adverse 
treatment. 
The Maryland proposed regulation similarly provides that H[w]henever 
there is a question or dispute as to the handicap or as to limitations of the 
handicapped person, medical vertification shall be obtained by the complain-
ant." 5 Md. Reg. 532 (1978) (to be codified as XVI COMAR (Code of Maryland 
Regulations) § 14.03.03(A) (hereinafter referred to by COMAR volume and section 
number). It is not clear, however, whether this is a procedural prerequisite for the 
Commission in the processing of charges filed by an individual who is claimed 
by the defendant employer not to be handicapped, or whether any individual 
who files a charge against his employer must first provide the employer with 
medical proof of his handicap. 
176. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON RATING OF MENTAL AND 
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT 
IMPAIRMENT preface, iii (1972) (hereinafter cited as AMA GUIDES TO 
EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT). 
177. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.7(d) (1977). 
178. AMA GUIDES TO EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT, ch. VII, Tables 1 and 5. 
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2. Maryland Standards 
Most of the state statutes prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment against the handicapped also set forth a definition of the class 
of individuals entitled to statutory protection. The variety of 
definitions provided 179 and, in some states, the absence of any 
definition for "handicap"l80 further illustrates the difficulty in 
formulating a description of this diverse minority class. The state 
definitions generally differ in several significant aspects from the 
definition in the Rehabilitation Act.18l The Maryland statute, which 
is more specific than most, provides: 
The term "physical or mental handicap" means any 
physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigure-
ment which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness 
including epilepsy, and which shall include, but not be 
limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of 
physical coordination, blindness or visual impairment, 
deafness or hearing impairment, muteness or speech 
impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog, 
wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device; and any 
mental impairment or deficiency as, but not limited to, 
retardation or such other which may have necessitated 
remedial or special education and related services.182 
179. Some state statutory deImitions of a handicap require that the condition be 
verified. E.g., Fair Employment Practice Law, amended by chs. 30 and 109, 1975 
Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1(7»; 1976 Equal 
Opportunities Act, H.B. 407, ch. 280, 1976, Ky. Acts (to be codified as Ky. REV. 
STAT. § 207.130(2»; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(20) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(7-a) (West Supp. 1976-77); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. 
§37.1103(b)(i) (West Supp. 1977-78); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.01(M) (Page 
Supp. 1976). Others specifically require some degree of permanence. HAW. REV. 
STAT. supra; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. supra. Some statutory definitions build in 
the concept that the condition must be unrelated to the individual's ability to 
perform the job sought, see IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(q) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA 
CODE § 601A.2(11) (1975); Act Against Discrimination, as amended S.B. 369, 1977 
Kan. Sess. Laws (to be codified as RAN. STAT. § 44-1002(j); ME. REV. STAT. supra; 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1974); Law Against Discrimination, H.B. 857, 1975 
N.H. Laws (to be codified as N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:3(13»; N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 4-33-2(K) (1974); N.Y. EXEC. LAw, supra; OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(2) 
(1975); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(p) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78), and others 
include in the deImition the concept of "reasonable accommodation" for the 
handicapped. See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 34-3.1 (West Supp. 1977-78). Some 
provide no guidance as to the specific types of impairments covered, while others 
list certain types of impairments deemed to be handicaps under the law. 
Compare Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, as last amended by H.B. 1454, 1977 
Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-302); D.C. CODE 
ENCYCL. supra; HAW. REV. STAT. supra, with MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(s) 
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. supra; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(q) (West Supp. 
1976); R.I. GEN. LAw § 28-5-7(H) (Supp. 1976). 
180. The Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin statutes 
contain no definition of the handicapped or disabled individuals entitled to 
protection under those states' non-discrimination laws. See note 138 supra. 
181. But see Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, as last amended by H.B. 1454, 1977 
Colo. Sess. Laws (to be codified as COL. REV. STAT. § 24-34-302(7.5». 
182. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(g) (Supp. 1977). 
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It first should be noted that the Maryland definition does not 
narrow the types of handicaps covered to those that substantially 
limit major life activities, as does the Rehabilitation Act. On its face, 
then, the definition would appear to cover an individual with any 
one of the listed disabilities, no matter how minor its effect on his 
lifestyle. The Maryland Commission on Human Relations at one 
time limited the breadth of the definition by promulgating proposed 
regulations183 intended to serve as "guidlines" for employers, which 
stated in a "working definition" that a handicapped person was "a 
person with a physical or mental disability or impairment, or a 
person with a record of this impairment, which results in a barrier to 
empioyment. 184 The Commission has since revised its definition to 
comport with that set forth in the statute.185 
It further should be noted that although the Maryland statute on 
its face covers only existing impairments, the Commission's original 
"working definition" purported to expand the coverage to include 
persons with a record of an impairment. Although this aspect of the 
regulatory def'mition also has been deleted since, and, even if finally 
adopted, would not have had the force of law,18B the original draft 
indicates that the Commission may attempt to assert jurisdiction 
over, investigate, issue determinations, and hold hearings on 
complaints filed by individuals who are not currently impaired but 
who only have records of impairments. The doctrine requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies makes it difficult for 
employers to challenge this practice until after the Commission has 
issued an order against them. The Commission, however, never has 
included individuals who are regarded as having handicaps within 
183. 4 Md. Reg. 967-69 (1977) (to be codified as XVI COMAR - Code of Maryland 
Regulations - §§ 14.03.01-.07). 
. The Maryland Commission's Notice of Intended Action states that the 
regulations "will establish guidelines for anti-discrimination as it relates to the 
physically and mentally handicapped." 4 Md. Reg. 967 (1977). The Administrator 
of State Documents originally declined to publish the proposed guidelines 
because Article 49B does not delegate to the commission the power to promulgate 
rules or regulations, and the administrator could find no implied power. The 
Maryland Attorney General rendered an opinion, however, that the commis-
sion's proposed guidelines could be categorized as "interpretive rules without the 
force of law for which the Commission needs no express statutory to 
promulgate." 62 OP. ATIY. GEN. 77-20 (1977). 
184. XVI COMAR § 14.03.02B (emphasis added). 
185. 5 Md. Reg. 532 (1978) (to be codified as XVI COMAR § 14.03.02). The revised 
regulations were originally intended to become effective on or about June 2, 1978. 
The Commission is currently reevaluating the regulations, however, and as of 
this date (June 20, 1978) has not issued a final rulemaking. 
186. See notes 183 & 185 supra. 
187. See Soley v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 356 A.2d 254 
(1976). In Soley, the plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the 
Maryland Commission had issued complaints that were not in compliance with 
§ 12(b) of Article 49B. The court specifically rejected the contention that 
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its "working defmition." Thus, in Maryland, an individual who is 
denied an employment opportunity because he is perceived as 
suffering from an impairment that is included within the Maryland 
definition of a handicap should not be that fact alone become 
entitled to the protection of the statute. 
It should be recognized that the Maryland statutory definition of 
a "handicap" includes an enumeration of specific types of impair-
ments deemed to be handicaps, which may result in the exclusion of 
some physical or mental problems that might otherwise appear to be 
covered by the general language in the definition. A recent decision 
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, construing a statutory 
definition of "handicap" that tracks Maryland's in structure and 
language,188 exemplifies this point. The court concluded in Provi-
dence Journal Co. v. Mason,189 that its state legislature could not 
have intended the unreasonable and burdensome consequences that 
would flow from interpreting a statutory definition of the term 
"handicap'" so broadly as to encourage persons with any medical 
problem whatsoever to seek relief from the state employment 
practices commission.l90 Thus, the court held, the more general 
language in the statutory definition of a handicap, which would 
appear to include any physical disability no matter how slight, was 
limited by the enumeration of several specific injuries, infirmities, 
and malformations that are deemed to be physical handicaps. The 
court found that all the impairments listed were of a serious or 
permanent nature, inferring therefrom a legislative intent to accord 
protection only to those individuals suffering from either a serious 
injury or an impairment of more than a temporary nature. The court 
then concluded that the plaintiffs "Whiplash" injury, which had 
caused only "some pain and discomfort," was not a handicap of such 
a serious or permanent nature.19l 
The same analysis should be applied to the Maryland statute.192 
Carrying this analysis a bit further, a close inspection of the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the act of the 
administrative agency is alleged to be illegal. The plaintiffs could not attack the 
Commission's action on this ground, said the court, until they had exhausted the 
statutory remedy available to them. Id. at 528, 356 A.2d at 258. 
188. See R.I. GEN. LAW § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1976). The Rhode Island statute describes 
physical handicaps in precisely the same language used in the Maryland statute, 
but does not cover mental handicaps. 
189. 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976). 
190. Id. at 620, 359 A.2d at 686. 
191. Id. at 620-21, 359 A.2d at 687. 
Some state statutes specifically provide that "handicaps" or "disabilities" 
covered by the law must be permanent. See Fair Employment Practice Law, 
amended by chs. 30 and 109, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws (to be codified as HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 378-1(7); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(m) (Page Supp. 1976). 
192. Maryland case law adopts the principle that general words in a statute, followed 
by a specific enumeration, should be regarded as limited by the subsequent more 
specific terms, Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949); cf. 
State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Ellicott-Brandt, inc., 237 Md. 328, 335, 
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Maryland definition of a handicap reveals that it does not purport to 
cover injuries, birth defects, or· illnesses as such. Instead, it covers 
their results - i.e., a "physical disability, infirmity, malformation or 
disfigurement ... caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness, 
including epilepsy." Thus, a person is not handicapped under the 
Maryland definition merely because he has a birth defect or suffers 
from an illness or injury - even one that is serious or permanent. 
The birth defect, illness, or injury must have resulted in a 
"disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement." With respect 
to mental handicaps, there must be a mental, not merely emotional, 
impairment or deficiency. To the extent, then, that illnesses (such as 
allergies, infectious diseases, or a bleeding ulcer), 'injuries (such as a 
sprained back or a whiplash), and birth defects (such as a bad back, 
flat feet, or an extra rib) have not resulted in severe or permanent 
disabilities, infirmities, malformations, disfigurements, or mental 
impairments or deficiencies, they should not be considered handi-
caps in Maryland. 
Moreover, the physical and mental disabilities enumerated in 
the law share characteristics other .than severity and permanence. 
The physical disabilities specifically deemed to be handicaps include 
"any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, 
blindness or visual impairment, deafness or hearing impairment, 
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye 
dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance."193 With respect to 
mental impairment~ or deficiencies, those specifically included are 
"retardation or such other which may have necessitated remedial or 
special education or related services."194 All of these impairments 
affect the capacity of an individual to move freely about or control 
his environment, impeding his functional ability, which in turn may 
affect his general employability. It therefore reasonably can be 
assumed that the Maryland General Assembly was attempting to 
provide protection from job discrimination to those handicapped 
individuals whose general opportunities for employment are so 
206 A.2d 131, 135 (1965) (holding that the general language of one part of a 
statute may be controlled by the more specific phraseology of another). 
This is true even when the specific enumeration is preceded by language 
such as "including, but not limited to," or other generally all-inclusive words. 
Although this phrase is a phrase of enlargement, rather than a phrase of 
limitation, the enlargement must be in kind, that is, any additions must share 
the characteristics common to the specifica'l.,ly enumerated items, since if the 
legislature had intended the general words to ~e used in an unrestricted sense, it 
would not have enumerated the particular items. See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 274 
Md. 646, 337 A.2d 703, 711 (1975); cf. American Ice. Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 
97 A. 999 (1916) (holding that when particular words of description are used in a 
statute to indicate the scope of its application, and the specific words are 
followed by general words, the latter are to be limited in their meaning so as to 
embrace only a class of things indicated by the particular things). 
193. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(g) (Supp. 1977). 
194. Id. 
238 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
severely limited that it behooves the state to ensure that they are not 
further limited for reasons that bear no relationship to their ability 
to work. As was pointed out with respect to the Rehabilitation Act 
definition of handicapped, however,195 the criterion for handicapped 
status should not be the individual's difficulty in obtaining a 
particular job, but rather the lack of functional ability that often 
causes difficulty in obtaining any employment at all. 
Finally, it should be observed that the Rhode Island court's 
disjunctive characterization in Providence Journal v. Mason of the 
impairments specifically enumerated in the Rhode Island and 
Maryland statutory definition of "handicap" as "serious or non-
temporary" is somewhat erroneous. In fact, each of the listed 
impairments is serious. Not all non-temporary impairments, how-
ever, share this characteristic. For example, an individual may never 
feel any functional effects from an extra rib. Such a "non-
temporary" birth defect should not fairly be described as an 
impairment of the type covered by the Maryland statute. 
To date, there have been no judicial decisions in Maryland 
analyzing the statutory def'mition of a handicap. With the exception 
of the Rhode Island decision, mentioned above, however, the few 
opinions rendered by other state courts have devoted almost no 
analysis to the issue of whether the complainant was actually 
handicapped within the meaning of the pertinent statutory lan-
guage. If a judicial trend on this issue can be perceived, it is 
evidenced best by the latitude given to the term "handicapped" by 
the courts in states where the fair employment practices statutes do 
not set forth a definition of the term.196 These cases indicate that the 
courts will tend to provide remedies to discrimination complainants 
without consideration of the type or effect of the handicap involved. 
In Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Department of Labor and Human 
Relations,197 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, lacking a 
statutory definition for "handicap," defined the term as "a 
disadvantage that makes achievement extremely difficult,"198 and 
concluded that diseases such as asthma fall within this definition.199 
Circuit courts in Wisconsin subsequently have interpreted the state 
employment practices law to provide protection to individuals 
suffering from such "handicaps" as a deviated septum~ and 
alcoholism. ~1 
195. See notes 170-172 and accompanying text supra. 
196. See note 180 supra. 
197. 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974). 
198. Ie!. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446; accord, Milwaukee Road v. Washington Human 
Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 805, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976). 
199. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446. 
200. Journal Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 F.E.P. 
Cas. 1655 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). . 
201. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1811 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). Other 
disabilities found to constitute handicaps by Wisconsin circuit courts have 
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3. Summary 
Most of the judicial decisions and administrative regulations 
that have read the term "handicapped" broadly seem to proceed on 
the assumption that the purpose of statutes mandating equal 
employment opportunities for the handicapped is to eliminate 
discrimination based upon unnecessary physical or mental job 
standards, and that such statutes should be liberaiIy construed to 
permit any complainant to point out the irrelevancy of the standard 
that resulted in his rejection for a job opportunity. After all, so the 
argument goes, if the standard is in fact relevant, the employer will 
have the opportunity to prove his case and the result will be a 
finding of no discrimination.202 
This rationale ignores some realities that may persuade the 
courts and administrative agencies to adopt a more restricted 
construction of the statutory definition of "handicapped." First, the 
courts and agencies should be reminded of their experiences in 
applying the 1964 Civil Rights Act and similar state statutes 
prohibiting employment discrimination against other minorities, 
and of the problems that have arisen in implementing equal 
employment opportunity laws that have been given too broad a 
sweep. Eager to assert their authority, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and state fair employment practice 
agencies at first took jurisdiction over, investigated, and often found 
probable cause to believe discrimination had occurred in complaints 
that patently lacked legal suffiCiency. Eventually, however, imple-
mentation of the laws bogged down in the slough of petty complaints 
that resulted from public awareness that every claim, no matter how 
minor, would receive agency attention. Consequently, the agencies 
soon found themselves lacking the time and resources to tackle the 
larger task of eliminating more serious and widespread discrimina-
tory practices without delay.203 
Many of these agencies now have reconsidered their approach 
and currently take the position that complaints over which the 
agency patently lacks jurisdiction will be dismissed quickly, if 
included rheumatoid arthritis, J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., 
Labor and Human Relations, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 1109 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 
1976), diabetes, Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and 
Human Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976), a heart 
murmur, City of Wisconsin Rapids v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and 
Human Relations, [1977] 171 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-I (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane 
County, 1977); and acute lymphocytic leukemia, Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 344 (Wis. 
Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). 
202. See, e.g., Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974). 
203. See Interview with Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, [1977] 135 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-1. See also H.R. 
REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1972): "[T]he burgeoning workload [of the 
Commission], accompanied by insufficient funds and a shortage of staff has, in 
many instances, forced a party to wait 2 to 3 years before final conciliation 
procedures can be instituted." 
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accepted at all, and that probable cause will be found only in 
"litigable" complaints.204 As the courts became overburdened with 
discrimination complaints that obviously lacked merit, or failed to 
conform to procedural prerequisites, they also began to appraise 
with a more critical eye the limitations in the coverage of the civil 
rights acts. 205 The hard-earned lesson that an inflationary construc-
tion of the coverage of discrimination laws results in their delayed 
and diluted enforcement should not be lost on the courts and the 
agencies as they encounter new laws to protect a newly recognized 
minority. 
A second consideration mandating a narrower approach to 
construction of statutory definitions of "handicapped" is the scope of 
the problem these statutes were intended to solve. The individuals 
who have been relegated to dependent positions by societal attitudes 
based upo~ erroneous notions about ability have not included those 
temporarily hampered by injuries or illnesses, or those who suffered 
from mild neuroses, allergies or unnoticeable birth defects.206 
Although such physical or mental conditions may cause a few 
isolated instances of difficulty in obtaining employment, they do not 
generally eliminate one from equal consideration for the great 
majority of jobs. Inasmuch as employment anti-discrimination and 
affirmative action statutes traditionally are geared to remedy 
deprivations resulting from broad-based and irrational classifica-
tions that significantly affect employment opportunity,207 it is 
204. For example, the EEOC's recently amended procedural regulations provide that 
the Commission will dismiss any charge which reveals on its face that it was not 
timely filed or otherwise failed to make a claim under Title VII. 42 Fed. Reg. 
55391 (1977) (to be codified as 29 C.F.R § 1601.19(a)). See also EEOC Draft 
Memoranda on New Procedures for Processing Title VII Complaints, [1977] 141 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E-l; Interview with Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairman 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, [1977] 135 DAILY LAB. REP 
(BNA) D-l, D-4 to D-5. 
205. For example, three recent decisions by the Supreme Court have restricted the 
applicability of Title VII. See, e.g., United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) 
(rehired employee may not attack policy that resulted in earlier separation from 
employment and loss of seniority under neutral seniority system as a 
"continuing violation" of Title VII); In1'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324 (1977) (neutral application of bona fide seniority system does not violate 
Title VII even though it perpetuates effects of pre-Act discrimination); General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (disability income protection plan that 
excludes disabilities arising from pregnancy does not constitute gender-based 
discrimination in violation of Title VII, EEOC Guidelines to the contrary 
notwithstanding). 
206. Cf. Nagi, McBroom & Collette, Work, Employment And The Disabled, 31 AMER. 
J. ECON. & SOCIa. 21 (1972) (survey of studies related to work, employment, and 
disability dealing primarily with individuals who have severe impairments, such 
as paraplegics, cardiacs, amputees, persons with spinal cord injuries, deafness, 
and persons with severe mental or psychiatric disorders). 
207. One reason, for example, that Title VII has not been held applicable to grooming 
codes that treat males differently from females is that the courts have interpreted 
Title VII to prohibit only discriminatory practices that impose a significant 
economic detriment to members of one sex, by substantially depriving them of 
opportunities for employment. See, e.g., Knott v. Missouri Pac. RR, 527 F.2d 
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unreasonable to assume that in this instance the laws were intended 
to pertain to individuals who have never been victimized previously 
in any general way. It is questionable, for example, whether 
Congress intended that tax dollars should be spent to process the 
complaint of a flat-footed person who is denied a job as a foot 
patrolman, a person allergic to chlorine who is denied a job as a 
swimming pool lifeguard, or a person with a bad back who is denied 
a job as a furniture mover . 
. Third, it is questionable whether the same legislative bodies 
whose previous equal employment enactments have been interpreted 
as directed solely towards the protection of individuals who unfairly 
had been denied jobs on the basis of characteristics that were not of 
their own makingaJ8 have, in this instance, intended to protect 
individuals who are discriminated against as a result of characteris-
tics acquired by choice. Thus, the decisions of HEW, OFCCP, and at 
least one lower level state court to include such conditions as 
alcoholism and drug addiction under the term "handicapped"aJ9 can 
be criticized severely. Alcoholics and drug addicts are not entirely 
innocent victims of a handicap, as are the victims of race, sex, 
national origin and religious discrimination.210 Moreover, addictions 
are not traditionally or popularly regarded as handicaps and it is 
questionable whether many individuals who have these conditions 
consider themselves "impaired."211 Certainly, such individuals 
1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, 488 F.2d 1333, 1335-37 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972). The 
Supreme Court has also recognized the relevance of the traditional concept of 
discrimination. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), for 
example, where the Court found no gender-based discrimination in a disability 
insurance program that excluded pregnancy, the opinion stated: 
The concept of "discrimination," of course, was well known at the 
time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the 
Fourteenth Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long 
history of judicial construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an 
employer to "discriminate. . . because of. . . sex. . .," without further 
explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant 
something different from what the concept of discrimination has 
traditionally meant. (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
429 U.S. at 145. 
208. See notes 14 and 105 supra. 
209. The Secretary of HEW has specifically stated that the regulations cover drug 
addiction and alcoholism as "handicaps." See 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 (1977). The 
OFCCP's summary of back pay cases, supra note 34, includes a case where the 
alleged "handicap" was alcoholism. In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1811 
(Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976), the Dane County Circuit Court of Wisconsin 
held that alcoholism or a "drinking problem" constitutes a handicap within the 
meaning of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. 
210. For a discussion of the volitional nature of alcoholism and drug addiction, see 
Ogden, Justice And The Problem Of The Volitional Victim, 1977 LAB. L.J. 417. 
211. After the first set of proposed regulations for the implementation of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act was issued by the Secretary of HEW, numerous comments 
were received on the proposed inclusion of drug addicts and alcoholics under the 
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would not be entitled to benefit under current equal protection 
analysis, even if handicapped status were otherwise held to be a 
suspect classification, since these handicaps are not "immutable 
characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth" or by a 
constitutionally protected choice.212 
Finally, a broad defmition of the handicapped class would be 
incompatible with some of the standards of proof ap'plied in 
discrimination litigation. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, for example, which was enacted to protect readily identifiable 
members of minority groups that historically had been victimized by 
individually motivated treatment, the plaintiff is not required to 
establish the defendant's specific intent to discriminate when the 
evidence reveals discriminatory effects, such as the "disproportion-
ate impact" upon minorities of a facially neutral employment 
criterion that is not justified by business necessity. Moreover, when 
the complaint is predicated upon the "disparate treatment" of 
minorities, intent is often inferred from the mere fact of differ-
ences in treatment.213 Unlike inequality of treatment because of 
race, sex, religion or national origin, handicap discrimination often 
stems from a sympathetic or benign intent, or at least from a lack of 
definition of a "handicapped individual." The Secretary noted, in issuing a 
second set of proposed regulations, that: 
Commentators made a number of arguments against including alcohol 
and drug addicts and homosexuals: That these conditions are self-
inflicted; that section 504 is not the proper vehicle for eliminating 
discriminations based on these characteristics; that the term "handi-
capped person" does not, from either an historical or popular viewpoint, 
denote addicts or homosexuals; that such persons, and in particular 
homosexual persons, would not agree with the notion that they are 
handicapped; and that inclusion of these groups would detract from the 
emphasis upon eliminating discrimination against those persons 
traditionally thought of as being handicapped. 
41 Fed. Reg. 29548-49 (1976). The Secretary decided, however, to include drug 
addicts and alcoholics as "handicaps" but determined that homosexuals were 
not "handicapped individuals." 
212. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
213. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 n.15 (1977). 
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), however, the Supreme Court 
recently held that the "disproportionate impact" theory of proof of employment 
discrimination had been applied erroneously in a claim alleging state action in 
violation of the equal protection clause and that proof of a racially discrimina-
tory purpose must be established in such cases. In distinguishing Title VII from 
the equal protection clause, the Court intimated that it is the language of Title 
VII that eliminates the need for proof of discriminatory intent in disproportion-
ate impact cases, stating: "Under Title VII, Congress provided that when 
[employment] practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate number of 
blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved." [d. at 247. 
Section 703(b) of Title VII makes it unlawful to classify or limit employees or job 
applicants in any way that "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). The Rehabilitation Act 
includes no such language and the courts therefore might apply to this statute 
the rules for ascertaining intent set forth in Washington. 
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knowledge about the effects of certain medical conditions.214 
Moreover, the characteristics that place an individual within the 
protected ''handicapped'' class, as it is currently being construed, 
will often be much less recognizable than the badges of race, age, 
national origin, or sex, and many will not be recognized at all in the 
absence of a physical examination. Further, because of the infinite 
variety of ''handicaps,'' many of which only members of the medical 
profession would recognize, it will be impossible, in many cases, for 
the employer to foresee that a physical job standard might have a 
disproportionate impact upon the handicapped.215 Similarly, if the 
term "handicap" includes minor physical conditions that ordinarily 
are not thought of with that connotation, the employer may be 
totally unaware that its actions constitute "disparate treatment" of 
the handicapped as that term is used in the Title VII context.216 
214. Equal Treatment, supra note 28 at 101-102. 
215. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), sets forth the elements of proof in 
a disproportionate impact case. These elements were further refined in Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.s. 405 (1975). 
[T]he employer [must meet] "the burden of showing that any given 
requirement [has] ... a manifest relation to the employment in 
question." This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining 
party or class has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has 
shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion 
in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of 
applicants. If an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its 
tests are "job related," it remains open to the complaining party to show 
that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable 
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 
"efficient and trustworthy workmanship." (citations omitted). 
Id. at 425. 
216. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court 
set forth the standards of proof in a case alleging disparate treatment: 
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under 
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) 
that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications .... 
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [complainant's] rejection. 
Id. at 802. Thus as stated in the text supra, although proof of discriminatory 
intent is required to make the prima facie showing in an' individual disparate 
treatment case, proof of discriminatory intent can be inferred from the mere fact 
that an individual was treated differently. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324 n.15 (1977). The employer who denies a secretarial position 
to an individual who suffers from migraine headaches, and hires instead an 
individual who does not have such a condition, and who otherwise is not as 
qualified or, in some circuits, is no better qualified than the rejected applicant, 
therefore, may have met each of the elements of handicap discrimination under 
the "disparate treatment" theory, even though the employer may not perceive 
migraine headaches as a handicap. Cr. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (defendant must articulate not only a legitimate r.on-discriminatory 
reason for its choice, but also must show that other person hired subsequent to 
the defendant's rejection of plaintiff were better qualified). 
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A broad construction of the term "handicapped," especially if 
applied in connection with standards of proof that obviate the need 
for evidence of discriminatory intent, could therefore have harsh 
consequences for employers. Moreover, when it is patently impossi-
ble for employers to identify the members of a class, or if individuals 
become members of the class as a result of their treatment by the 
defendant employer, rather than as a direct result of some inherent 
characteristic, there is room to challenge laws protecting that class 
on the grounds of vagueness. 217 
Thus, although it can be argued that the precise intent of 
legislative bodies that have enacted handicap discrimination laws 
was to force employers to make demonstrably job-related employ-
ment decisions, there is a strong equitable, historical, and practical 
argument to support the proposition that there was no intent to so 
thoroughly police employment practices of businesses. A more 
rational inference is that the legislative intent is to hold employers 
liable only to individuals with handicaps that seriously impair their 
functional ability and thus their general employability. Current 
agency and judicial interpretations of the scope of handicap 
discrimination and affirmative action laws arguably have exceeded 
statutory authority and furthermore, may be counterproductive in 
overreaching the intended beneficiaries of the law. Legal develop-
217. A statute so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates due process, and the rule is 
applicable to regulations. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 
340 (1952). In Boyce, the Court upheld a regulation, attacked as impermissibly 
vague, in part because the statute pursuant to which it was promulgated 
included culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense. The Court stated, 
"this requirement ... does much to destroy any force in the argument that 
application of the Regulation would be so unfair that it must be held invalid. [d. 
at 342. The problem with the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicap, as 
applied to impairments that are not readily ascertainable or commonly 
recognizable as "handicaps," is that the defendant is subjected to liability for his 
treatment of individuals whom he understandably would not consider "handi-
capped" and thus would have no intent to make a victim of discrimination on the 
basis of handicap. OFCCP regulations providing for an invitation to the 
handicapped to identify themselves and for medical documentation of handi-
caps, discussed at note 174 and accompanying text supra, may result from the 
agency's recognition of the susceptibility of its regulations to a vagueness 
challenge. 
In any event, however, it is extremely difficult to obtain the invalidation of a 
statute on the grounds that it is impermissibly vague. See Milwaukee Road v. 
Washington Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976) 
(statute forbidding discrimination on basis of handicaps is not void for 
vagueness, even though statute does not contain definition of "handicap," 
because term has well understood, common meaning); accord, Milwaukee Road v. 
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W. 
2d 443 (1974); c{. Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (standard 
for disability under the Social Security Act, - "unable to engage in substantial 
gainful activity" - as applied by the Social Security Administration is precisely 
defined in the Social Security Act, and thus must be upheld as against challenge 
of vagueness). For a comprehensive discussion of the vagueness doctrine, see 1 
A. C. SAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.16 (4th ed. 1972). 
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ments in this area are still at the sprout stage, however, and before 
the dust settles from the "planting season," the courts may well be 
persuaded by practical, equitable, and policy considerations, such as 
those discussed above, to more stringently apply the rules of 
statutory construction in ascertaining the intended coverage of the 
laws. 
B. IDENTIFYING "QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS" 
Regardless of whether an individual is "handicapped," the equal 
employment opportunity laws do not entitle him to the benefit of 
affirmative action or to protection from discrimination unless he is 
able to do the job he is seeking. The Rehabilitation Act covers only 
"qualified handicapped individuals"218 and, while there is no 
definition of the term "qualified" in the Rehabilitation Act itself, the 
OFCCP regulations provide that a handicapped individual meets 
this standard only if he is "capable of performing a particular job 
with reasonable accommodation to his or her handicap."219 The 
HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations make one variation on 
this standard; under their definition of "qualified," the handicapped 
individual need be capable of performing, with "reasonable accom-
modation," only the "essential functions" of the job.220 
218. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. V 1975). See Rogers v. Frito Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 
(N.D. Tex. 1977). Although §504 of the Rehabilitation Act uses the term 
"otherwise qualified," 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975), the HEW regulations 
interpret this phrase to mean merely "qualified." See note 44 supra. The 
Veterans' Readjustment Act similarly protects only "qualified disabled vete-
rans." 38 U.S.C. § 2012(a) (Supp. V 1975). One need be only a "handicapped 
individual," however, in order to file a complaint under § 503 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act or a "disabled veteran" to file a complaint under the Veterans' 
Readjustment Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. V 1975); 38 U.S.C. § 2012(b) 
(Supp. V 1975). 
219.41 C.F.R. §60-741.2 (1977). The OFCCP Veterans' regulations track the OFCCP 
handicapped regulations in this regard. Id. § 60-250.2. For a discussion of the 
meaning of the word "qualified" as applied in other contexts, such as under the 
Social Security laws, see Equal Treatment, supra note 28, at 72 n.24. 
220. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(I), 85.32(a). The HEW Secretary's analysis states that the 
phrase "essential functions" is included to emphasize that handicapped 
individuals should not be disqualified merely because of difficulty in performing 
tasks that bear only a "marginal relationship" to a job, and that it is "not 
inconsistent" with the Department of Labor's interpretation of "qualified." 42 
Fed. Reg. 22676, 22687 (1977). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2134 (1978). 
The term "otherwise qualified" is interpreted somewhat differently by HEW 
when applied in the context of federally financed educational programs. Section 
84.3(k)(3) defines a "qualified handicapped person" with respect to post 
secondary and ·vocational educational services as "[a] handicapped person who 
meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or 
participation in the recipient's educational program or activity." 
In Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No. 77-1237 (4th Cir., filed 
March 28, 1978), reu'g 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976), the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently relied on § 84.3(k)(3) as the basis for its reversal of a 
district court holding that an applicant for a nursing educational program was 
not "otherwise qualified" because her hearing deficiency would prevent her from 
safely performing the· clinical training for a nursing degree and would, after her 
graduation, restrict her in the pursuit of her proposed profession. The fourth 
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The Maryland law similarly makes handicap discrimination in 
employment unlawful only when it is based upon a physical or 
mental handicap "unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably 
preclude the performance of the employment,"221 and most other 
state statutes include the same type of limitation.222 In addition, the 
laws of some states, including Maryland, provide that where 
"physical or mental qualification is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a] 
particular business or enterprise," it is not an unlawful practice for 
the employer to base employment decisions upon physical or mental 
qualifications.223 
Thus, although the drafters of state and federal laws affecting 
the employment rights of the handicapped have phrased the caveat 
in varying terms, none of the legislation forbids the rejeCtion of 
applicants whose handicaps render them unqualified for a job. As 
interpreted by the courts and administrative agencies, however, 
these laws make the process of distinguishing between qualified and 
unqualified handicapped individuals substantially more complicated 
than it might appear to be. A two-tiered inquiry is required under 
these interpretations. Initially, it must be determined whether the 
handicap is "job-related," and there are restrictions upon the factors 
that may be considered and the methods that may be used to 
ascertain this fact.224 Second, if the handicap is "job-related," the 
question becomes one of whether "reasonable accommodations" for 
the handicap can be made in order to alleviate the impediment it 
imposes to employment.225 The duty to make "reasonable accommo-
circuit held that, in view of the above quoted regulation, which was not in effect 
at the time of the district court decision, the district court "erred by considering 
the nature of the plaintiff's handicap in order to determine whether or not she 
was 'otherwise qualified' for admittance to the nursing program, rather than by 
focusing upon her academic and technical qualifications." [d., slip op. at 9. The 
case was remanded and the college was ordered to reconsider the plaintiff's 
application without regard to her hearing disability and to focus its inquiry on 
other relevant subjective and objective factors utilized in the consideration of 
non-handicapped applicants, such as past academic performance. [d. at 5-6. 
Although the fourth circuit explicitly refrained from commenting upon the 
reasonableness of the regulations, the import of its interpretation of the section 
in question is that handicapped status must be irrelevant in a determination of 
whether an applicant is qualified for a federally financed educational program. 
The rule, based as it is on § 84.3(k)(3) of the § 504 regulations, would not be 
applicable to employment programs, however, since as stated in the text above, 
HEW has defined a "qualified handicapped person," for purposes of empioyment, 
as "a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation can perform the 
essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (emphasis 
added). Thus, the regulations do not preclude consideration of physical or mentlll 
ability in employment decisions. 
221. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(a)(1) (Supp. 1977). 
222. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18:80:220(1) (Supp. 1976). 
223. Md. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19(9)(1) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). See also CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126(a) (1977). 
224. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b), (c), -250.6(b), (c) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13; 85.54. 
225. The second line of inquiry is necessary because both the OFCCP and HEW 
regulations build into the definition of "qualified" the concept that "reasonable 
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dations" for the handicapped, which has ramifications beyond its 
application to the question of whether an individual is qualified will 
be discussed in more detaillater,226 while the instant discussion' will 
deal with the more immediate problem of identifying job-related 
handicaps. 
1. The Concept of Job-Relatedness 
An individual's handicap can be deemed "job-related" only to 
the extent that it prevents him from meeting "job-related" require-
ments for employment. In other words, a handicapped individual is 
not "unqualified" because he fails to meet or pass job qualifications 
that do not measure, and have no relevance to, his ability to perform 
the specific job sought. 
In irrebuttable presumption cases, the courts have applied this 
standard to allegations of a deprivation of fourteenth amendment 
rights, holding that public employers may not reject a job applicant 
because of a handicap that would not necessarily impede his ability 
to perform the employment.227 The OFCCP regulations impose the 
same restriction on government contractors, requiring them to 
review all physical and mental job qualification requirements for the 
purpose of ensuring that they do not tend to exclude qualified· 
handicapped applicants from consideration for reasons that are not 
"job-related and ... consistent with business necessity and the safe 
performance of the job."228 The burden is placed on the contractor to 
demonstrate that its job qualification requirements meet this 
standard.229 The HEW and Executive Order 11,914 regulations 
similarly require federally financed enterprises to ensure that 
employment selection criteria which tend to screen out the handi-
capped are "job-related."230 The Maryland proposed regulations on 
the handicapped impose the same obligation by providing that 
employers must adopt 
[p]hysical standards for employment that are fair, reasona-
ble, and adapted to the actual requirements of this 
employment; these standards shall be based on complete 
accommodation" to an individual's handicap is a condition precedent to a 
determination of whether the individual is in fact "qualified" for a particular job. 
See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.2, -250.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(I), 85.32(a). The 
regulations of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations also purport to 
impose an accommodation duty upon employers with respect to the determina-
tion of qualification for a job. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04(8). 
226. See notes 303-304 and accompanying text infra. 
227. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Duran v. City of Tampa, 
430 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Com'n, 13 F.E.P. 
Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (dictum); cf. Coleman v. Darden, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
6789 (D. Colo. 1977: "There can be no question but that sufficient visual acuity 
to enable the employee to read has a direct relationship to the [paralegal] job." 
228. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(l) (1977); see id. § 60-250.6(c)(l). 
229. Id. § 60-741.6(c)(2); see id. § 60-250.6(c)(2). 
230. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13(a), 85.54. 
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factual information concerning working conditions, ha-
zards, and essential physical requirements of each job; 
physical standards may not be used to arbitrarily eliminate 
the disabled person from consideration.231 
a. Proof of Job-Relatedness 
While the regulations make it clear that handicapped individu-
als may not be disqualified from employment on the basis of nonjob-
related criteria, they provide no guidance as to the types of physical 
and mental employment criteria that will pass the "job-related" test. 
Some guidance by analogy can be derived, however, from judicial 
rulings that various types of employment selection criteria, such as 
diploma, license, and financial requirements, and certain educa-
tional, skill, and aptitude tests, impacted disproportionately upon 
racial minorities and females in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Ad of 1964.232 In general, the courts have required employers 
to prove the "business necessity" of job standards found to exclude a 
significantly greater percentage of protected minority group 
members than nonminorities from employment, and have accepted 
proof of the "job-relatedness" of the standards as an adequate 
showing of "business necessity."233 Since these Title VII cases are 
the source of the "job-relatedness" concept, they may be helpful in 
predicting the manner in which the concept will be applied with 
respect to the newly-recognized handicapped minority. 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court, Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,234 typifies the approach taken in Title VII attacks on standards 
for employment. The Court found that height and weight require-
ments for guards in a prison for males, although facially neutral, 
231. XVI Co MAR § 14.03.04B(2)(c). The Maryland proposed regulations include this 
requirement among the suggestions for "reasonable accommodation" to the 
handicapped, but the prevailing standards for ascertaining whether discrimina-
tion has occurred would impose this requirement in the absence of any duty to 
accommodate. See note 233 infra. 
232. For a discussion of the cases dealing with this issue under Title VII, see B. 
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw chs. 4-6 (1976). 
233. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court forbade the 
use of a high school diploma or a general intelligence test as a criteria for 
promotion because significantly more blacks than whites failed to meet both 
criteria, the criteria had been adopted "without meaningful study of their 
relationship to job performance ability," and there was no proof of job-
relatedness or any other "genuine business need." Id. at 431-32. 
The terms "job-relatedness" and "business necessity" are frequently used 
interchangeably, and it has been suggested that 
"job-relatedness" is merely one means of proving business necessity, 
although it may be in some circumstances the only means of proving 
business necessity if the purpose of the criteria is to predict the capacity 
of a particular individual to successfully perform the job .... In other 
areas ... [g]iven proper proof of a substantial disparate effect, the issue 
of business necessity would turn not on predictive factors relating to the 
employee's performance, but upon the burden to the business. 
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 133 (1976). 
234. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
1978J Handicapped Employment Opportunity 249 
had a disproportionate impact on female applicants for the 
position.235 The defendant alleged that the height and weight 
requirements were related to the physical strength essential to 
effective performance of the guard's job, but failed to introduce 
evidence to verify this contention. The requirements were struck 
down, with the Court commenting that "[i]f the job-related quality 
... is bona fide, [the defendant's] purpose could be achieved by 
adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures strength 
directly."236 
The Dothard opinion illustrates that where a facially neutraP37 
job criterion is found to impact adversely on a minority protected by 
235. ld. at 331. In Dothard, a statistical showing of adverse impact triggered the 
employer's burden to prove "business necessity." Under the HEW regulations, at 
least as interpreted by the Secretary, no statistical proof of adverse impact is 
required. The complainant need show only that an employment test "substan-
tially limits" the job opportunities of handicapped persons in order to give rise to 
the employer's burden to prove "job-relatedness." 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 
22688-22689 (1977). 
236. 433 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). 
237. Some employment criteria are invalidated not because their facially neutral 
character belies a disproportionate impact unjustified by business necessity, but 
because they absolutely exclude members of a protected class from certain jobs. 
The Dothard decision sets forth standards for upholding this type of employment 
criterion as well. Even though the Court would not permit the virtual exclusion of 
women from all guard positions in male prisons through the use of facially 
neutral height and weight requirements not justified by their job-relatedness, the 
defendant was allowed to absolutely exclude women from assignments to guard 
positions that involved "contact" with male prisoners, via the Court's holding 
that sex was a "bona fide occupational qualification" ("BFOQ") for such 
positions. This result was justified, in the Court's opinion, because the evidence 
demonstrated that women guards would be more susceptible than males to 
assault by male sex offenders which could cause them to lose control over prjson 
security. 433 U.S. at 336. 
The Court articulated, without specifically adopting, several verbal formula-
tions of the test for a BFOQ, including a standard that would permit the 
employer to rely on the exception when it had "reasonable cause to believe, that 
is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be 
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." ld. at 
2729, (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 
1969)). The Court also quoted another standard: "[D]iscrimination based on sex 
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by 
not hiring members of one sex exclusively." 433 U.S. at 333, (citing Diaz v. Pan 
American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
950 (1971)). 
The Court's discussion of the BFOQ issue might appear to have limited 
application to handicap discrimination since, unlike Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(e) (Supp. V 1975), the Rehabilitation Act does not contain a specific 
BFOQ exception. Under handicap discrimination laws that specifically limit 
applicability to "qualified" handicapped individuals, a strong argument can be 
made that a BFOQ exception is necessarily implied, however. C[. 13 C.F.R. 
§ 113.3-l(b) (1977) (providing that nothing in the SBA regulations issued 
pursuant to § 504 prohibits "the restriction of certain jobs to qualified 
handicapped persons or to members of one sex if a bona fide occupational 
qualification can be demonstrated by the ... recipient.") Moreover, as discussed 
at note 223 supra, some state handicap discrimination laws, including the 
Maryland laws, specifically include a BFOQ exception. When an employer can 
establish that the physical condition required for a particular job is a BFOQ, it 
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Title VII, the courts ordinarily will not uphold the criterion in the 
absence of specific evidence to substantiate its job-relatedness, at 
least where a validated test could be used in lieu thereof.238 In most 
cases the burden of proof requires the submission of detailed 
evidence of job duties and conditions, and statistical demonstrations 
of the validity of the criterion as a predictor of job performance.239 
A few Title VII cases have deviated somewhat from a rigid 
application of this onerous proof burden, and have articulafed the 
principle that there is a narrow class of job qualifications so 
manifestly job-related that no evidentiary showing is required to 
justify their imposition.240 Recently, in Smith v. Olin Chemical 
should logically be permitted to frame employment criteria or inquiries in 
absolutely exclusionary terms, rather than be forced to struggle with the 
difficulties often involved in drafting the facially neutral inquiries or criteria 
that OFCCP and HEW apparently intend to require. See discussion at note 
283-295 infra. ~_ ~_ 
238. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975), the Court stated that 
even though an employer proved a job criterion was job-related, the criterion 
could still be struck down if the plaintiff showed that alternatives with a lesser 
impact on minorities could be used to accomplish the same business purposes. 
Dothard reiterated this view at the beginning of the opinion, 433 U.S. at 329, but 
the statement quoted in the text at note 237 supra, implies that proof that no less 
restrictive alternative exists - such as, in that case presumably, a validated test 
- might be required from the defendant as part of its initial burden, rather than 
from the plaintiff. Several federal circuit courts have adopted this approach. E.g., 
Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); Pettway v. American 
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 244 n.87 (5th Cir. 1974). 
HEW has taken the position that the job-relatedness required under the § 504 
regulations may be demonstrated by methods other than a validated test. 42 Fed. 
Reg. 22676, 22688-89 (1977). Moreover, the regulations place the burden on the 
Director to advance less restrictive alternatives. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a)(2). The 
OFCCP regulations are silent on this point. 
239. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); United 
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 911-19 (5th Cir. 1973). There are some 
recent indications of a relaxation in these standards. Cf, Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976) (applying a lesser standard for validating job-
relatedness in a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Compare 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1607 (1976) (the EEOC's Employee Selection Guidelines) with 42 Fed. Reg. 
65542-65552 (1977) (the Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines proposed for 
adoption by the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Labor 
and the Department of Justice) (proposed for codification in 5 C.F.R. pt. 300, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1607,28 C.F.R. pt. 50, and 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-3) (hereinafter cited to title 5 
of C.F.R. and proposed section number). The proposed guidelines specifically 
state that they do not apply to employees' subject to § 504 of the Rehabilitation· 
Act. 5 C.F.R. § 30D-2D. While there is no specific exemption of employers subject 
to § 503, that section is not included in the list of statutes and executive orders to 
which the guidelines do apply. Id. § 300-2A. 
240. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for example, where 
the company had refused to hire a black man who had participated in illeg~l 
picketing at its premises, the Supreme Court held that although the plaintiff had 
established a prima facie case of discrimination, see note 216 supra, the 
defendant had met its burden of proof by articulating a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason - the illegal picketing - for the rejection. The defendant 
was not required to prove the business necessity for this standard and the case 
merely was remanded to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to show that the 
defendant's stated reason for the rejection was in fact a pretext for discrimina-
tion. 
1978] Handicapped Employment Opportunity 251 
Corporation,241 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that the need for a manual laborer to have a 
"good back" is such a manifestly job-related criterion. The plaintiff 
in the case was discharged from a laborer's position due to a 
company doctor's diagnosis of spinal degeneration, explained by the 
plaintiffs history of sickle cell anemia. Since this disease is found 
almost exclusively in Blacks, the plaintiff alleged that the "good 
back" criterion impacted adversely upon members of his race. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendant, holding that, inasmuch as a "good 
back" is "manifestly necessary" to work as a manual laborer, 
an employer does not have to justify with evidentiary proof 
of business necessity the exclusion from manual labor of 
any person with "bone degeneration in his spinal region," a 
bad back, even if such practice affects disproportionately 
some class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.242 
Where "manifestly necessary" job criteria, such as a "good 
back," can be identified,243 they logically should be upheld against 
any claim of disproportionate impact, whether predicated on the 
241. 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
242. Id. at 1288. The court inferred from McDonnell Douglas, which involved 
disparate treatment, a suggestion that, even in a disparate impact case, "a 
facially neutral job criterion can be so manifestly job·related so [sic] as not to be 
the kind of 'artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barrier' Title VII prohibits." Id. 
at 1287. Thus, in essence, the fifth circuit held that where the peculiar 
circumstances of a disproportionate impact case so require, the rules governing 
the burden of proof in a disproportionate treatment case can be applied. Whereas 
the traditional burden of proof rules for a disproportionate impact case applied in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), see note 215 supra, require the defendant to make a 
strong showing of business necessity in order to counter the plaintiffs prima 
facie case, the rule set forth in Smith requires only the articulation of some 
legitimate non·discriminatory justification for the allegedly discriminatory act, 
for which no evidentiary proof is required. The employer who meets this lesser 
burden would prevail, in the absence of a claim by the plaintiff that the 
employment criterion was used as a pretext for discrimination. 
243. Industrial physicians have conducted a number of research studies that could be 
helpful in proving the "manifest necessity" of a physical job standard. See, e.g., 
Bond, Low·Back X·Rays - Criteria for Use in Placement Examination in 
Industry, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 373 (1964). See also AMA GUIDES TO 
EVALUATION OF IMPAIRMENT, note 176 supra. The GUIDES set forth methods for 
calculating degrees of impairment, which could be correlated with specific job 
functions. The OFCCP regulations currently authorize the use of the GUIDES, but 
only with respect to an evaluation of the existence of an impairment, and not 
with respect to an evaluation of the degree of impairment. See notes 175-178 
supra and accompanying text supra. 
If HEW adheres to its current position that a handicapped complainant need 
show only that a job criterion "significantly limits" employment opportunities in 
order to establish the invalidity of the criterion's application to determine 
whether he is "qualified," instead of a statistically significant showing of 
disproportionate impact, see note 236 supra, the employer's burden of proof to 
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characteristic of race, sex, national origin, or handicapped status -
at least if the employer establishes that the handicap could not 
reasonably be accommodated in the job.244 In addition to the "good 
back" criterion for applicants for laborer positions, the list of 
"manifestly necessary" physical qualifications should include good 
vision for a driver and good hearing for a telephone operator. Other 
examples can be derived from cases where the courts have refused to 
hold that an employer discriminated on the basis of race or sex when 
its actions were predicated on physical or mental job requirements 
which the plaintiff was unable to meet, and which were not found to 
be mere pretexts to cover a discriminatory motive. 245 
With the exception of the few cases where specific physical or 
mental job requirements have been upheld as valid when interposed 
as a defense to claims of race, sex, age, or national origin 
discrimination, however, judicial authority under Title VII and other 
equal employment opportunity statutes protecting other minorities is 
helpful in the handicap discrimination context only insofar as it 
establishes a methodology for proving job-relatedness. Some 
variations in this methodology may be urged in handicap discrimi-
nation cases. First, physical condition - the very characteristic that 
places an individual in the protected handicapped minority - is 
generally more closely related to job performance than the character-
istics peculiar to other minorities. 246 Second, as the Smith case 
illustrates, the relationship will sometimes be so obvious as to 
eliminate the necessity for statistical proof. Finally, because the 
Rehabilitation Act and most state handicap discrimination laws 
counter this contention also should be lightened. The approach taken by the fifth 
circuit in Smith therefore is a reasonably equitable allocation of proof burdens 
that should be considered seriously by agencies and courts confronted with a 
plaintiffs claim that he cannot be deemed "unqualified" under a job standard 
that disproportionately impacts upon individuals with his handicap. 
244. The nature and extent of the employer's duty to "accommodate" the handicapped 
is discussed at notes 303-344 and accompanying text infra. It is logical to 
assume, however, that administrative agencies and courts will conclude that just 
as some job criteria are "manifestly necessary," so also some accommodations 
are manifestly inappropriate, since they clearly would impose an "undue 
hardship" on the conduct of business. No evidentiary support should be required, 
for example, of an employer's contention that it is impossible to accommodate 
the blindness of an individual who seeks a job as a driver. 
245. Several courts have denied claims alleging discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, and age, after concluding that the discriminatory act was justified by the 
defendant's need for employees who met certain physical or mental standards. 
See, e.g., Boyce v. Reynolds Metals Co., 532 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1976) (discharge of 
black plaintiff justified by his asthmatic condition); Thompson v. Chrysler Corp., 
382 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (preliminary injunction denied to female who 
claimed that discharge because of hypertension constituted discrimination on 
the basis of race and age); Dorcus v. Westvaco Corp., 345 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D. Va. 
1972) (failure to hire black complainant justified by knee condition); Johnson v. 
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 2 F.E.P. Cas. 668 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (inability of 
obese person to make rounds of job site justified discharge). 
246. See, e.g., discussion at note 15 supra. 
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apply only to qualified handicapped individuals,247 the complain-
ant's prima facie case of discrimination should consist of more 
evidence than that he is handicapped and that the job requirement 
under which he was rejected falls more harshly upon individuals 
with his handicap than upon normal individuals. Such facts do not 
establish that the complainant is a "qualified handicapped individ-
ual" within the protected class, much less a prima facie case of 
handicap discrimination.248 Despite the assertions of administrative 
agencies that the burden is on the employer to prove the job-
relatedness of its employment criteria, the complainant in a 
handicap discrimination case therefore should be required to put 
forth some evidence that his handicap is not job-related, and that he 
falls within the protected class of "qualified handicapped individu-
als," before the defendant's burden to rebut this contention arises.249 
By their very nature, almost all physical job requirements will 
have a disproportionate effect on individuals who can claim that 
they are handicapped under the defmitions of "handicap," discussed 
above. Thus, there is an explosive potential for litigation on job-
relatedness issues. To date, however, few handicap discrimination 
cases attacking the predictive validity of physical job requirements 
have reached the courts and it is difficult to foretell the extent to 
which the methodology developed in Title VII cases will be varied to 
meet the unique characteristics of the handicapped and of the laws 
protecting them. 250 
247. See Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977) (no evidence that 
children sighted in only one eye are "otherwise qualified" under § 504 to play 
contact sports); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 28 Or. App. 747, 561 
P.2d 637 (1977) (holding that employer's refusal to hire individual for position as 
heavy appliance salesman on basis of physician's diagnosis that the individual's 
heart condition precluded him from such work was not discriminatory under 
state law). 
248. Proof that one is a member of the "protected class" is usually the first element of 
proof in a discrimination suit. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792,802 (1973). Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the language of most other equal 
employment opportunity statutes does not specifically limit the "protected class" 
to "qualified" individuals, so that for example, in a disproportionate impact case 
of race or sex discrimination, the plaintiffs job qualifications technically are not 
required to be proved before the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the 
"job relatedness" of the criterion under which the plaintiff was excluded from 
employment. Under the McDonnell Douglas standards for proof in Title VII 
cases predicated on disparate treatment, on the other hand, the plaintiff must 
establish as part of his prima facie case that he was qualified for employment, in 
addition to his status as a member of the "protected class." 
249. The plaintiff might meet this burden with medical evidence, or with evidence 
that he has previously done similar work elsewhere. See, e.g., Boynton Cab Co. v. 
Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, No. 157-111 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane 
Co., filed Jan. 24, 1978), where the defendant was required to hire as a taxicab 
driver an individual with only one arm. The plaintiff established that he had 
been successfully employed as a cab driver for nine months, and that he had a 
driver's license. The court noted that the defendant failed to submit any medical 
evidence, actual driving comparisons, or statistical evidence relative to the type 
of handicap involved to overcome the plaintiffs showing that he was qualified. 
250. Cases arising under -the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. V 1975), provide a closer analogy for the 
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The predictive validity of physical employment standards that 
exclude handicapped individuals as unqualified is only one of the 
issues that can be raised in the process of ascertaining whether a 
handicap is "job-related". Even when there is no question as to a 
handicapped individual's present ability to do a job, there may be 
other grounds, properly characterized as "business necessity,"251 to 
justify his rejection for employment. One question that has arisen in 
this context is whether the possibility that exposure to certain job 
conditions would aggravate a preexisting handicap is sufficient 
"business necessity" to justify a refusal to hire the handicapped 
individual. 
Some state statutes deal directly with this issue, specifically 
providing that it is not discriminatory to deny employment to a 
handicapped individual because of the safety hazard that would 
result to the employee and his co-workers, or the general public.252 
While the Maryland statute does not speak to this point, the 
Maryland Commission's proposed regulations recommend that an 
Rehabilitation Act than do Title VII cases. Although the language of the ADEA 
tracks Title VII while the Rehabilitation Act does not, both age and handicapped 
status bear a closer relationship to ability to work than do race, sex, or national 
origin. In ruling on suits brought pursuant to the ADEA, some courts have 
recognized that this difference, along with the fact that the ADEA is embodied in· 
a different statute and has a different history from Title VII, mandates against a 
rigid application of Title VII proof standards in ADEA cases. See, e.g., Laugesen 
v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311-13 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 
(1976); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 
1974); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D. D.C. 1974). In 
Laugesen, for example, the court noted: "we do not believe that Congress 
intended automatic presumptions to apply whenever a worker is replaced by 
another of a different age." 510 F.2d at 312-313 n.4. Some of the same 
differences, plus others discussed throughout this paper, distinguish the 
Rehabilitation Act from Title VII and mandate some distinctions in the 
treatment of these cases by the judiciary. 
251. See note 233 supra. 
252. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a)(I), (2) (West. Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5 
§ 4573(4) (West. Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02, subd. 5 (West. Supp. 
1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-304 (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 354-A:3(13) (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(L) (Supp. 1976). 
Such provisions have been criticized .roundly on the grounds that anyone 
who undermines safety would be unqualified for a job in any event, and that the 
incorporation of these provisions into laws dealing specifically with the disabled 
infers that there is something peculiar about this classification that distin-
guishes it from other protected minorities. See Employment and the Disabled, 
supra note 2, at 463. It further has been suggested that "allowing an employer to 
discriminate against disabled applicants who might represent a single 'danger""to 
themselves' exemplifies the very paternalism of which the disabled complain." 
ld. This argument ignores the fact, however, that in most cases the employer 
must compensate the handicapped individual for on-the-job injuries, and that an 
employer who is precluded both from considering the likelihood that the 
handicapped individual will suffer an on-the-job injury and from obtaining a 
waiver of the right to compensation for such injury, see discussion notes at 
269-71 infra, truly is caught between the proverbial rock and hard place. 
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assessment of the applicant's qualifications should include a 
determination of whether an applicant is physically and mentally 
qualified to do the work "without adverse consequences, such as 
creating a dangerous condition to life or health of self or others. ''253 
The OFCCP regulations include "safe performance of the job" 
among the factors to be considered in the development of job 
criteria,254 and although the HEW regulations do not specifically 
discuss safety considerations, the Secretary's comments indicate 
that they are relevant.255 
All of these regulations appear to support employer concerns for 
the safety of the handicapped individual's co-workers and the 
general public, but only the Maryland proposed regulations clearly 
permit the employer to consider the danger to the handicapped job 
applicant that would result from his employment. There may be 
some question as to whether even this permission can be read so 
broadly as to allow the employer to consider the possible aggrava-
tion of an impairment that could result from job conditions. The 
central issue concerns the extent to which the employer may make a 
health decision for the handicapped job applicant. 
There is some judicial support for the proposition that, despite 
the absence of a statutory provision specifically permitting consider-
ation of the danger to which a handicapped employee would be 
subjected in a job, the employer may impose his judgment and deny 
employment for this reason, even though the handicapped applicant 
is unconcerned about the danger to his health. For example, in 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor,256 in which the issue 
was whether a pre-existing heart condition was related to the 
complainant's ability to work as a heavy appliance salesman, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals held: 
[W]e interpret the Act as providing that an employer may 
refuse to hire an applicant with such a "handicap" where 
there is a reasonable medical possibility that the applicant 
might, because of the extent of disability and the nature of 
the work, be unable to perform the work or could experience 
injury as a result of attempting to perform it.257 
253. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04A(2) (emphasis added). 
254. 41 C.F.R. § 60-74l.6(c)(2). See also id. § 60-250.6(c)(2). 
255. For example, in discussing pre-employment inquiries in his analysis of the HEW 
regulations, the Secretary stated: 
[EJmployers may make inquiries about an applicant's ability to perform 
a job safely. Thus, an employer may not ask if an applicant is an 
epileptic but may ask whether the person can perform a particular job 
without endangering other employees. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
256. 28 Or. App. 747, 561 P.2d 637 (1977). 
257. Id. at 750, 561 P.2d at 639 (emphasis added). 
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Other judicial opinions concerned with this issue have been 
rendered in appeals from administrative agencies heard at the state 
circuit court level. In Washington,258 the circuit courts have taken 
the position that safety hazards to the job applicant and his co-
workers and the possibility of aggravation of a pre-existing 
handicap may be considered in determining whether an individual is 
qualified for the job. In Rhode Island259 and Wisconsin,260 on the 
other hand, the circuit courts generally have refused to consider 
anything other than present ability to do the job. Specifically, the 
Wisconsin circuit courts have held that an employer may not 
consider in employment decisions such factors as the high risk of 
frequent illness and absenteeism typical of a leukemia patient, and 
the resulting probability of higher rates for employer-supplied 
258. In Milwaukee Road v. Washington Human Rights Comm'n, 11 F.E.P. Cas. 854 
(Wash. Super. Ct., King County, 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 
557 P.2d 307 (1976), a Washington county court held that a railroad was not 
required to hire as a brakeman an individual who had undergone surgery on his 
knees, since there was a significant likelihood of further future degenerative 
cllanges in the knees. See Clark v. Milwaukee Road, 12 F.E.P. Cas. 1102, 1104 
(Wash. Super. Ct., Spokane County, 1975) (connected case): 
In determining whether the denial of employment to an allegedly 
handicapped person is discriminatory under the laws of the State of 
Washington, one must look at more than present ability to do the job. 
One must also examine the safety hazard to the applicant and to his co-
workers and any physical deterioration the body of the applicant may 
experience in the future as a result of this job, as compared to a person 
without the alleged handicap. 
259. In Providence Journal Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 13 F.E.P. 
Cas. 168 (R.I. Super Ct., Providence County, 1975), aff'd sub. nom. on other 
grounds, Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116 R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 
(1976), a Rhode Island county court held that the fact that a whiplash injury 
might be aggravated by a desk job was not a defense to a charge of a 
discriminatory refusal to hire an individual with such an injury. 
260. See notes 261-263 infra. But see Milwaukee Road v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., 
Labor & Human Relations, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 937 (Wisconsin Cir. Ct., Dane County, 
1971), aff'd 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974), where the employer's rules 
prohibited individuals with asthma from working in a diesel roundhouse because 
of the fact that the fumes would aggravate the asthmatic condition. The court 
commented: 
Common sense should make an employee hesitate to take or continue in 
work which may cause him injury even if he exercises due care. And if 
the law makes it discrimination to refuse to employ on that ground, even 
if the possibility of injury is not to a reasonable certainty but presents a 
known hazard, it would seem that the law is doing the employee, as well 
as the employer, a great disservice and probably exposing him to harm. 
Id. at 938. The court rejected the employer's defense, however, holding that the 
Wisconsin law permitted the consideration only of present ability to perform the 
job sought and did not permit the consideration of possible hazard to health. Id. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the basis of the lack of 
evidence that the plaintiff was able to efficiently perform the duties of his job. It 
commented, however, that "in fact, there was no medical testimony that, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that [sic] the working conditions were or 
would be in the future hazardous to his health." This statement leaves open the 
question of whether the presence of such evidence would have changed the 
results. 62 Wis. 2d at 399, 215 N.W.2d at 446. 
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insurance,261 or the safety hazard resulting from the possible 
blackout of a diabetic, absent proof that the plaintiff actually created 
such a hazard.262 
To date, there have been no decisions on this issue under Section 
503 of the Rehabilitation Act. The OFCCP summary of backpay 
cases and the facts involved in the administrative complaints issued 
by the agency indicate that OFCCP does not give significant weight 
to employer defenses grounded on the possibility that a handicapped 
individual's condition would be aggravated by a particular job, the 
possibility of increased absenteeism, or the possibility of increased 
insurance costS.263 As Smith v. Olin Chemical Corporation,264 
discussed above, illustrates, however, the federal courts frequently 
have found such defenses sufficient to justify discharges or refusals 
to hire that were alleged to constitute race or sex discrimination.265 
In age discrimination cases, some courts have based holdings that 
age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for a particular 
job on evidence establishing the probability that individuals older 
than the cut-off age, while able to perform the job at the time oftheir 
rejection, would experience future physical degeneration, not readily 
detectable, that would have a detrimental impact on job perfor-
mance.266 The same types of defenses should be accepted in 
handicap discrimination cases. Although employers may not be 
entitled in all cases to paternalistically prevent job applicants and 
employees from taking the risks associated with a particular job, 
substantial proof that there is a probability of increased danger to 
employee health, and a resulting probability of a substantial 
detrimental impact on the business through excessive absenteeism 
261. Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cas. 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). 
262. Fraser Shipyards, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human 
Relations, 13 F.E.P. Cas. 1809 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1976). 
263. See OFCCP BACK PAY CASES SUMMARY, supra note 34. 
264. 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (increased risk of back pain or injury to black with 
"bad back" in laborer position justifies discharge). 
265. E.g., Boyce v. Reynolds Metals Co., 532 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1976) (danger to black 
asthmatic employee held sufficient to justify discharge); Thompson v. Chrysler 
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1317, 1319-20 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (preliminary injunction 
denied to hypertensive employee claiming race and age discrimination because 
"[t]he objective standards which the law establishes in commercial settings must 
yield at times to the frailties of human life. This court cannot approach the 
plaintiffs motion without considering the possible harm to her own health a 
decision in her favor may entail"); Johnson v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 2 
F.E.P. Cas. 668 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (inability of obese female to safely make rounds 
of job site justified discharge). But cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 
n.20 (1977) (noting that "[i]n the usual case, the argument that a particular job is 
too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the 
purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for 
herself," but finding a BFOQ where danger to woman guard in male prison 
resulted in danger to co-workers and inmates). 
266. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. 
Greyhound Lines,. Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., 
Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). 
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or higher insurance rates, should constitute sufficient business 
necessity to justify the exclusion of handicapped individuals from 
jobs involving dangers to which they are peculiarly susceptible. 
A somewhat related question is whether an employer may 
legally decline to hire or retain an individual who refuses to sign a 
waiver of his right to workmen's compensation for on-the-job injuries 
caused or contributed to by a pre-existing disability or injury. Many 
state workmen's compensation statutes permit such waivers for 
"second-injuries."267 If equal employment opportunity laws for the 
handicapped are interpreted to preclude the consideration in 
employment decisions of the probability that an existing disability 
would be aggravated, or would increase the risk of subsequent 
injury, employers may attempt to use "second injury waivers" to 
limit their liability for workmen's compensation. A direct conflict is 
predictable between the workmen's compensation statutes that 
explicitly condone such waivers as an approved means of encourag-
ing the employment of the handicapped,268 and anti-discrimination 
and affirmative action statutes that might be interpreted to prohibit 
such waivers as constituting a discriminatory treatment of the 
handicapped.269 
There may be a similar conflict with various state and federal 
laws and regulations governing employment in certain jobs. For 
example, Maryland health regulations preclude the employment of 
individuals with certain types of infections or communicable 
diseases in some positions in hospitals, or in jobs in industries where 
contact with food or food containers is involved.270 Similarly, 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Control and Enforcement Act of 1970271 by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration272 place a voluntary obligation on 
267. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, §§ 36(1)(b), 51 (1964 & Supp. 1977). 
268. For a discussion of the relationship between second injury funds and employer 
receptiveness to handicapped workers, see Larson, The Role of Subsequent 
Injury Funds in Encouraging Employment of Handicapped Workers, reprinted in 
II SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION LAWS 403 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. Doc. No. 0-521-667, 1973). 
269. For a more detailed discussion of the issue whether differentiation in treatment 
of handicapped individuals under insurance programs constitutes illegal 
discrimination, see Equal Treatment, supra note 28, at 77-89; Hanks, Medical 
Standards for Employment in Relation to Nondiscrimination Laws, 19 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 181 (1977). 
270. See, e.g., X COMAR § 10.02.04.203 (obstetrical service personnel in general 
hospitals must be free of communicable disease, respiratory infections, diarrhea, 
and skin lesions), § 10.03.15.30 (employees in contact with food in eating or 
drinking establishments must be free of communicable disease, boils, infected 
wounds and acute respiratory infections) § 10.03.18.582 (employees in contact 
with milk or milk products in milk processing or distribution plants may not 
have or be suspected of having communicable disease). 
271. 21 U.S.C. § 801(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
272. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.90 to .93 (1977). The regulations include among the 
suggested inquiries the following: "In the past three years, have you knowingly 
used narcotics, amphetamines or barbituates, other than those prescribed to you 
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employers who manufacture or distribute "controlled substances" to 
implement a standard screening procedure for employees who will 
have access to controlled substances.273 In addition, standards 
promulgated pursuant to the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Act274 by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration275 
mandate that certain types of protective apparatus be used or worn 
in dangerous job situations. In some cases, however, the protective 
apparatus may pose an even greater danger than the existing job 
situation to handicapped employees.276 
It would seem that compliance with such laws and regulations 
would constitute sufficient "business necessity" to justify a determi-
nation that a handicap is "job-related."277 When the law or 
regulation is designed to ensure public safety or the safety of co-
workers, there is little room for argument. When the law is one that 
originally was designed merely to encourage employment of the 
handicapped, however, such as the "second-injury" waiver provision 
discussed above, the question is much closer. In their relationship to 
the Rehabilitation Act, such laws may be analogized to state 
protective legislation for women that, in some cases, was struck 
down because of conflict with Title VII.278 The continued validity of 
by a physician? If the answer is yes, furnish details." Some of the inquiries, 
which would otherwise have appeared to violate the pre-employment selection 
guidelines then in effect at the EEOC were accepted by that agency as necessary 
for business if limited to individuals applying for positions that clearly had 
access to controlled substance. See 40 Fed. Reg. 17142, 17143 (1975). Although the 
regulations are not mandatory, while the HEW regulations regarding pre-
employment inquiries are, it would appear that the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's statement that the need to know the information requested is a 
matter of "business necessity, essential to overall controlled substances 
security," see 21 C.F.R. at § 1301.90, should be acceptable to HEW. 
273. The "controlled substances" restricted by the Act are defined at 21 U.S.C. § 812 
(Supp. V 1975). 
274. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970). 
275. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132-140 (1976). 
276. The OSHA standards provide, for example, that persons should not be assigned 
to tasks requiring use of respirators unless they are physically able to work and 
use the equipment. 29 C.F.R. § 191O.134(b)(1O) (1976). Thus, persons with asthma, 
who sometimes find it difficult to use respirators, would effectively be precluded 
from many production jobs in certain industries, e.g., pesticide production, coal 
mining, and coke-producing. It is often difficult, moreover, for persons wearing 
glasses to obtain a proper fit with a respirator, and contact lenses may not be 
worn. Id. § 1910.134(e)(5)(ii). . 
277. But cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1O(a), which provides: 
The obligation to comply with this part is not obviated or alleviated by 
the existence of any state or local law or other requirement that, on the 
basis of handicap, imposes prohibitions or limits upon the eligibility of 
qualified handicapped persons to .. . practice any occupation or 
profession. 
278. For a discussion of the cases on this point, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 299-305 (1976). Although not necessarily 
protective of the handicapped, second injury laws were designed to encourage 
their employment, at a time when there were few laws prohibiting employment 
discrimination, by alleviating the employers' fears of increased liability under 
Workmen's Compensation laws. Some recent studies have cast doubt on the 
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second injury provisions therefore likewise may be called into 
question, or the application of such provisions narrowed.279 
Another difficult· problem will probably arise in attempts to 
distinguish between those "unqualified". handicapped employees to 
whom subminimum wages may be paid in certain circumstances 
permitted by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act,280 and those 
"qualified" handicapped individuals for whom such differentiation 
in compensation is prohibited under the more recent equal employ-
ment opportunity laws for the handicapped.281 The onus will be on 
the Department of Labor to resolve this issue, however, since 
subminimum wages may be paid to the handicapped only upon 
issuance of a certificate of approval from the Department. 282 
2. Methods For Ascertaining Whether A Handicapped 
Indiui~ual Is ((Qualified" 
Even if job criteria comport with the "job-relatedness" and 
"business necessity" tests, the methods used to ascertain whether 
applicants for employment meet these criteria may violate handicap 
discrimination and affirmative action laws. These laws and the 
implementing regulations curtail the extent to which pre-
employment inquiries as to existing mental or physical condition 
and pre-employment physical examinations and other tests may be 
used to ensure that employees are qualified. 
OFCCP permits government contractors to conduct comprehen-
sive pre-employment physical examinations, but the results of such 
examinations must be used in accordance with the regulations 
requiring that all standards for employment be job-related, and must 
validity of such fears. See, e.g., VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, BALTIMORE 
REGIONAL OFFICE, COUNSELING AND REHABILITATION SECTION, A GUIDE TO THE 
HANDICAPPED WORKER - FACTS, MYTHS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 5 (1977). 
279. In some cases, however, the individual who is requested to waive the right to 
workmen's compensation for a "second injury" in fact may not be handicapped 
and entitled to the protection of anti-discrimination laws. For example, the pre-
existing disability may not limit the individual's "major life activities." 
280. Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (Supp. V 1975), 
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue special certificates to employees 
permitting the payment of subminimum wages to workers whose earning or 
productive capacity is impaired by physical or mental deficiency. The regula-
tions implementing this provision are set forth at 29 C.F.R. pts. 524, 525 (1976). 
281. Inasmuch as the subminimum wage provisions are applicable only to those 
individuals who cannot perform at normal productivity standards, see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 524.2(a), .2(b), .5 (1976), such individuals would appear to fall outside the 
definition of a "qualified handicapped individual" to whom the Rehabilitation 
Act pertains. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(K)(1). The OFCCP 
regulations permit the government contractor to contract with "sheltered 
workshops" (which may be established under the Fair Labor Standards Act in 
order to facilitate the training and employment of the handicapped at less than 
the minimum wage) to obtain handicapped employees, but stipulate that the use 
of employees from "sheltered workshops" does not relieve the government 
contractor from his other obligations to the handicapped. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(j) 
(1977). 
282. See 29 U.S.C. 214(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
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be kept confidentiaJ.283 OFCCP also permits the employer who needs 
a determination of whether an applicant or employee is handi-
capped to require the individual to undergo a special medical 
examination at the employer's expense, or, alternatively, to require 
the individual to provide medical documentation of his impair-
ment. 284 
While OFCCP does not directly prohibit government contractors 
from making inquiries concerning a job applicant's or an employee's 
physical or mental condition,285 some restrictions on these inquiries 
are implied in the regulation requiring the contractor to invite all 
handicapped job applicants and employees to identify themselves 
and take advantage of the contractor's affirmative action pro-
gram.286 The invitation must state that information as to handi-
capped status is requested only on a voluntary basis, that refusal to 
provide it will not subject the employee to any adverse treatment, 
and that the information will be used only in accordance with the 
contractor's obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. Information 
obtained in any inquiry into handicapped status, like physical 
examination results, must be kept confidential. 
The HEW regulations issued to implement Section 504 of the Act 
are somewhat at variance and are more specific in some respects 
than the OFCCP regulations. Although the recipient of federal 
financial assistance, like the federal contractor, is prohibited from 
using any employment tests or other selection criterion that tend to 
screen out handicapped persons unless such tests are job-related, the 
federal aid recipient also is prohibited from using even job-related 
tests, if alternative job-related criteria that screen out fewer 
283. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(c)(3), 250.6(c)(3) (1977). The confidentiality requirements are 
as follows: 
[I]nformation obtained in response to such ... examination[s] shall be 
kept confidential except that: 
(i) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding 
restrictions on the work or duties of handicapped individuals 
and regarding accommodations; and 
(ii) First aid and safety personnel may be informed, where and 
to the extent appropriate, if the condition might require 
emergency treatment; and 
(iii) Government officials investigating compliance with the Act 
shall be informed. 
284. Id. § 60-741.7(b), (c), (d). See id. § 60-250.7. 
The distinction between 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) and § 60-741.7 appears to be 
that the former section deals with pre-employment physicals required of all 
employees. while the latter deals with an employer's need for physical 
information relating to a particular individual who may not have been subjected 
to a pre-employment physical but who the employer suspects may be unqualified 
for a job because of a disability. In the former case there is no express 
requirement in the regulations that the employer pay for the examination, while 
in the latter case the employer is specifically required to undertake the cost. 
285. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(c)(2), 250.6(c)(2) (1977). 
286. Id. §§ 60-741.5(c), 250.5(c). See discussion at note 174 and accompanying text 
supra. 
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handicapped persons are shown by the Director of the Office of the 
Civil Rights of HEW to be available.287 Moreover, the HEW 
regulations provide that any tests used must accurately measure job 
skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor the tests purport to 
measure, rather than merely reflect the handicapped applicant or 
employee's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, except 
where these skills are what the test purports to measure.288 The 
analysis of the HEW regulations notes that, for example: 
[A] person with a speech impediment may be perfectly 
qualified for jobs that do not or need not, with reasonable 
accommodation, require ability to speak clearly. Yet, if given 
an oral test, the person will be unable to perform in a 
satisfactory manner. The test results will not, therefore, 
predict job performance but instead will reflect impaired 
speech.289 
Second, unlike OFCCP, HEW generally prohibits pre-
employment inquiries into whether an applicant is handicapped, or 
the nature and severity of a handicap.290 The employer may, 
however, inquire as to an applicant's ability to perform job-related 
tasks. The distinction is narrow indeed. As an example, the analysis 
states that while an employer may not ask if an applicant is 
epileptic, it may ask whether the applicant can perform a particular 
job without endangering other employees.291 
The only exception to HEW's prohibition on pre-employment 
inquiries into handicapped status occurs when the employer makes 
the inquiries in conjunction with (1) voluntary action to overcome 
past conditions that may have limited the employment of the 
handicapped, (2) the fulfillment of a duty to take remedial action to 
correct discrimination, or (3) the fulfillment of a duty to take 
affirmative action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, if it is 
a government contractor as well as a recipient of federal financial 
assistance.292 Under these circumstances, the employer may invite 
287. 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a). The Executive Order 11,914 regulations are not quite as 
specific. They prohibit only discriminatory employment tests, without mention of 
"job-relatedness," and do not require the 'use of less restrictive tests found by 
HEW to be available. ld. § 85.54. The Secretary's comments to these regulations 
indicate, however, that tests that are not "job-related" are per se discriminatory. 
43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2135 (1978). 
288. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13(b), 85.54. 
289. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977). 
290. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.14(a), 85.55. 
291. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22689 (1977). 
292. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b), 85.55. In its analysis of the more recently adopted Executive 
Order 11,914 regulations, HEW comments that while its regulations may differ on 
this point from those of OFCCP, there is no real inconsistency. According to 
these comments, the HEW regulations require merely that the recipient postpone 
inquiries or examinations directed towards the ascertainment of the nature and 
severity of a handicap until after the employment decision. 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 
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individuals to identify themselves as handicapped if the invitation 
includes the same safeguards required by the OFCCP invitation. 
Neither the OFCCP nor HEW regulations comment upon the fact 
that inquiries into mental or physical condition traditionally are 
included in the medical history forms completed as part of a physical 
examination, which may be required under some circumstances. 
Presumably, however, inquiries essential to a thorough medical 
examination are not unlawfu1.293 
HEW differs from OFCCP on a third point. Under the HEW 
regulations, employers may condition an offer of employment on the 
results of a medical examination conducted prior to the employee's 
commencement of work only if the examination is given to all 
entering employees regardless of handicap.294 In addition, as under 
the OFCCP regulations, the results of such examinations must be 
used in accordance with the employer's obligations under the 
regulations and must be kept confidentia}.295 Thus, the HEW 
regulations start out with a broad prohibition on pre-employment 
inquiries or medical examinations directed towards the asc,ertain-
ment of handicapped status, but create exceptions to this general 
rule, while the OFCCP regulations contain no such broad prohibi-
tion. 
2135 (1978). Thus, there does not appear to be a limitation on post-employment 
inquiries. The restrictions on the use of information obtained from such 
inquiries, and the requirement that such information be kept confidential, would 
be applicable whenever they are made, however. 
293. The job applicant is under an obligation to respond truthfully to all lawful and 
relevant pre-employment inquiries, and proof that an applicant accepted for 
employment has lied on application forms may constitute just cause for 
discharge. The discharge of individuals for falsification of employment records 
has been upheld against claims that the discharge was unlawfully discrimina-
tory. See, e.g.,Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v_ NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(finding no discrimination on basis of union activism). 
294. 45 C.F_R. §§ 84.14(c), (d), 85.55. The proposed § 504 regulations of the SBA flatly 
prohibit pre-employment physical examination unless the recipient is taking 
remedial voluntary or affirmative action to hire the handicapped. 13 C.F.R. 
§ 113.3(b)(2). 
295. The discussion of pre-employment physicals in the comments to the Executive 
Order 11,914 regulations strongly suggests that HEW permits physicals only 
after an offer of employment has been made, and that the offer may be 
conditioned on nothing other than successful completion of the physical. In other 
words, any reference checks or skill tests should be conducted prior to the offer of 
employment, if the employer intends to condition the offer on the physicaL exam. 
43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2135 (1978). The comments to the OFCCP regulations are 
rather sparse, and contain no indication as to whether OFCCP contemplates 
such a strict rule. This restriction serves to box the employer into an employment 
decision based solely on physical condition, so that any claims of discrimination 
by individuals rejected after a pre-employment physical could not be defended on 
the ground that the applicant was unqualified for some reason other than 
physical condition. 
Although the HEW regulations state that pre-employment physicals may not 
be given unless all entering employees are subjected to a physical, employers 
who give such physicals only to entering employees in certain departments 
probably would not be held in violation if there is a business justification for the 
differentiation. 
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The Maryland proposed regulations clearly contemplate the use 
of pre-employment physical examinations and employment tests, but 
likewise indicate that such devices should be directed towards 
determining whether an applicant for a job meets certain criteria -
whether he has the physical and mental ability to perform the duties 
of the position, is professionally competent or has the necessary 
skills and ability to become professionally competent to perform the 
job, has compensated for his limitation through prosthesis or 
rehabilitation training, and, as mentioned above, whether he can do 
the work without adverse consequences to himself or others.296 Like 
the HEW regulations, the Maryland proposed regulations impose on 
employers the duty to provide handicapped job applicants with the 
opportunity to demonstrate their ability through testing methods 
adapted to their handicap.297 Otherwise, the Maryland proposed 
regulations do not comment upon pre-employment inquiries. In this 
connection, however, employers should recognize that a specific 
provision in the Maryland Allnotated Code prohibits them from 
requiring a job applicant to answer a question "written or oral, 
pertaining to any physical, psychiatric or psychological illness, 
disability, handicap or treatment which does not bear a direct, 
material and timely relationship to the applicant's fitness or 
capacity to properly perform the activities or responsibilities of the 
desired position."298 
Those employers who give pre-employment physical examina-
tions will no doubt be concerned about the extent to which they are 
entitled to rely upon the opinion of a company doctor or the 
physician to whom they refer job applicants for pre-employment 
physicals. Initially, it should be recognized that the physician 
cannot make "job-related" employment judgments in a vacuum. If 
the physician is effectively making the employment decision to reject 
job applicants on the -basis of physical problems, the regulations 
mentioned above require that he be provided with sufficient 
information to ascertain the job-relatedness of a particular impair-
ment, such as job functions like weight lifting and other physical 
effort requirements; exposure to conditions, such as noise, heat, 
fumes, airborne particles, and various chemicals; and potential 
hazards, such as whether the job involves work at great heights, in 
close proximity to heavy machinery, or with dangerous tools. If, on 
296. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04A. 
297. Id. § 14.03.04B(2)(d). 
298. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95A (Supp. 1977), as amended by Law of April, 1978, 
ch. 470, 1978 Md. Laws _ (Senate Bill 518; amendment effective July 1, 1978). 
The provision does not, however, prohibit medical evaluation by a physician for 
the purpose of assessing an applicant's ability to perform the job. 
The Division of Labor and Industry of the Maryland Department of 
Licensing and Regulation has taken the position that open-ended questions such 
as "Have you ever been treated for alcoholism or delerium tremors?" or "Have 
you ever been hospitalized?" would violate the provision. Letter from Harvey A. 
Epstein, Commissioner, Division of Labor and Industry, to Maryland State 
Chamber of Commerce (Dec. 29, 1976). 
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the other hand, the physician merely provides the company's 
employment office with a list of physical restrictions for each job 
applicant, and does not make the decision to accept or reject, he need 
not be provided with such detailed job information. 
Regardless of the type of input that the physician has into 
employment decisions, however, the question remains whether the 
employer is entitled to rely on the opinion of its doctor that a job 
applicant has physical limitations on his capacity to do work, or 
whether it must also consider an opinion submitted by the 
handicapped individual's personal physician. Only one handicap 
discrimination case has specifically dealt with this issue. In 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Bureau of Labor,299 the Oregon Court of 
Appeals was confronted with medical opinions by both the 
complainant's physician and the company doctor differing on 
whether the complainant was able to perform the work of a heavy 
appliance salesman without serious risk of a heart attack. The court 
ruled that the question before it was not which of the doctors' 
opinions was more persuasive. The proper rule, it held, was: 
[W]here an employer requires a job applicant to undergo a 
medical examination by a licensed physician, and the 
physician renders a reasonable and good-faith opinion that 
the applicant's condition is not compatible with the 
projected employment, the employer should not be held in 
violation of the Act-for rejecting the applicant in reasonable 
and good-faith reliance on the advice of the physician.300 
This interpretation of the standard against which an employer's 
decision to reject an employee for medical reasons should be 
measured is manifestly appropriate. The problems encountered by 
the judicial system in dealing with the widely differing views of 
physicians on almost every medical problem called into question in 
medical malpractice litigation, amply illustrate the difficulties 
involved in considering the opinions of more than one physician. 
This interpretation also would be consistent with the great weight of 
authority in arbitration decisions. Absent a collective bargaining 
provision to the contrary, most arbitrators do not set aside company 
299. 28 Or. App. 747, 561 P.2d 637 (1977). 
300. Id. at 750, 561 P:2d at 639-40. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 
1977), indicates that a defendant's reliance on a medical opinion is entitled to 
some deference under § 504 as well. The court refused to grant a preliminary 
injunction under § 504 to children who had been denied participation in contact 
sports, since the defendant had relied on the opinion of a school physician that 
the children, who were sighted in only one eye, would run a high risk of eye 
injury. The plaintiffs had come forward with little evidence to the contrary, and 
the court ruled that there was insufficient likelihood of success on the merits of 
plaintiffs' contention that they were "otherwise qualified" under § 504 to warrant 
a preliminary injunction. 
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decisions made in good faith reliance on medical advice from 
company doctors.301 
3. Summary 
As shown by the above discussion, there remains considerable 
legal uncertainty regarding the proof that will be required to 
validate a physical requirement for employment as "job-related," 
and regarding the "business necessity" sufficient to justify the 
rejection of handicapped individuals who have the present ability to 
perform the job sought. It is clear, however, that one of the major 
purposes of the laws mandating equal employment opportunity for 
the handicapped is to ensure that members of this new minority are 
not excluded from employment on the basis of their handicaps, 
unless the adequate performance of a given job necessitates that 
applicants pass muster under the physical and mental standards 
being imposed. Thus, employment decisions made on the basis of 
anything other than present ability adequately to perform the job 
without risk to co-workers and the public are subject to attack. 
Experience may well temper the current negative attitude of 
administrative agencies towards the consideration of factors such as 
the medically significant probability that an individual's existing 
disability will be aggravated or will subject him to a greater risk of 
injury in the job sought. More credence may be given to such 
justifications when employers establish that the employment of 
individuals with specific disabilities in certain jobs not only 
increases the business' risk of liability for injury, thus deferring 
resources that might otherwise be used to increase production, but 
also increases the risk that handicapped individuals will, because of 
illness or injury, lose the independence that equal employment 
opportunity laws are designed to help them obtain. 
The methods an employer uses to ascertain the qualifications of 
handicapped individuals thus far have received less attention from 
the federal agencies than the job standards themselves, in part 
because OFCCP has concentrated its efforts on handling individual 
discrimination complaints. Such individual complaints u~ually 
involve a challenge to the validity of the employer's qualifications 
rather than a challenge to the procedure by which one's "qualified" 
status is ascertained. Recently, however, OFCCP has shifted its 
focus and indicated that it will begin to undertake compliance 
reviews of affirmative action programs for the handicapped.302 
301. See F. & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 292 (3d ed. 1973). 
Despite the justifications for permitting the employer to proceed on the 
advice of its doctor, OFCCP and the Maryland Commission on Human Relations 
consistently permit the complainant to submit another medical opinion, and, in 
some cases, base findings of probable cause on the opinion of the complainant's 
physician, even though the company had relied on the opinion of its doctor. 
302. See note 28 supra. 
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Agency auditors can be expected to review closely the pre-
employment inquiries and physical examinations utilized by the 
employer. 
C. THE VALIDITY AND EXTENT OF THE DUTY To 
MAKE "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS" 
As discussed previously, the OFCCP, HEW, and Executive Order 
11,914 regulations require that before a determination can be made 
on whether a particular handicapped individual is qualified for a 
job, the "reasonable accommodations" that could be made for his 
handicap must be considered.303 A similar accommodation obliga-
tion is imposed by the Maryland Commission's proposed guidelines 
on handicap discrimination.304 The validity and effect of this 
"accommodation" duty, as well as the expense and effort it requires, 
have been the subject of controversy and confusion. 
Initially, there is some question of whether an administrative 
agency can enforce such a requirement, in the absence of a specific 
legislative mandate for accommodation. When Congress and state 
legislatures have intended that accommodations be made to the 
needs of a particular minority group, their enactments have so 
stated in no uncertain terms. Until 1972, for example, when 
Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require accommo-
dation to the religious needs of employees,305 the authority of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) to 
impose such a requirement through administrative guidelines had 
been severely questioned. In refusing to rehear its decision in Dewey 
v. Reynolds Metals Company306 that the employer did not violate the 
303. The duty initially arises out 'If the definition of a "qualified handicapped 
individual," that is, one who can perform the tasks required "with reasonable 
accommodation." See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k); 85.32(a). 
The nature of the accommodation duty is spelled out in more detail elsewhere in 
the regulations. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12; 85.53. The 
same accommodation duty arises under OFCCP's regulations issued pursuant 
to the Veteran's Readjustment Act. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-250.2, .6(d) (1977). 
304. See XVI Co MAR § 14.03.04B. Some state laws include a statutory mandate for 
accommodation, while others specifically prohibit the imposition of any such 
requirement. See note 143 supra. The Maryland statute, however, omits any 
mention of accommodation for the handicapped. 
305. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. 
V 1975). The amendment added a new definition of religion, which had 
previously been among the prohibited bases of discrimination. The new 
definition specifically spells out the duty to accommodate as follows: 
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective 
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on 
the conduct of the employer's business. 
Id. (emphasis added). A similar amendment was added in 1973 to the Maryland 
law. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(0 (Supp. 1977). 
306. 429 F.2d 334, denying reh. of 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afi'd without written 
opinion by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The original Dewey 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating an employee who refused to 
work on his sabbath, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
recognized the absence of any legislative authority for the EEOC 
guidelines, stating: 
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any 
Congressional intent to coerce or compel one person to 
accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of another. 
The requirement of accommodation to religious beliefs is 
contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our 
judgment are not consistent with the Act.307 
The Dewey court further stated that the nondiscrimination duty did 
not include any obligation to make accommodations, commenting 
that "[t]he fundamental error of Dewey and the Amici Curiae is that 
they eql!ate religious discrimination with failure to accommodate. 
We submit these two concepts are entirely different."308 
Since neither the Rehabilitation Act, nor the provisions of 
Article 49B of the Maryland Annotated Code, impose upon 
employers any specific duty to accommodate the needs of the 
handicapped, it would appear that the administrative agencies 
attempting to impose such a duty have erred in the same direction as 
the EEOC in 1967. OFCCP, however, could argue to the contrary 
that Section 503's requirement of affirmative action includes a duty 
to accommodate the handicapped. Under the authority vested in it 
by Executive Order 11,246, which similarly requires government 
contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment members of religious minorities,309 OFCCP has required 
such contractors to make reasonable accommodations for the 
religious needs of employees since 1973.310 Congress, so the 
argument would go, contemplated accommodations to the handi-
capped as a means of fulfilling the affirmative action obligation it 
imposed subsequently under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.311 
decision rested, not on the questionable validity of the EEOC guidelines, but on 
the rulings, inter alia, that the employer had in fact made reasonable 
accommodations and that the alleged discriminatory conduct had occurred prior 
to the promulgation of the guideline. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977). 
307. 429 F.2d at 334. 
308. Id. at 335. The legislative history of the subsequent 1972 amendment that 
incorporated the accommodation duty reveals Congress' recognition of the need 
to provide a statutory basis for the duty: "The purpose of this subsection is to 
provide the statutory basis for EEOC to formulate guidelines on discrimination 
because of religion such as those challenged in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co." 
118 Congo Rev. 7167 (1972). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. V. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63, 76 n.ll (1977), the Supreme Court viewed the subsequent amendment as a 
ratification of the guideline justifying its application to pre-1972 conduct. 
309. See note 23 supra. 
310. See 38 Fed. Reg. 1933 (Jan. 19, 1973), codified as 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.3 (1977). 
311. There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act to 
indicate, however, that Congress was aware that the Department of Labor 
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With respect to Section 504, the argument can be made that, 
notwithstanding Dewey, the nondiscrimination mandate of this 
section also connotes affirmative rights that suggest, though 
perhaps to a lesser degree, an accommodation duty.312 The Secretary 
of HEW has justified the accommodation duty on the grounds that 
the unique characteristic of the handicapped minority will, in many 
cases, make equal treatment discriminatory.313 
It must be remembered, however, that under both Sections 503 
and 504, no duty arises except with respect to "qualified" or 
previously had required accommodations for religion under an affirmative action 
mandate. The only support of the accommodation duty is a letter, attached as an 
appendix to the Senate Report on the 1974 amendments to the Act, to the 
Secretary of Labor from Senators Williams, Cranston, Randolph and Stafford, 
questioning the nature of the extenuating factors listed as grounds for mitigating 
the accommodation duty in the Department of Labor's initial regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Section 503. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Congo 2d Sess., 
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6373, 6427-31. 
312. Cf. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 538 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1975) (Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 established affirmative rights which could be vindicated by a private 
cause of action). But cf. Snowdon v. Birmingham-Jefferson Co. Trans. Auth., 407 
F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (no violation of 
§ 504 in failure of mass transit authority to provide means of access to public 
buses to those confined to wheelchairs when special efforts had been made to aid 
handicapped persons other than those confined to wheelchairs, and when 
modern technology had not progressed to point of doing any more). 
313. See 42 Fed. Reg. ·22676 (1977).- The argument is that merely 'providing 
handicapped individuals with the opportunity to participate in federally 
financed programs is meaningless if there is no way they can take advantage of 
the opportunity unless special arrangements are made. Cf. Lau V. Nichols, 414 
U.S. 563 (1974) (under nondiscrimination mandate of Title VI of Civil Rights Act, 
school board required to provide educational accommodations for non-english 
speaking students). While there may be some merit to such an argument in the 
context of federal programs that provide benefits and certain entitlements for 
participants, it has no relevance to employment, which is only a by-product of 
most federal programs. There is no entitlement or right to federally financed 
employment. See Murgia V. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
The possibility of a' reverse discrimination suit resulting from affirmative 
action for or accommodations to the handicapped is remote under the current 
status of the law. The handicapped constitute a unique classification in that 
there is no obvious correlative class protected by any law, other than the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution, that can challenge affirmative action for 
the handicapped as discriminatory. Where laws prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, age, religion or national origin, on the other hand, individuals 
of one race, for example, may contend that affirmative action for persons of 
another race results in discrimination against the first group. Under most state 
laws, however, discrimination is prohibited not with respect to physical or 
mental condition, but on the basis of a handicap or disability. One therefore 
must be handicapped or disabled to be protected. Likewise, § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against otherwise qualified handi-
capped individuals. Thus, in the absence of any indications from the Supreme 
Court that it will uphold a constitutional challenge to the imposition of an 
affirmative action duty in the absence of a finding of discrimination, cf. Bakke v. 
Board of Regents, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. 
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (1977), argued Oct. 12, or the unusual situation where 
affirmative action for the handicapped violates the rights of another protected 
minority, it is unlikely that a challenge to the validity of the accommodation 
duty would be raised by anyone other than the employer on whom it is imposed. 
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"otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals. The term "qualified" 
ordinarily implies the absence of a need for any special accommoda-
tion. Its use of this terminology is yet another indication that 
Congress. intended only to eliminate employment practices that 
exclude handicapped individuals who are fully capable of perform-
ing the employment sought. It therefore appears that both OFCCP 
and HEW have committed an error in logic by imposing upon 
employers the duty to make reasonable accommodations for 
handicapped individuals who might in fact be "unqualified," and 
not entitled to the protection of the Act, were it not for such 
accommodations.314 
NotwithstandIng their arguable lack of authority to impose such 
a duty, it is clear that HEW, OFCCP, and the Maryland Commission 
on Human Relations have deemed "accommodation" a proper means 
for achieving nondiscrimination and affirmative action for the 
handicapped, and that efforts to accommodate the needs of a 
handicapped individual must be made prior to a determination that 
the individual is not qualified for a particular job. Under the 
OFCCP, HEW, Executive Order 11,914, and Maryland proposed 
regulations, an employer must make such "reasonable accommoda-
tions" unless it can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the conduct of its business.315 
The OFCCP regulations state that, in determining the extent of 
a contractor's accommodation obligation, factors such as business 
necessity and financial costs and expenses may be considered.316 
While the Executive Order 11,914 regulations provide no explication 
of the extent of the accommodation duty, the HEW regulations state 
314. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (where in detailing the reasonable accommodation 
duty, HEW states that the duty arises only with respect to the "known" 
limitations of "otherwise qualified" [see note 44 supra] handicapped individuals) 
with id. § 84.3(k) (where a qualified handicapped individual is defined as one who 
can perform essential functions of the job "with reasonable accommodations"). 
Compare id. § 85.53 with id. § 85.32, and compare 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977) 
(requiring that reasonable accommodation be made "to the physical or mental 
limitations of an employee" with id. § 60-741.2 (where OFCCP defines a qualified 
handicapped person as "one who can do a job with reasonable accommoda· 
tions"). 
315. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(d), -250.6(d) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12, 85.53; XVI 
COMAR § 14.03.03(b)(1). 
316. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1977). An earlier version of the OFCCP regulations 
included "resulting personnel problems," but this factor was later deleted as 
"confusing and misleading." See 41 Fed. Reg. 16147, 16148 (1976). The earlier 
version also listed various types of accommodations that might be requi'red, 
including "providing access to the job, job restructuring, acquisition or 
modification of equipment or devices." Job restructuring was defined to include 
"realignment of duties, revision of job descriptions or modified and part·time 
work schedules." 40 Fed. Reg. 39887, 39889, at proposed § 60-741.5(c)(l) (1975). 
These examples were deleted when the requirement that contractors provide 
examples of proposed accommodations in their affirmative action program was 
dropped, see 41 Fed. Reg. 16147, 16148 (1976), but nevertheless are indicative of 
the type of accommodations OFCCP may expect. 
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that the following factors can be considered in assessing whether a 
particular accommodation would constitute an "undue hardship" on 
a federally assisted program: 
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with 
respect to number of employees, number and type of 
facilities, and size of budget; 
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the 
composition and structure of the recipient's workforce; and 
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.317 
The comments of the Secretary of HEW accompanying these 
regulations further indicate that these factors will be measured in 
relative terms and that greater efforts probably will be required of 
larger establishments, in view of the larger number of handicapped 
individuals affected. 318 
The HEW regulations also set forth some examples of the types 
of accommodations that may be expected, such as job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work scheduling, providing readers or 
interpreters, and making facilities readily accessible to and usable 
by handicapped persons.319 In a separate subpart of the regulations, 
entitled "program accessibility," HEW mandates that recipients 
make all programs or activities accessible to the handicapped within 
60 days of the effective date of the regulations, June 3, 1977, except 
where structural changes to existing facilities would be necessary. If 
the latter is the case,- the recipient must develop within six months of 
the effective date of the regulations a transition plan detailing the 
changes required and must complete the changes within three 
years.3aJ Although not directly related to the employment aspects of 
the regulations, these requirements clearly are indicative of the 
intent behind the regulatory statement that "reasonable accommo-
dations" to handicapped employees include making facilities readily 
accessible to and usable by them. 
The Maryland Commission's proposed regulations include a 
similarly broad accommodation duty. Like the federal agencies, the 
Maryland Commission has stipulated that business necessity may 
be considered in determining whether a particular accommodation 
imposes an undue hardship on a business.321 The proposed 
regulations also set forth a listing of the types of accommodations 
317. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c). 
318. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22688 (1977). 
319. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1(b). 
320. See id. §§ 84.21 to .22, 85.56 to .57. New facilities and alterations also must be 
designed for accessibility by the handicapped. Id. §§ 84.23, 85.58. 
321. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04B(I). 
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that are contemplated in employment, including probationary trial 
periods in employment for entry-level psoitions, and occupational 
training and re-training programs, such as guidance programs, 
apprentice training programs, and executive training programs.322 
The Commission's proposed regulations indicate that the 
reasonable accommodation duty may require the employer to 
facilitate access by handicapped employees to its work, toilet, eating, 
resting, and recreational facilities. The employer may be required to 
provide ramps for mobility-handicapped individuals, extra wide 
doorways and corridors to provide passage for persons in wheel-
chairs and on crutches, and handrails in restrooms. Further required 
accommodations may include the installation of public telephones, 
water fountains, elevator buttons, and other amenities at a height 
that is reasonably accessible to persons in wheelchairs, and the 
waiver of any no-pet requirements to permit the use of seeing eye 
dogs.323 
Under all of the above-mentioned regulations, the employer has 
the burden to demonstrate that a particular accommodation for the 
handicapped constitutes an undue hardship. The decisions rendered 
to date in cases involving violations of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and of state fair employment practice laws 
indicate that this burden may be onerous. For example, in Barnes v. 
Conve~se Coliege,324 a South Carolina federal district court recently 
granted a preliminary injunction sought under Section 504 to compel 
the college to provide and compensate a sign language interpreter 
for a deaf student. Although the court found "obvious inequities" in 
the imposition of such a requirement on the college,325 it deemed 
itself bound to enforce a Section 504 regulation that required the 
provision of auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory 
skills.326 Section 84.12(b) of the HEW regulations, which sets forth 
the reasonable accommodation duty for employers, likewise man-
dates, among other things, the provision of interpreters and readers 
for handicapped employees. It appears, then, that under Section 504 
at least, the accommodation duty may require significant expendi-
322. Id. § 14.03.0413(2). 
323. Id. § 14.03.04H. 
324. 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). See Crawford v. Univ. of North Carolina, 440 F. 
Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977). Cf, Davis v. Southeastern Community College, No. 
77-1237 (4th Cir., filed March 28, 1978), reu'g, 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976) 
(instructing court on remand to review applicability of Section 504 regulations 
requiring modifications in academic program to plaintiff who had been denied 
admission to nursing training program due to hearing impairment, noting that 
"precedent supports the requirement of affirmative conduct on the part of certain 
entities under § 504, even when such modifications become expensive.") [d., slip 
op. at 11. 
325. 436 F. Supp. at 638-39. 
326. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d). 
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tures to provide special privileges for handicapped beneficiaries or 
employees of federally assisted programs.327 
Some decisions rendered by state courts in interpreting fair 
employment practice statutes indicate that employers also may be 
required to change employment practices in order to accommodate 
the handicapped - to the possible detriment of other employees. For 
example, in Holland v. Boeing Company,328 a Washington county 
superior court held that the Boeing Company illegally discriminated 
against a plaintiff who suffered from cerebral palsy by transferring 
him, during a reduction in force, to a job that he could not 
adequately perform because of his disability. The plaintiffs 
inadequacy in his new job resulted in poor evaluations, culminating 
in his rejection for a better position and his eventual downgrading. 
The court mentioned several options that should have been 
considered by the defendant as alternatives to the transfer of the 
plaintiff. Another able-bodied person could have been transferred to 
the job, and, if further reductions had occurred, the plaintiff could 
have been transferred to open jobs in other departments that later 
were filled by other workers: he could have been laterally transferred 
to a suitable job under the company's collective bargaining 
agreement; other able-bodied employees could have been transferred 
to other jobs, leaving open positions that the plaintiff could fill; a 
surplus could have been declared within the plaintiffs classification 
with the result that layoffs would have taken place in order of 
seniority so that the plaintiffs relative seniority would have 
protected his job; finally, the company's past practice of creating 
jobs for individuals in some types of circumstances could have been 
applied in this case.329 In short, the court saw in the plaintiffs well-
documented presentation of alternatives a variety of means by 
which the defendant. could have accommodated the handicapped 
individual, including alternatives that could have been exercised 
only at the expense of other employees. 
The case further indicates, as do the HEW and Maryland 
proposed regulations, that an individual need not be capable of 
327. There are some indications to the contrary. In a recent public statement, David 
S. Tatel, Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, commented, for example, that 
despite the fears of college administrators that all buildings must be made 
accessible in three years pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.21- .23, the intent of HEW is 
to require merely that programs be made accessible, which would involve 
structural changes in some, but not all, buildings. See Statement by David Tatel, 
Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, 1977 (available from HEW's Office for Civil Rights). 
A new bill, introduced in the House on November 18, 1977 by Rep. Jeffords, 
would authorize grants to states to fund studies regarding the costs of 
compliance with § 504; require the Secretary of HEW to report to the Congress on 
such studies; and authorize grants to pay the cost of removing architectural, 
communications and attitudinal barriers in order to comply with § 504. See H.R. 
10,100, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
328. 12 F.E.P. Cas. 975 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County 1976). 
329. Id. at 978. 
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performing all jobs in a promotion or seniority sequence, or even all 
the tasks involved in a particular job, in order to be deemed 
"qualified". Although the OFCCP regulations do not comment on 
this point, the HEW regulations specifically state that an individual 
need be capable only of performing "essential" job functions,330 and 
the Maryland proposed regulations suggest the elimination of minor 
job functions as one means of accommodation.33l 
These types of accommodation requirements have not been 
limited to cases involving allegations of statutory violations. Federal 
courts reviewing charges that job standards created constitutionally 
impermissible "irrebutable presumptions" similarly have suggested 
the necessity for reasonable accommodation to the needs of 
handicapped job applicants. One characteristic common to these 
cases is the courts' thorough analysis of the job in question, with a 
view towards determining whether special arrangements could have 
been made for the handicapped individua1.332 For example, the trial 
court opinion in Gurmankin v. Costanzo,333 striking down a school 
board policy excluding blind persons from teaching sighted students, 
mentioned several means by which the special problems incurred by 
blind teachers could be avoided, and indicated the court's opinion 
that the utilization of such alternatives would not impose an undue 
burden on school authorities. Specifically, the court noted that 
problems associated with the use of a black board could be avoided 
by using students to write material on the black board, or by 
utilizing mineographed materials in lieu of the black board; 
problems associated with proctoring exams could be avoided by 
using students or teachers with a free period as exam proctors; the 
blind teacher could use a reader to assist in reviewing student papers 
and educational material; and sighted instead of blind teachers 
could be assigned to playground and lunchroom supervision.334 The 
court further indicated, as do the OFCCP and Maryland proposed 
regulations,335 that handicapped job applicants must be given a fair 
chance to explain how their problem reasonably could be accommo-
dated.336 
Similarly, in Hoffman v. Ohio Youth Commission,337 the district 
court's decision that the case was moot nevertheless was punctuated 
with a point-by-point analysis of the employer's reasons for rejecting 
the blind plaintiffs application as a youth counselor for delinquent 
boys. The court concluded that many of the reasons were related to 
secondary aspects of the job and that alternative means for 
330. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(K)(1); 85.32. 
331. XVI COMAR § 14.03.04B(2)(a). 
332. See note 95 supra. 
333. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aii'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). 
334. ld. at 986. 
335. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c)(1) (1977); XVI COMAR § 14.03.04(B)(3)(g). 
336. 411 F. Supp. 982, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aii'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). 
337. 13 F.E.P. Cas. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 
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overcoming such secondary problems should have been pursued 
prior to the plaintiff's rejection.338 
The initial response of the courts to the notion of reasonable 
accommodation to the needs of the handicapped, whether considered 
pursuant to a constitutional or statutory claim, clearly has been to 
impose rather stringent requirements upon employers. The ripple 
effect of a recent decision by the Supreme Court, rendered in the 
context of the Title VII duty to accommodate the religious needs of 
employees, may curtail this trend to some extent. In Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,339 the Court reversed an Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals holding that TWA had not satisfied its duty to 
accommodate the religious needs of an individual who was 
discharged because he refused to work on Saturday. The court of 
appeals had suggested, first, that TWA should have accommodated 
Hardison's religious beliefs by permitting him to work a four-day 
week, utilizing in his place on the fifth day a supervisor or another 
worker who was assigned to duty elsewhere, even though this might 
have caused other shop functions to suffer. Second, the court of 
appeals stated that TWA could have used other available personnel 
to fill Hardison's job on Saturdays, even though this alternative 
would have necessitated additional premium overtime pay. Third, 
the court held that TWA could have permitted a swap of jobs 
between Hardison and another employee on Hardison's sabbath, 
even though this would have involved a breach of the seniority 
provisions of its union contract. The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that each of these alternatives constituted an "undue 
hardship" for TWA.340 
The Court laid down three basic guidelines for assessing 
whether a particular religious accommodation constituted undue 
hardship. First, the Court ruled that "reasonable accommodation" 
does not require an employer to deny the shift and job preferences of 
some employees in order to accommodate the religious needs of 
others.341 Second, it held that employers were not required by the 
accommodation duty to carve out a special exception to a negotiated 
seniority system in order to help employees meet their religious 
obligations.342 Finally, the Court held that requiring an employer to 
bear more than a de minimis cost to institute an accommodation 
constitutes an undue hardship.343 
Although the TWA decision was rendered in the context of the 
employer's duty imposed by Title VII to make reasonable accommo-
338. Id. at 35. 
339. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
340. Id. at 77. 
341. Id. at 81. See Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(plaintiffs request for a guarantee of no work on Saturday was per se 
unreasonable and granting it would result in an undue hardship). 
342. 432 U.S. at 83. 
343. Id. at 84. 
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dations to the religious needs of employees, the Court did not base its 
decision on first amendment considerations. The majority decision 
concentrated instead on defining the extent of "undue hardship" 
sufficient to alleviate the accommodation duty. It therefore appears 
that the analysis is equally applicable to any statute or agency 
regulation that requires accommodation only where there would be 
no resulting "undue hardship" to the employer on which the 
obligation is imposed. Such is the case, of course, with all of the 
regulations that mandate accommodation to the handicapped. 
Agencies attempting to require accommodations that unduly 
interfere with business operations therefore should be reminded of 
the TWA decision. 
Unfortunately, the controversial accommodation duty is one of 
the least explicated aspects of the equal employment opportunity 
laws for the handicapped. Notwithstanding initial judicial and 
administr.~tive indications as to the breadth of the obligation, which 
portend expensive and disruptive results for business, employers 
have several grounds for challenging, first, the underlying validity 
of the obligation imposed by agency regulations absent a statutory 
mandate, and second, any attempt to require significant interference 
with the rights of other employees or more than a de minimis 
expenditure.344 The employer who seeks to avoid the high costs of 
litigation in this area, however, is well advised for the present to 
make whatever accommodations its business can tolerate and to 
document all accommodations, thereby establishing a record of good 
faith compliance with the law. The best way for an employer to 
defend itself against charges that it has acted unreasonably in 
failing to make a particular accommodation is to present evidence 
that it gave the aggrieved employee the opportunity to suggest 
accommodations, that it gave due consideration to all accommoda-
tions suggested, that it made other reasonable accommodations 
when implementation did not result in undue hardship, and to 
present evidence of documentation of the justification for failure to 
make the accommodations in question. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The gains in status achieved by racial minorities and females 
upon obtaining legislative support for their goal of equal opportunity 
in employment have prompted America's handicapped citizens to 
enlist the aid of Congress and state legislatures to assist in their 
efforts to achieve employment equality. Their efforts have been 
rewarded by statutes requiring federal contractors to take affirma-
344. It has been suggested that any requirement for significant expenditures is also 
challengeable as a taking of private property for public use without just 
compensation, violative of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Epstein & Manson, 
First Questions on the HEW Handicap Regulations, 51 J. AMER. Hasp. Ass'N 57, 
60 (1977). 
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tive action to employ the handicapped, and prohibiting recipients of 
federal financial assistance from discriminating against this group, 
by protective legislation in most states, and by judicial receptiveness 
to discrimination claims asserted under constitutional doctrines or 
the Reconstruction Era civil rights acts. 
As occurred under statutes protecting the job rights of other 
minorities, the administrative agencies charged with enforcement of 
the recently-enacted employment opportunity laws for the handi-
capped have construed their mandates broadly and have imposed 
onerous standards for compliance. Since the surge in litigation that 
usually results from the recognition of minority rights has not yet 
had time to fully develop, there has been no significant guidance 
from the courts on substantive problems such as the scope of the 
class of individuals who can be characterized as "handicapped" 
within the meaning of the law, the factors that may be considered in 
ascertaining whether these individuals are "qualified" for a 
particular job and the standards for proof of that fact, or the validity 
and extent of the administratively imposed duty to make "reasona-
ble accommodations" for the handicapped. The few scattered cases 
indicate, however, a judicial tendency to approach administrative 
interpretations with the same deference, to apply the same 
standards of proof, and to vocalize the same rationalizations for 
doing so that characterize opinions rendered under laws pertaining 
to the equal employment rights of sexual and racial minorities. 
Yet, as this artiCle has pointed out, there are distinctions 
between the handicapped and the other minorities for whom the 
primers on anti-discrimination law were written. Handicap discrimi-
nation is fostered, not by the invidious motives that resulted in 
discrimination against blacks, females, and immigrants, but by 
myths that advanced medical knowledge has only recently begun to 
dispel, by ignorance as to the effects of a disability, by misconcep-
tions as to the work capacity and needs of the afflicted individual, 
and by benign or compassionate attitudes. Moreover, handi-
capped status is largely a matter of degree, and handicaps take a 
variety of forms, many of which are not as obvious as the badges of 
race, sex, age or national origin, and some of which are the result of 
the victim's own volition. Unlike racial and sexual characteristics, 
physical or mental condition is usually, rather than rarely, related in 
some way to work capacity. Finally, although some severely 
handicapped individuals have been excluded from virtually all 
employment, many individuals with minor or obscure impairments, 
covered under expansive interpretations of the law, have not been 
victimized by pervasive discrimination. While employers may have 
erroneously presumed that the physical or mental condition of these 
individuals precluded adequate performance in one job, the presump-
tion was not carried over to all jobs, so that these individuals have 
not suffered from a general and broad-based deprivation of 
opportunities for employment or for advancement. 
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Although there is a paucity of legislative history from which to 
infer the intent of the drafters, the differences between the structure 
and phraseology of the equal employment laws for the handicapped 
and those protecting other minorities may have resulted from 
cognizance of the characteristics and problems that are peculiar to 
the handicapped minority. Thus, administrative directives to 
employers that effectively preclude consideration of an applicant's 
physical or mental condition in employment decisions, except where 
the employer can establish the necessity for doing so, may exceed 
the authority granted by the statutes, which call only for the 
elimination from consideration of nonjob-related handicaps. The 
former is more costly for employers to accomplish, as well as more 
difficult for agencies to police. Similarly, since most of the laws 
specifically limit the protected class to qualified handicapped 
individuals, the enforcement agencies may have erred in assigning 
proof burdens, and in imposing an obligation to make costly and 
disruptive accommodations for handicapped applicants who other-
wise would not be able to meet performance standards. 
As developments proceed in this area of the law, the courts may 
be persuaded by these legal and factual distinctions to re-evaluate 
the mandates asserted by administrative agencies. Experience under 
other equal employment opportunity statutes has taught that 
inflationary interpretations often hinder, rather than speed imple-
mentation, and that judicial and administrative attitudes become 
more balanced as they perceive this effect. This evolution is 
hastened when enforcement authorities recognize that employers 
have familiarized themselves with the legislative and judicial 
developments, have honestly assessed their attitudes and employ-
ment practices, and have made earnest efforts to comply with the 
spirit of the law. 
